China's challenge to the Western-led international order

Insights from public opinion surveys in 56 countries worldwide

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CEIAS

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Content

Summary and policy recommendations

This paper addresses China's challenges to the current international order. We assess the present stage of competition between the West and China for the "hearts and minds" of people worldwide and provide explanations for why certain audiences find China favourable and want to align with it over the West. To do so, we consult unique new data produced as part of the Sinophone Borderlands project[1] in collaboration with CEIAS. A series of representative online public opinion surveys were conducted in 56 countries between 2020 and 2022, investigating global attitudes toward an array of general international affairs as well as specific China-related issues.[2]

This report will consist of four main parts. First, we will discuss issues related to the current international order and China's challenges to it. This section will also explain how our approach offers new valuable insights into these questions. The second part will show how countries worldwide perceive the leading great powers – the US, China, the EU, and Russia. After presenting the "big picture" from the global perspective, we will discuss situations in specific regions and country groupings, namely the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), Latin America and Africa, China's neighbourhood, and North America, Europe, and US allies and partners. The third part will offer answers to why some audiences find China favourable (and why some do not) by conducting a series of regression analyses of the driving forces behind general attitudes toward China and respondents' willingness to align with Beijing. Finally, the fourth part will narrow in on several country case studies to highlight crucial issues which make certain audiences more favourable to China than others.

To preview the main findings, China is not (so far) winning the global competition for "hearts and minds". Of the 56 surveyed countries, only people in Pakistan, Russia, Serbia, Kazakhstan, and Bangladesh favour China over the West. However, there is a larger group of countries where the public is split, and China (and Russia) get similar average approval ratings to the US and the EU – including Egypt, Tunisia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Greece, Turkey, and Slovakia. Specifically, we have found that normative issues such as political values are the key factors behind perceptions of China in the West. This is not true for the rest of the world, however, where material factors play more important roles, namely assessments of Chinese foreign policy, China's economic importance, and

perceived quality of life in China. We have also identified societal groups within certain countries, including the US, Latvia, Slovakia, Kazakhstan, and Israel, which diverge significantly in their attitudes from the rest of the population. These internal divisions may negatively affect the coherence and stability of foreign policy orientations in these countries and, in some cases, undermine the resilience of the international order.

Overall, our findings suggest that "the West" still enjoys substantially larger appeal among populations worldwide. However, there are divergences from this overall trend, both at the state level and within certain countries. These represent cases in which China (and Russia) have been able to build relatively strong positions. As a result, our findings do not entirely support alarmist claims that the Western-led liberal international order will collapse and be replaced by China's revisionist ambitions. At the same time, the current situation also does not mean that the West's leading position is secure. Indeed, in several places, the appeal of China (and Russia) has essentially caught up with the West and appears to be seen as a valid alternative.

In order to compete, the West should, first of all, understand why China and Russia have succeeded in the "popularity contest" among some audiences and then use lessons gained from such cases to increase the resilience of the liberal international order. Based on our analytical findings, we offer these recommendations on how to do so:

- Western countries should have a reasonable understanding of the trajectories of the competition between the West and its competitors, primarily China (but also Russia). There is no factual basis for the alarmist belief that the Western-led international order is facing an imminent collapse due to China's growing international role. At the same time, complacency about guaranteed Western leadership would also be misplaced and could soon backfire. In other words, Western countries should take China's challenge seriously but should not exaggerate it either.

- Western countries should recognise that domestic stability, government legitimacy, and good governance impact their ability to compete internationally. Growing popular discontent and increasing social tensions can undermine arguments about democracy being a role model to emulate. Political polarisation and the rise of extremist political parties can be particularly problematic, as they could undermine normative features of the current international order (such as liberalism, the rule of law, and human rights) domestically, making the West less capable of competing internationally. Western countries

should ensure that various marginalised groups increase their sense of belonging to the current regimes. Otherwise, they can turn into pockets of resistance from within and even side with external rivals such as China and Russia.

- Similarly, on the international stage, the West should pay more attention to the countries "at the margins," such as those in the Global South or the Western periphery. Many of these countries and their populations nurture long-standing discontent with various features of the current international order. Thus, they may offer promising space for China, Russia, or both to increase their position there as perceived alternatives or simply opponents sharing similar discontentment. This requires that Western countries increase their diplomatic activity and presence worldwide and ensure that their diplomatic conduct does not create a sense of disrespect. Various populations and individuals worldwide should consider themselves as stakeholders of the current international order and feel that it offers them suitable space for achieving their personal ambitions.

China's challenges to the current international order and our study

The current international order was adopted after World War II and was built on ideals such as multilateralism, liberalism, the rule of law, and human rights. Some of the main features of this international order have also been accelerating and deepening globalisation. In terms of power dynamics, it is clear that the liberal international order has been underwritten by the US post-WW II dominance on the international scene, which the broader "West"[3] has benefitted from as well. This reality introduces a certain tension in the foundations of the order, as many have showcased that its liberal characteristics are most pronounced in the advanced Western industrial world, with hierarchical relations remaining dominant in much of the Global South.[4] This has led to discontent among some countries and has helped fuel narratives friendly to alternative powers such as China.

There has been an ongoing discussion about China's relationship with this international order. Some have argued that China has generally respected its norms and rules and can be counted as a status quo power while also being one of the major beneficiaries of its open nature and stability. Others have long pointed out China's authoritarian nature and tensions in its relations with various countries, including the US, claiming China is a revisionist power. Although this debate has not been concluded, since around 2012, China has been increasingly "assertive" in its foreign policy, regularly confronting the US and the West.[5] Meanwhile, the West has also sharpened its stance toward China: the US has made China its key opponent around which all US foreign policy revolves,[6] prompting claims that the US-China relations have entered the stage of a new "cold war."[7] The EU, for its part, has also adjusted its approach. While still calling China a necessary "partner" to engage on global issues, it also acknowledges China to be an economic "competitor" and a "systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance."[8]

It is not our intention to take a position on the debate of whether China is a revisionist or status quo power.[9] However, we will assume that China and the West compete with each other for influence in the international system and that increasing China's influence will, at the very least, challenge the Western leadership of the international order, which has been in place since its beginning in the aftermath of World War II. Moreover, China acts upon

different sets of political norms (stemming from its authoritarian political system), which would likely question the liberal characteristics of the international order. Thus, it is legitimate to assess the competition between China and the West and assume that the growing influence of China and the decreasing influence of the West (if they were to occur) would indeed lead to changes in the international order both in terms of power distribution and its normative features.

Much attention has been paid to the economic and military domains of China's rise. But, as tensions between China and Western countries have grown, ideational factors have also been recognised as highly important.[10] Joseph Nye and his concept of "soft power"[11] have long been the "go-to" way of analysing international competition for the "hearts and minds" of people. Initially, soft power was used as part of the argument for why the US would dominate the international system even as other countries steadily narrowed the gap economically and militarily. The US would allegedly continue to enjoy unparalleled international attractiveness due to its popularly acclaimed culture, political values stemming from the democratic system, and principled foreign policy.

However, China presents a challenge to this vision – both in terms of real-world politics and our analytical ability to understand these dynamics. Despite being authoritarian, China has garnered favourability with various audiences worldwide. As a result, some have claimed that a clearer distinction between democratic and authoritarian countries is needed – namely, that while democracies are attractive due to their free societies, authoritarian countries resort to manipulating foreign audiences to be seen more favourably.[12]

Manipulated or not, the question remains – why do some audiences worldwide see China favourably and prefer to align with it over the West? What are the roles of ideational factors, such as perceptions of political values, culture, and foreign policy, and material factors, such as military and economic power and importance? And how about specific issues such as aid during the Covid-19 pandemic? Is there any relationship between views toward China and the US?

This paper provides answers to these questions and, by doing so, contributes to our understanding of the resilience of the current international order. It assesses the current stage of competition between the West and China for the "hearts and minds" of people worldwide, and it provides explanations for why audiences hold these perceptions. As such, these findings can serve as guidelines for policymakers active in public diplomacy and related areas.

Our assertion that studying global public attitudes toward China (as the leading challenger of the West) yields insights into factors shaping the stability of the current international order is twofold. First, it has been accepted that public opinion plays a role in foreign policy-making in both democratic and authoritarian regimes. Second, public opinion is an indicator of predominant attitudes in a given country – a "barometer" of common sentiments – and thus informs us about the positions a given country is likely to take on relevant issues. As a result, there is a good chance (although not a certainty) that a government policy approach in a given country would be more or less in line with the popular views on China. In light of this, we argue that public opinion plays a role and can inform us about the stability of the international order. Obviously, this is not to deny the roles of other factors, such as military capabilities and economic wealth.

The added value of this paper is the unique dataset consulted to provide new empirical insights into the issues at hand. We draw on data produced as part of the Sinophone Borderlands project in collaboration with CEIAS. A series of representative online public opinion surveys were conducted between 2020 and 2022,[13] investigating global attitudes toward international affairs in general and China, in particular. Altogether, we have surveyed 56 countries worldwide[14] (four of them twice – Germany, Czech Republic, Latvia, and the UK) and have collected responses from more than 80 thousand respondents. We hired reputable market and social research agencies to collect the data, including NMS, Focus, and STEM/MARK, who collaborated with global partners such as Cint, Rakuten, Toluna, and others to collect responses. The research has an ethical statement from the Palacky University Olomouc ethical board and has been conducted according to the ICC/ESOMAR International Code on Market and Social Research.[15]

The survey data we use differs significantly from other available sources (such as Pew Research, Asia Barometer, African Barometer, Eurobarometer, or Americas Barometer) in at least two important ways, allowing us to conduct analyses and reach findings otherwise not possible. First, our list of surveyed countries is much longer and inclusive than any other source, allowing us to investigate truly global attitudes rather than limiting our focus to the developed Western countries (which is the case of most surveys) or selected regions (which is the approach of many 'barometer' projects). Second, our survey included numerous questions about various aspects of China and other countries, unlike most other surveys that are usually limited to general attitudes toward a given country. This allows us to conduct more sophisticated analyses, including regressions, to identify the reasons

behind held perceptions. To our knowledge, our dataset is currently the broadest and most detailed source of global attitudes toward China and its international affairs in general.

We will begin by engaging data on general attitudes toward four great powers – two representing the West (the US and the EU) and China and Russia as the "competitors."[16] We will also provide findings about preferred foreign policy alignment to the four great powers.[17] These two questions will serve as the primary indicators of the surveyed populations' position toward China (and Russia) or the US and the EU (see Annexes 1 and 2 for the data).

Based on our data, we found strong relationships between respondents' favourability toward China and Russia, as well as their overall views of democracy as the best governance model.[18] Indeed, the correlation coefficient between China's and Russia's favourability was found to stand at 0.51, indicating a high degree of covariance between the two. Furthermore, favourability toward China and Russia was found to be negatively correlated to favourability toward democracy, with correlation coefficients of -0.2 and -0.18, respectively. Interestingly, the above effects seem unique to Russia and China. Favourability toward the US was largely uncorrelated with attitudes toward democracy.

As a result, we suggest that China and Russia are perceived similarly as challengers to the norms of the current international order. Subsequently, we will treat general attitudes toward China and the willingness to align with China's foreign policy as two dependent variables and possible indicators of attitudes in opposition to the current international order. We will engage several other survey questions to answer why respondents hold given perceptions of China. Specifically, the questions we will consult asked respondents about their assessment of China's political values, their assessment of Chinese foreign policy and its cultural attractiveness, their perception of quality of life in China, China's economic importance for the development of the respondents' own country, and their perception of China's help during the Covid-19 pandemic.19 We will control for standard socio-demographic characteristics, such as gender, age, and education. Finally, we will zoom in on several key countries and engage more detailed societal divisions, such as ethnicity, religion, and voting preferences.

Attitudes toward great powers: The US, China, Russia, and the EU

Global Picture

From the 56 countries we have surveyed, the most positive attitudes toward China (Figure 1, see also Annex 1) were from respondents in Pakistan, followed by those in Bangladesh, Thailand, Indonesia, Jamaica, and Nigeria. The most negative attitudes toward China were expressed among respondents from South Korea, followed by those in Switzerland, Sweden, Japan, Canada, and France. Western countries, their allies, and partners tended to be more negative toward China, while developing countries tended to be more positive. Although there are various nuances which will be discussed below, the overall picture is in line with the expectations of this paper. China represents an alternative to Western leadership of the international order and is seen more negatively among Western countries, their allies, and partners than the rest of the world.

Figure 1: Attitudes toward China (darker colour represents a more favourable attitude)[20]

Interestingly, when it comes to attitudes toward the US (Figure 2, see also Annex 1), there is much less of a clear pattern when compared to attitudes toward China. Most positive toward the US were respondents in Nigeria, Angola, Ghana, the Philippines, and Israel, while the most negative were those in China, Slovakia, France, Serbia, Russia, and Sweden. At the same time, even in most of these countries, the average sentiment was only just below the neutral mark and thus could be interpreted as overall "slightly negative."

Figure 2: Attitudes toward the US (darker colour represents a more favourable attitude)[21]


When comparing global attitudes toward China and the US, the latter emerges as the clear winner: from the 56 countries we have surveyed, only people in Pakistan, Russia, Serbia, and Kazakhstan decisively favoured China over the US. However, there is a larger group of countries where the public is balanced or split. In these countries (Bangladesh, Egypt, Tunisia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Greece, Turkey, and Slovakia), China gets average approval ratings similar to those of the US.

Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)

One grouping of countries often thought to be balancing against the power and influence of the West is the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). From among its full members and dialogue partners, we have surveyed China, Russia, Kazakhstan, India, Pakistan, Turkey, and Egypt and visualised their sentiments below (Figure 3). At first glance, the SCO does look like a group competing with the West: none of the countries we surveyed here clearly prefers the US and the EU over China and Russia. Instead, there are countries where public sympathy is decisively favouring China and Russia over the US and the EU (Pakistan, China, Russia, and Kazakhstan). The remaining countries (India, Egypt, Turkey) are split without a clear preference for either China and Russia or the US and the EU. This is noteworthy also because these three countries are allied to or partner with the US under various schemes (NATO, Quad, or bilateral agreements). However, their public opinion still does not show a clear preference toward the West over China and or Russia.

Figure 3: SCO perceptions of great powers (mean values, 100 most positive, 0 most negative, 50 neutral)[23]

BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa)

Similarly to the SCO, the BRICS grouping is often regarded as a bloc of countries balanced against the West. However, unlike the SCO, the BRICS countries are split regarding public attitudes and do not show such scepticism of the West as was found in the SCO (Figures 4 and 5).[23] On the one hand, Russia and China are decisively anti-US and favourable toward each other (although, interestingly, their attitudes toward the EU are neutral or even slightly positive). On the other hand, Brazil and South Africa show a visible preference for the US and the EU over China and Russia. India is more complex and split, displaying negative views toward China but positive views of the US, Russia, and the EU (in this order). All in all, BRICS does not seem to be a coherent "anti-Western" group as it is often described, at least concerning public attitudes. Our findings suggest that public attitudes toward great powers among BRICS members primarily follow their individual countries' perspectives rather than falling within a dichotomy of the West vs the rest. For example, India's positive perceptions of Russia and negative perceptions of China illustrate that sentiments are likely tied to the country's historical relationships with these two great powers.

Figure 4: BRICS perceptions of great powers (mean values, 100 most positive, 0 most negative, 50 neutral)[24]

Figure 5: BRICS foreign policy alignment (mean values, 10 align completely, 0 don't align at all)[25]


China's Neighbourhood

Countries in China's neighbourhood show highly divergent attitudes toward China and the West. As a result, it would be inaccurate to claim that China's neighbours are either pro-China (and anti-West) or anti-China (and pro-West). Both positions are present in their (almost) pure forms – while other countries in the region hedge and are generally open to China and the West simultaneously.

On the one hand, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Kazakhstan, and Russia are more favourable toward and prefer to align their foreign policy with China. On the other hand, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, and India are more favourable toward and prefer to align with the US and the EU. Furthermore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore feel more or less equally about China and the West, signalling their hedging attitudes (Figure 6).

Figure 6: China's neighbourhood perceptions of great powers (mean values, 100 most positive, 0 most negative, 50 neutral)[26]

It is noteworthy to add that when respondents in these countries were asked another question about whom they would choose to align with if they had to, a majority would choose to align with the US over China, thus revealing their deeper preferences (Figure 7). Only Pakistan would choose China, and Malaysia and Kazakhstan were more or less split (although slightly leaning toward alignment with the US). These findings suggest that, indeed, many countries, especially in Southeast Asia, prefer not to choose and develop relations with both China and the US, which is in line with the idea of "hedging." However, they would pick the US over China when pushed to choose.

Figure 7: China's neighbourhood alignment preferences (% shares of respondents)[27]


Africa and Latin America

China traditionally positions itself as the leader of the developing world, and it has devoted significant diplomatic efforts to building relations with the countries of the Global South. Every year, for instance, the first international trip of a Chinese minister of foreign affairs leads to Africa, and numerous interactions between Chinese, African, and Latin American officials are characterised by a distinctively friendly atmosphere.

However, perhaps contrary to expectations, China scored worse in our survey than the US and the EU in terms of public attitudes (Figure 8). No African or Latin American country surveyed decisively prefers China over the West, and only Egypt feels equal toward the two. Each of the remaining 14 countries feels more favourable toward and wants to align (albeit at different intensities) with the US and the EU over China (and Russia).

Figure 8: African and Latin American perceptions of great powers (mean values, 100 most positive, 0 most negative, 50 neutral)[28]

Again, respondents were also asked whom they would choose to align with if they had to. Large majorities preferred the US in almost all countries except for Tunisia (where still more people wanted to align with the US than with China, but a large section did not want to align with either) (Figure 9). The very low willingness to align with China in countries participating in BRICS (Brazil, South Africa) or G20 (Nigeria, Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, South Africa) reveals that China is still struggling to win the "hearts and minds" of people even in the Global South.

Figure 9: African and Latin American alignment preferences (% shares of respondents)[29]

North America, Europe, and US Allies and Partners

Finally, looking at North America, Europe, and the US allies (Australia, New Zealand, Israel, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan), negative attitudes toward China and preference for the West prevail (Figures 10 and 11).[30] There are a few caveats, however, which need to be considered as they have potential strategic implications.

Serbia stands out as the only country in this group that visibly prefers China and Russia over the US and the EU. Slovakia has more positive views of Russia and China than the US (although attitudes toward the EU are more positive). Turkey and Greece view China and Russia only slightly less positively than their Western allies and partners. Latvia, Romania, and New Zealand are relatively neutral in their attitudes toward China (despite nevertheless favouring the Western powers more). These findings have potential strategic implications, given that these countries are in or around NATO's Eastern border or are included in intelligence-sharing agreements such as Five Eyes.

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Figure 10: North America, Europe, and US partners' perceptions of great powers (mean values, 100 most positive, 0 most negative, 50 neutral)[31]


Figure 11: North America, Europe, and US partners' foreign policy alignment (mean values, 10 align completely, 0 don't align at all)[32]

Sources of China's attractiveness at the global and regional levels

To explain China's attractiveness among some audiences, we conducted several regression analyses of the driving forces behind general attitudes toward China and the desire to align with it. Specifically, variables relating to respondents' assessment of the quality of life in China, its military power, the attractiveness of its culture, its foreign policy, its economic importance for the development of the respondent's home state, their favourability toward its political values, and the help that China provided during the Covid-19 pandemic served as independent variables in our analyses. Separate models were used to test the effects of these factors on respondents' preferences regarding foreign policy alignment with China and their overall favourability toward China. In addition, sub-groups within the survey data corresponding to different regions were included in separate models to test whether there were differences between them.[33]

The driving forces behind overall favourability and foreign policy alignment differ to some extent, thus substantiating our decision to study them as separate models (Figures 12 and 13). Perhaps most interestingly, the perceived economic importance of China plays a more significant part in the desire to align with China than in general favourability toward it. Likewise, China's cultural attractiveness plays a greater role in shaping its overall favourability than the desire to align with it. These findings reveal an important feature that may not be apparent without conducting the regressive analysis: while general favourability toward and willingness to align with China correlate strongly, there are different driving forces behind them. As a result, the foreign policy implications of factors behind general favourability may be less important than is often assumed – particularly concerning factors such as cultural attractiveness, which is often considered the cornerstone of the soft power concept.

Another noteworthy aspect revealed in the general models is that China's perceived military importance was the only factor negatively affecting alignment preferences with and favourability toward China. This suggests that much of the world's population holds a negative view of China's military.

Figure 12: Driving forces of general attitudes toward China (all surveyed countries)

Positive coefficients indicate that the variable positively shapes perceptions of China. Negative coefficients indicate a negative effect on perceptions. In both cases, greater distances from the 0 red line indicate stronger effects. Results denoted with *** showcase a high degree of statistical significance (p < 0.001).

Figure 13: Driving forces of willingness to align with China (all surveyed countries)

Significant regional differences were also identified through the regression models, meaning there are different factors behind China's attraction in various parts of the world (see Figures 14-19).

These models show that the perception of quality of life in China played a more prominent role in the Indo-Pacific region and Africa and Latin America compared to Europe and North America, revealing a higher appeal of China's successes among developing countries but not among the developed ones.[34] Assessments of China's foreign policy were, by far, the most significant driver of the country's favourability in the Indo-Pacific region, likely reflecting physical proximity to China and higher sensitivity to China's behaviour. In contrast, assessments of China's political values were key in shaping Europeans' and North Americans' favourability of the country, suggesting that China is first and foremost seen as a country representing different political values.

Regarding foreign policy alignment, no factor played a noticeably significant role in driving preferences in North America and Europe. In contrast, assessments of China's foreign policy held the greatest effect across the Indo-Pacific, while assessments of its economic importance played the biggest role in Africa and Latin America.

Figure 14: Driving forces of general attitudes toward China (Europe and North America)

China's quality of life — 2.42 ***
China's military power — -0.55 ***
China's cultural attractiveness — 2.18 ***
China's foreign policy — 3.35 ***
China's economic importance — 0.86 ***
China's political values — 3.64 ***

Regression Coefficient (See interpretation under Figure 12)

Figure 15: Driving forces of willingness to align with China (Europe and North America)

Regression Coefficient (See interpretation under Figure 12)

Figure 16: Driving forces of general attitudes toward China (African and Latin American countries)

Regression Coefficient (See interpretation under Figure 12)

Figure 17: Driving forces of willingness to align with China (African and Latin American countries)

Regression Coefficient (See interpretation under Figure 12)

Figure 18: Driving forces of the general attitude toward China (Indo-Pacific countries)

Regression Coefficient (See interpretation under Figure 12)

Figure 19: Driving forces of willingness to align with China (Indo-Pacific countries)

Regression Coefficient (See interpretation under Figure 12)

As past studies have identified, these results suggest that much of the developing world perceives China primarily through material lenses as an economic partner or a successful development case. Conversely, many Indo-Pacific nations and populations prioritise security when assessing China and the relationship between Beijing and their home country. In the West, attitudes toward China are shaped to a large extent by non-material factors such as political values.

Case studies of critical countries

This section will focus on a few select countries to better understand their overall attitudes, revealing several noteworthy dynamics. We will first look at two countries that displayed the most positive and negative perceptions of China within our dataset: Pakistan and South Korea. Next, we examine several countries with important domestic divisions that impact their overall attitude and may have important strategic implications.

Pakistan

Pakistan was the most favourable country toward China among all 56 countries we have surveyed and one with the clearest preference for China (and Russia) over the US and the EU. To provide an additional answer to why that is the case (going beyond factors revealed in the previous section at the regional and global levels), we can investigate what the Pakistani respondents had to say about China (Figure 20). The most common answers were "friend," "best friend," "good friend," and even "trusted friend". Chinese people were perceived as friendly and hardworking. China itself was seen as strong and developed, with many respondents labelling it as a superpower. Importantly, China was seen as helpful and supportive of Pakistan. The connection between the two countries was described as a "brotherhood," and many people celebrated it by saying, "Long live Pak-China friendship."[35]

The two countries officially call their relationship an "all-weather friendship," or more poetically describe it as "higher than the mountains, deeper than the oceans, sweeter than honey." Although there are also strong sentiments on the ground in various parts of Pakistan against China's presence, our findings show that, on average, it is apparent that the positive official relations between the countries impact Pakistani people.

Similar patterns are visible in several other countries. Serbia-China official relations are also amicable and labelled by officials on both sides as a "steel friendship." Subsequently, Serbians stand out in Europe for having positive attitudes toward China.[36] Similarly, Chinese and Russian respondents were found to have positive views of each other, and their descriptions of each other also show the impact of the officially labelled "no-limit friendship," such as relying on top-down messaging and stereotypes.[37]

Figure 20: What first comes to your mind when you think of China? (Pakistan respondents)

South Korea

This link between the quality of state-level relationships and public attitudes also applies to democracies and countries with negative relations with China. South Korea is a telling example: the respondents here expressed the most negative attitudes toward China among all 56 countries we surveyed. South Korea used to be known for its balancing act between its ally and security guarantor, the United States, and its leading economic partner and increasingly dominant neighbour, China. In the past, this was also visible at the public opinion level. According to Pew Research, in 2015, South Koreans were relatively positive about China, with only 37% holding unfavourable views. However, Korean attitudes toward China have turned sharply negative over the subsequent years, together with tensions in bilateral relations surrounding the deployment of the US anti-ballistic missile system THAAD, which was announced in 2016.[38]

Interestingly, when asked about various aspects of China, the most negatively perceived issue in South Korean public opinion was "China's impact on the global natural environment." Indeed, transboundary air pollution has been hotly debated between South Korea and China over the past few years. Another issue that seems to drive South Korean views of China is Covid-19. In fact, Covid-19 is the most commonly held first association of China among Korean respondents, followed by communism. Notably, among the commonly held associations, those with negative sentiments dominate, with references to "history distortion" reflecting the lasting effects of public outcry over the hanbok issue evoked during the Beijing Olympics. Other common themes point to further negative features associated with China in South Korea, such as "dirty," "counterfeits," or "selfish."

Figure 21: What first comes to your mind when you think of China? (South Korean respondents)

Slovakia

Slovakia held the second most negative attitude toward the US among all 56 surveyed countries (with China being the most negative). Although China's image in Slovakia is only marginally better than the image of the US, Russia was seen predominantly positively. In fact, Slovaks showed the most positive sentiments toward Russia among all surveyed EU countries. At the same time, Slovak respondents' willingness to align with the EU decisively surpassed their willingness to align with Russia. Thus, the picture we are getting is one of a population that seems friendly toward the EU and Russia but not to China and the US (Figure 22).

Figure 22: Perceptions of countries/entities among Slovak respondents (% shares of respondents)

Anti-Americanism and Russia-friendly sentiments among the Slovak public have long been a staple of Slovak politics.[39] However, to understand these overall attitudes, it is important to stress that Slovakia is a deeply divided country regarding political attitudes. To do so, we looked at how voters of the current Slovak president, Zuzana Čaputová, differ from the opposition

candidate, Maroš Šefčovič, when it comes to perceptions of China, Russia, the US, and the EU.

The results reveal that the voters of the two presidential candidates were polarised when it came to their attitudes toward the US and Russia. At the same time, the different stances toward China and the EU were present but much less pronounced. In effect, some parts of Slovak society are positive toward the US and negative toward Russia, and others hold a precisely opposite view.

Figure 23: Willingness to align with the great powers according to the voters of President Čaputová and opposition candidate Šefčovič (% shares of respondents)

Foreign policy alignment with China

Foreign policy alignment with Russia

Foreign policy alignment with the USA

Foreign policy alignment with the EU

Voters of Maroš Šefčovič	
Voters of Zuzana Čaputová	

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

• Not At All • Not Close • Somewhat • Close • Completely

Slovakia is not the only country with such polarised views of great powers. Neighbouring Czech Republic holds similar divisions, most visible again when it comes to Russia, nearly as pronounced regarding China and the EU but less so concerning the US.[40]

Such major differences regarding the country's strategic orientation mean that any election has the potential to substantially change the country's foreign policy. This results in decreased credibility in the foreign policy of given countries – but it also negatively affects the broader organisations such as the EU and NATO.

Latvia

In some countries, substantial differences exist between various ethnic groups. Latvia is a telling example of the implications such divisions can have, as it turned out to be the most favourable country toward China among EU members. Yet, its mean values of attitudes toward the US and Russia might also look surprising at first sight, considering the clear pro-Western and pro-US strategic direction of Latvian governments. However, the country's population also includes a sizeable portion of ethnic Russians (or Russian-speaking Latvians) whose relationship with the Latvian state has often been problematic since Latvia regained its independence from the Soviet Union.

Our findings reveal that Russian speakers differ significantly from Latvian speakers when it comes to international perceptions.[41] Perhaps unsurprisingly, the most notable (indeed, truly massive) differences exist in perceptions of Russia, followed by still considerable differences in perceptions of the US. Perceptions of China were also polarised, while views of the EU are more similar among the Latvian and Russian speakers.

Figure 24: Perceptions of great powers by Latvian ethnic/linguistic groups (% shares of respondents)

Perceptions of the US

Perceptions of the EU

Perceptions of China

Perceptions of Russia

Although Russian speakers do not hold a realistic chance of controlling the government due to their demographic share within the Latvian population, the fact that their strategic visions differ so greatly raises doubts about the extent to which they recognise the current Latvian international position as legitimate.

Israel

A similar situation to Latvia is evident in Israel, where the Arabs are the marginalised group within the Jewish majority.[42] Indeed, Arabs differ from the Hebrew speakers in terms of their international preferences, although not as much as in Latvia. The differences are most visible when it comes to attitudes toward the US and Russia and are almost non-existent regarding views of the EU and China.

These findings are also interesting because they again emphasise that in various contexts, different countries may be seen as more or less polarising. Such varying polarisation is perhaps representative of the contestation between the current international order and its alternatives. Moreover, Israeli findings also reveal that even in such a staunch ally of the US, views of China are not necessarily aligned with the position of the US government. Despite a rapid worsening of relations between Washington and Beijing and corresponding adjustments in US foreign policy, even Hebrew speakers are, on average, neutral toward China.

Figure 25: Perceptions of great powers by Israeli ethnic/linguistic groups (% shares of respondents)

Perceptions of the US

Perceptions of the EU

United States

Indeed, even in the US itself, public opinion does not seem entirely on board with the US government's assertive, and sometimes even hawkish, attitude toward China in recent years. Again, the US average sentiment toward China is not exceptionally negative due to societal divisions between various ethnic groups.[43]

In particular, those self-identifying as "white" are substantially more negative toward China and Russia and more positive toward the EU than those self-identifying as "Asian," "Latino/a," or "Black." In terms of China, this difference means that while "white" Americans hold similar attitudes toward China as held in most European countries, the international views of other ethnic groups are more like those held in the Global South.

Figure 26: Perceptions of great powers by US ethnic groups (% shares of respondents)

Perceptions of the EU

Perceptions of China

Perceptions of Russia

Kazakhstan

Similar ethnic divisions are present in some other countries – and they can provide additional explanations of attitudes in these countries beyond those identified by the regressive analyses in the previous section. Kazakhstan was one of the few countries which preferred China and Russia over the US and the EU. When looking at the differences between the Russians and Kazakhs, we can again discover that those primarily identifying as Russians in Kazakhstan are more positive of China and Russia (by about the same magnitude) than those primarily identifying as Kazakhs. Russians in Kazakhstan also tend to be more negative toward the US and the EU

(although less so) than the Kazakhs. As a result, Kazakhstan ends up being more favourable toward Russia and China than toward the US and the EU, creating a certain political context within which the government must operate.

Figure 27: Perceptions of great powers by Kazakhstan's ethnic groups (% shares of respondents)[42]

Perceptions of the US

Perceptions of the EU

Perceptions of China

Perceptions of Russia

Malaysia

Finally, we will review the situation in Malaysia to highlight that internal ethnic divisions may not have the same implications as we have just seen in some other countries. Perhaps contrary to some expectations, ethnic Chinese Malaysians do not differ substantially from other ethnic groups in the country – and in some cases, they even show different trends than what might be expected. In terms of attitudes toward China, they are more positive than ethnic Malays and Indians, but the difference was marginal. Regarding Russia, ethnic Chinese were slightly less positive than ethnic Indians and Malays, while attitudes toward the US and EU differed slightly.

As a result, Malaysia shows that even in a country with pronounced ethnic divisions (i.e., ethnic Chinese Malaysians and relations with China), the differences between ethnic groups may not be as large as we have seen in countries such as Latvia or Kazakhstan.

Figure 28: Perceptions of great powers by ethnic groups in Malaysia (% shares of respondents)[45]

Perceptions of the US

Malays / Chinese / Indians

Very Negative · Negative · Neutral · Positive · Very Positive

Perceptions of the EU

Chinese / Malays / Indians

Very Negative · Negative · Neutral · Positive · Very Positive

Conclusion

Having examined China's challenge to the international order, visualised and discussed global attitudes toward China, the US, the EU, and Russia, explored the possible factors behind China's attractiveness, and conducted eight case studies of internal divisions, we can now summarise and consider the main findings of this report. First, we have found that significant negative correlations exist between the international public favourability of China (and Russia) and support for democracy. Because liberal and democratic norms are foundational to the current international order, our results suggest that China's rise may challenge the current international order in ways beyond a general shift in the relative power of the leading international powers. In the minds of global populations, supporting China is associated with decreasing support for the ideational underpinnings of the existing international order.

Second, our findings show that China continues to be seen less favourably than its main Western competitors in most countries worldwide. However, this should not lead to complacency among Western powers. China's favourability has overtaken the US and the EU in a small pocket of states, with several others holding no clear preferences between the two. Western powers should hence implement policies seeking to maintain the support and favourability of diverse global audiences to preserve their leading position in the international order. When crafting such policies, it is important to keep in mind that the factors driving support for the different international powers diverge significantly based on regional and national characteristics.

Third, our analysis provides evidence that in North America and Europe, perception of political values is a more crucial driving force of attitudes toward China than in the rest of the world. Instead, material factors such as China's economic importance for national development, perceived quality of life in China, and assessment of Chinese foreign policy are crucial in determining how people in the Global South and China's neighbourhood perceive China.

Fourth, several countries have important domestic divisions, which can affect their capacity to conduct efficient foreign policy or even lead to major shifts in their strategic directions with political reshuffling. In Slovakia, large sections of society traditionally hold positive views of Russia and negative

views of the US. Still, the country's foreign policy elite usually manages to preserve a pro-Western direction. Other countries face similar political divisions or may do so in the future. In many places, these divisions overlap and are further sharpened by ethnic, religious, and linguistic divisions. Notably, this applies to the Russian-speaking minorities (such as in Latvia and Kazakhstan), which differ dramatically from the majority populations regarding perceptions of China, Russia, the US, and the EU.

Interestingly, these internal divergences in attitudes can be found even in the case of the US, the leading guarantor for the current international order and security provider for many countries worldwide. Indeed, our analysis finds significant differences in views between various ethnic groups within the US, with those self-identifying as "white" being more decisively negative on China than those self-identifying as "black," "Latino/a," and "Asian." These internal divisions might affect the efficiency and stability of the US foreign policy, its ability to compete with China internationally, and thus, the resilience of the current international order.

Finally, based on these findings, we propose three recommendations for the Western powers to compete more efficiently for global "hearts and minds." First, it is essential to understand the current trajectory of the competition with China. Most importantly, China's power and influence should be neither exaggerated nor underestimated. Second, the stability of the Western-led international order begins at home. Therefore, democratic governments should prove they can perform efficiently and provide opportunities for all their people, including minorities. Third, Western powers should not ignore and disrespect countries they may usually deem unimportant. Doing so could provide the space needed for China to take advantage of local discontent and develop "pockets of resistance" to the current international order.

Endnotes

1   "Sinophone Borderlands – Interaction at the Edges", was a research project funded by the European Regional Development Fund and run by Palacky University Olomouc in 2018–2022 (see sinofon.cz/surveys).

2   The data collection was conducted online and was coordinated by reputable market and social research agencies (see note 13 for more details). The questionnaire consisted of more than 300 data points, including a few open questions. The questions asked about various aspects of attitudes toward foreign countries, policy preferences, views about social and human rights issues, and basic demographics.

3   We will use the term "West" in this paper as a shortcut for the group of countries broadly including the US and its allies and partners, especially those of the NATO and the EU, but also others such as Australia and New Zealand.

4   Ikenberry, John G. "The Future of the Liberal World Order: Internationalism After America", Foreign Affairs, 2011.

5   Yan, Xuetong. "From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement". The Chinese Journal of International Politics 7 (2), 2014: 153–84.

6   Weiss, Jessica Chen. "The China Trap". Foreign Affairs, 2022.

7   Brands, Hal, and John Lewis Gaddis. "The New Cold War". Foreign Affairs, 27 July 2022.

8   European Commission. "EU-China – A Strategic Outlook". European Commission, 2019.

9   Johnston, Alastair Iain. "Is China a Status Quo Power?" International Security 27 (4), 2003.

10   Miller, Manjari Chatterjee. "Why nations rise: Narratives and the path to great power". Oxford University Press, 2021.

11   Nye, Joseph S. "The Changing Nature of World Power". Political Science Quarterly 105, 1990.

12   Walker, Christopher and Jessica Ludwig. "The Meaning of Sharp Power: How Authoritarian States Project Influence". Foreign Affairs, 2017.

13   In September and October 2020, we surveyed 13 European countries (UK, Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Sweden, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Latvia, Serbia, and Russia), with at least 1500 respondents per country representative according to the quotas of gender, age, region within country, education, rural-urban divide (and in Latvia also based on ethnic/linguistic divide).

In March 2022, we surveyed Mainland China (n=3000) and Hong Kong SAR (n=1200), with the samples being representative according to the quotas of gender, age, and region within the country and the region.

From April to September 2022, we surveyed 15 countries in the Indo-Pacific region (South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Australia, and New Zealand) with at least 1200 respondents per country representative according to the quotas of gender, age, and region within a country (and in India, Malaysia, and Kazakhstan also based on religious/ethnic/linguistic divides).

From June to July 2022, we surveyed 15 countries in Africa and Latin America (Egypt, Tunisia, Kenya, Nigeria, Ghana, Angola, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Colombia, Panama, Mexico, and Jamaica), with at least 1200 respondents per country representative according to the quotas of gender, age, and region within a country.

From July to September 2022, we surveyed 15 countries in North America, Europe, and the Middle East (US, Canada, UK, Belgium, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Portugal, Finland, Latvia, Czech Republic, Romania, Greece, Turkey, and Israel) with at least 1500 respondents per country representative according to the quotas of gender, age, region within country, education, rural-urban divide (and in the US, Latvia, Israel, and Switzerland also based on ethnic/religious/linguistic divides).

14   For the visualisation of the list of surveyed countries, see Figures 1 and 2.

15   https://iccwbo.org/publication/iccesomar-international-code-on-market-and-social-research/

16   The exact wording of the question was "How positively or negatively do you feel about the following countries/entities on a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 represents cold, negative feelings, 50 represents neutral, and 100 represents warm, positive feelings?"

17   The exact wording of the question was "How closely should [given country's] foreign policy align with the following actors?"

18   Respondents were presented with the statement "Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government." and expressed their approval on a 1 to 7-point Likert scale ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree".

19   The exact questions are as follows:

- "How positively or negatively do you perceive the political values of the following countries/entities?" (7-point scale from very negatively to very positively)

- "How positively or negatively do you assess the foreign policy of the following countries/entities?" (7-point scale from very negatively to very positively)

- "How attractive or unattractive do you consider the cultures of the following countries/entities?" (7-point scale from very unattractive to very attractive)

- "How good or bad would life be for a person like you if you were to live in these places?" (7-point scale from very bad life to very good life)

- "How important or unimportant do you consider the following countries/entities for the development of [your country's] economy?" (7-point scale from very unimportant to very important)

- "How much did the following countries/entities help [your country] during the Covid-19 pandemic?" (10-point scale from didn't help to helped a lot).

20   This map is based on respondent's answers to the question "How positively or negatively do you feel about the following countries or entities?". The scores are based on a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 represents cold, negative feelings, 50 represents neutral, and 100 represents warm, positive feelings toward China. In the Figures, darker shades of colour represent more positive perceptions (higher mean scores) and vice versa.

21   See supra note.

22   This figure is based on the question "How positively or negatively do you feel about the following countries or entities?". In this case, respondents from SCO countries were asked about their perceptions of four countries and entities, and each is represented by a colour: China (red), the USA (blue), the EU (yellow), and Russia (green).

23   We include here figures for both general attitudes and for foreign policy alignment due to missing data.

24   This figure is based on the question "How positively or negatively do you feel about the following countries or entities?". In this case, respondents from BRICS countries were asked about their perceptions of four countries and entities, and each is represented by a colour: China (red), the USA (blue), the EU (yellow), and Russia (green).

25   This figure is based on the question "How closely should [your country's] foreign policy align with the following actors?". In this case, respondents from BRICS countries were asked how closely their country should align with four countries and entities, and each is represented by a colour: China (red), the USA (blue), the EU (yellow), and Russia (green).

26   This figure is based on the question "How positively or negatively do you feel about the following countries or entities?". In this case, respondents from China's neighbourhood were asked about their perceptions of four countries and entities, and each is represented by a colour: China (red), the USA (blue), the EU (yellow), and Russia (green).

27   This figure is based on the question "If you had to decide between the USA and China, which would you choose to align with?". The scores are based on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 represents full alignment with China, 4 represents neutral, and 7 represents full alignment with the US. In this figure, Red represents a desire to align with China (responses 1-3), yellow represents neutral responses (4), and blue represents alignment with the US (responses 5-7).

28   This figure is based on the question "How positively or negatively do you feel about the following countries or entities?". In this case, respondents from the Global South were asked about their perceptions of four countries and entities, and each is represented by a colour: China (red), the USA (blue), the EU (yellow), and Russia (green).

29   This figure is based on the question "If you had to decide between the USA and China, which would you choose to align with?". In this figure, Red represents a desire to align with China (responses 1-3), yellow represents neutral responses (4), and blue represents alignment with the US (responses 5-7).

30 We include both figures due to some missing data and due to some differences between their findings.

31 This figure is based on the question "How positively or negatively do you feel about the following countries or entities?". In this case, respondents from North America, Europe, and US allies were asked about their perceptions of four countries and entities, and each is represented by a colour: China (red), the USA (blue), the EU (yellow), and Russia (green).

32 This figure is based on the question "How closely should your country's foreign policy align with the following actors?". In this case, respondents from North America, Europe, and US Allies were asked about their alignment preferences toward four countries and entities, and each is represented by a colour: China (red), the USA (blue), the EU (yellow), and Russia (green).

33 It is important to note that, as these analyses were aimed at simply providing an exploratory analysis of the main driving forces of China's international favourability, no in-depth statistical diagnostics were run to test the robustness of results and the assumptions underlying them. As a result, these results should only be considered through an exploratory lens and should not be interpreted as definitive evidence of the magnitude and significance of any specific coefficients.

34 The regression analyses were conducted following the regional waves, see note 13.

35 Kironska, Kristina and Jeremy Garlick. "Pakistanis Perceive China as Their 'Best Friend'", The Diplomat, 2022. https://thediplomat.com/2022/10/pakistanis-perceive-china-as-their-best-friend/

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37 Turcsányi, Richard Q. "Chinese Views of the US and Russia After the Russian Invasion of Ukraine", The Diplomat, 2022. https://thediplomat.com/2022/05/chinese-views-of-the-us-and-russia-after-the-russian-invasion-of-ukraine/

38 Turcsányi, Richard Q., Esther E. Song. "South Koreans Have the World's Most Negative Views of China. Why?" The Diplomat, 2022. https://thediplomat.com/2022/12/south-koreans-have-the-worlds-most-negative-views-of-china-why/

39 Marušiak, Juraj. "Slovakia: Emergence of an Old-New Pseudo-Pan-Slavism in the Context of the Conflict Between Russia and Ukraine After 2014". In Pan-Slavism and Slavophilia in Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe: Origins, Manifestations and Functions, edited by Mikhail Suslov, Marek Čejka, and Vladimir Đorđević, 329–55. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-17875-7_16.

40 Šebeňa, Martin, and Richard Q. Turcsányi. "Divided National Identity and COVID-19: How China Has Become a Symbol of Major Political Cleavage in the Czech Republic". China Review 21 (2), 2021, 35–64.

41 Our respondents in Latvia could choose at the beginning of the survey whether to answer the survey in Latvian or Russian. The figures below use this division as the indicator of the preferred language of use.

42 Our respondents in Israel could choose at the beginning of the survey whether to answer the survey in Hebrew or Arabic language. The figures below use this division as the indicator of the preferred language of use.

43 Our respondents in the US were asked to choose which ethnic groups they "primarily" identify with. The figures below show results for the four most numerous ethnic groups in the US.

44 Our respondents in Kazakhstan were asked to choose which ethnic groups they "primarily" identify with. The figures below show results according to the division between the Russian and Kazakh identity.

45 Our respondents in Malaysia were asked to choose which ethnic groups they "primarily" identify with. The figures below show results according to the division between the Malay, Chinese, and Indian identities.

Annex 1: Perception of Great Powers

(mean values, 0 most negative, 50 neutral, 100 most positive)

	China	USA	EU	Russia
Angola	63,67	78,19	70,61	49,80
Argentina	43,55	60,69	61,53	38,52
Austria	36,69	50,01	56,00	26,81
Australia	41,80	63,04	65,26	33,51
Bangladesh	73,76	69,19	68,63	69,42
Belgium	38,46	56,90	59,59	23,84
Brazil	47,41	69,07	60,29	34,74
Canada	33,27	56,21	61,55	22,82
Chile	49,64	65,16	63,04	37,19
China	N/A	39,09	54,17	69,61
Colombia	51,21	69,54	64,54	42,87
Czechia	36,57	51,48	49,92	24,12
Czechia 2020	36,99	46,75	N/A	40,82
Ecuador	54,45	70,11	64,64	45,74
Egypt	52,63	55,80	55,91	51,72
Finland	37,35	61,40	65,73	17,21
France	34,29	43,51	N/A	36,87
Germany	34,42	55,54	59,90	24,84
Germany 2020	35,44	39,23	N/A	36,71
Ghana	61,03	76,00	68,98	48,83
Greece	51,87	55,19	55,97	47,14
Hong Kong	N/A	56,33	62,98	36,34
Hungary 2020	41,80	54,21	N/A	42,46
India	41,76	73,81	66,41	69,00
Indonesia	69,12	67,70	71,33	71,91
Isreal	43,93	74,30	57,36	31,98
Italy 2020	45,57	54,67	N/A	48,24
Jamaica	67,42	73,96	69,38	56,28
Japan	33,55	64,08	62,82	26,48
Kazakhstan	64,64	57,95	59,36	69,70
Kenya	57,11	74,15	68,23	41,54
Latvia	50,31	62,79	67,53	26,70
Latvia 2020	54,86	49,40	N/A	53,99
Malaysia	63,58	59,04	65,60	49,51
Mexico	56,30	65,05	63,73	47,35
New Zealand	50,23	61,06	67,62	32,41
Nigeria	65,66	79,25	71,30	49,95
Pakistan	80,29	54,72	64,61	66,85
Panama	56,10	69,55	62,42	41,65
Philippines	55,93	75,11	71,82	55,41
Poland 2020	46,19	64,22	N/A	35,68
Portugal	39,26	63,64	74,20	16,86
Romania	50,14	67,96	67,29	29,33
Russia 2020	64,11	46,15	N/A	N/A
Serbia 2020	62,49	45,57	N/A	71,89
Singapore	60,55	62,04	63,46	45,58
Slovakia 2020	44,36	41,44	N/A	55,40
South Africa	52,11	64,89	59,20	38,47
South Korea	25,50	66,59	63,39	28,36
Spain 2020	44,58	47,97	N/A	41,46
Sweden 2020	32,75	47,26	N/A	29,99
Switzerland	31,71	51,42	54,18	22,11
Taiwan	38,08	63,98	63,63	33,66
Thailand	70,08	72,35	73,21	58,02
Tunisia	50,95	54,19	58,57	49,83
Turkey	44,14	49,81	55,59	45,02
United Kingdom	35,78	59,63	57,28	18,99
United Kingdom 2020	35,09	50,29	N/A	34,58
United States	39,43	N/A	58,83	30,41
Vietnam	44,38	72,77	71,64	67,00

Annex 2: Foreign Policy Alignment Preferences
(mean values, 0 not at all aligned, 10 aligned completely)

	China	USA	EU	Russia
Angola	4,94	6,37	6,08	4,27
Argentina	4,09	6,11	6,12	3,26
Austria	3,81	4,86	5,99	3,27
Australia	3,88	6,27	6,17	N/A
Bangladesh	7,83	7,70	7,32	N/A
Belgium	3,59	5,16	6,29	2,75
Brazil	4,80	6,84	6,25	3,47
Canada	3,24	6,36	6,04	2,52
Chile	4,69	6,20	5,86	3,21
Colombia	4,84	6,90	6,26	3,86
Czechia	3,93	5,45	6,20	2,81
Czechia 2020	4,02	5,20	6,41	4,38
Ecuador	5,11	6,72	6,17	4,23
Egypt	6,29	6,37	6,40	6,06
Finland	2,93	5,12	6,19	2,00
France	3,24	3,96	5,70	3,46
Germany	3,79	5,46	6,36	3,13
Germany 2020	4,82	5,32	7,53	4,91
Ghana	5,06	6,30	5,83	3,85
Greece	4,70	5,69	6,44	4,62
Hungary 2020	4,71	5,75	7,41	4,88
India	4,43	7,50	6,93	N/A
Indonesia	6,90	6,90	7,01	N/A
Israel	4,62	6,99	5,94	4,15
Italy 2020	4,33	5,38	6,19	4,64
Jamaica	6,20	6,36	6,18	4,87
Japan	4,45	7,07	6,60	N/A
Kazakhstan	6,08	4,80	5,27	N/A
Kenya	5,34	6,91	6,44	3,83
Latvia	4,36	5,87	7,09	5,54
Latvia 2020	4,78	4,91	7,59	5,54
Malaysia	6,34	6,37	6,35	N/A
Mexico	4,78	5,95	5,57	4,07
New Zealand	4,36	5,90	6,22	N/A
Nigeria	6,10	7,15	6,61	4,57
Pakistan	7,57	6,00	6,21	N/A
Panama	4,48	6,39	5,15	2,77
Philippines	5,73	7,45	7,10	N/A
Poland 2020	5,56	7,07	7,78	4,88
Portugal	3,70	6,37	7,80	1,88
Romania	4,92	6,80	7,06	3,49
Russia 2020	6,16	4,24	5,09	N/A
Serbia 2020	6,09	4,94	5,97	6,70
Singapore	6,12	6,55	6,39	N/A
Slovakia 2020	4,54	4,43	6,86	5,54
South Africa	4,78	6,04	5,66	3,93
South Korea	4,92	7,98	6,65	N/A
Spain 2020	5,08	5,67	7,62	4,50
Sweden 2020	2,61	4,95	7,23	2,64
Switzerland	3,13	4,73	5,73	2,29
Taiwan	4,67	7,45	7,28	N/A
Thailand	7,11	7,48	7,40	N/A
Tunisia	4,98	5,42	5,71	4,55
Turkey	5,90	6,16	6,65	6,14
United Kingdom	3,46	5,88	6,30	2,41
United Kingdom 2020	3,62	5,71	6,21	3,57
United States	4,08	N/A	5,77	3,61
Vietnam	5,80	8,17	7,89	N/A

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