



Policy recommendations

From strategy to action: The European Union in the Indo-Pacific

Alfred Gerstl • Tanguy Struye de Swielande

A coherent, flexible Indo-Pacific strategy—firmly rooted in European values and interests as well as in the realities, needs, and priorities of the region—is crucial if the EU is to remain an influential player in this key arena of the 21st century. This requires regional and sector-specific approaches tailored to different subregions and countries, within an overarching strategy that acknowledges and leverages their unique characteristics. To implement this strategy effectively, the EU must define clear objectives, establish practical implementation methods, and set measurable success criteria, while allowing for regular adjustments as needed. At the same time, internal reforms are required in order to strengthen the EU’s overall capacity to act.

Challenges and opportunities for the EU and Indo-Pacific partners

The return of Donald Trump to the White House in January 2025 reinforces the sense that the international system is evolving towards a multipolar order. Yet this emerging multipolarity is far from the one many Europeans had envisaged. A world with several centers of power is not necessarily one characterized by multilateralism or joint efforts among states and international organizations to strengthen the **rules-based order** and **promote human rights and democracy** globally.

The strategy of President Trump, as well as that of other great-power leaders—notably Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi—is to recreate large geopolitical spaces based on a logic of living space (*Lebensraum*). Great powers are increasingly seeking to create and control their own ecosystems, each developing an **exclusive sphere of influence**. In some cases, these spheres overlap, raising the risk of military confrontation, as seen in the South China Sea, Taiwan, and Myanmar.

On this logic, each region would be dominated by a great power in a classic **center-periphery dynamic**. This pattern can be seen in Trump’s rhetorical claims over Greenland, Canada, and the Panama Canal, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and China’s assertions in the South China Sea and East China Sea. The overarching objective of these great powers is to foster closer ties among geographically proximate states, which tend to interact more frequently with one another than with external actors. This process of rapprochement, recognized in political sociology as socialization, can unfold through consensual cooperation or coercion, with the dominant power striving to assert control over its periphery.

In the **Indo-Pacific**, the strategies and behavior of peripheral states show that they are generally reluctant to be drawn into great-power rivalries. Many of these countries resist choosing sides between the United States and China. Instead, they tend to adopt strategies of **hedging** or **multi-alignment**: engaging pragmatically and flexibly with both powers, while refusing to fully align with either, in line with their own national interests. A critical element of successful hedging is the pursuit of economic and security partnerships with a diverse range of actors to avoid overreliance on any single great power. In crafting its own hedging strategy, the EU can draw on the extensive experience of Southeast Asian countries, where hedging has become a widely used and refined approach.¹

The evolving global order, increasingly shaped by geopolitics and geo-economics, presents significant **strategic challenges for the EU**. At the same time, these developments, including the termination of USAID programs by the second Trump administration, offer **important opportunities** for Brussels to strengthen its profile as a champion of multilateralism and global governance, while pursuing its interests in the Indo-Pacific. Because many Indo-Pacific countries pursue hedging strategies, the **EU** is a “**structurally welcome**” partner. Moreover, the growing influence of China in Europe, both within the EU and in its immediate neighborhood, as well as North Korea’s

¹ Gerstl, Alfred, *Hedging Strategies in Southeast Asia: ASEAN, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam and their relations with China*, Routledge, 2022.

involvement in Russia’s war against Ukraine, underscores how closely the European and Indo-Pacific theatres are becoming intertwined.

In what follows, the EUVIP project outlines detailed recommendations for a **revised role conception, a new foreign policy grand strategy, and concrete actions** that can enhance the EU’s role and influence in an economically dynamic yet security-wise volatile **Indo-Pacific region**.

Recommendations for a new EU role conception and a new grand foreign policy strategy

The intensifying US–China rivalry in the Indo-Pacific creates significant opportunities for the EU. There is **real momentum** for the EU to position itself as a partner that offers credible alternatives to unwanted binary choices. Areas of potential convergence between the EU and the Indo-Pacific region are broad, encompassing development, economic cooperation, and security.

The overarching goal is to maintain a strong and constructive EU presence in the region, contributing to its development and stability. This, in turn, implies that a successful strategy, while firmly guided by clear principles and values, must remain flexible enough to adapt to shifting circumstances and unforeseen challenges.

1

Reconceptualize the EU’s role in international affairs in an ambitious, yet realistic manner and develop a grand strategy based on the new role conception

The evolving international system presents a range of **strategic opportunities for the EU**, but only if it first unifies its efforts. Without greater foresight and initiative, the EU risks becoming the big loser in the world’s geopolitical reconfiguration. It has been unable (and, above all, unwilling) to anticipate fundamental shifts in power. As Thucydides put it: “The strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must.”

With its myriad standards, Taylorian bureaucracy, lack of a single voice, endless discussions and deliberations, and lingering Eurocentrism, the EU is no match for the United States or China. Obsessed with further enlargements, it has neglected the basics: efficient functioning, clear and appropriate objectives, rigorous planning, and consistent, fair implementation. In short, the EU has forgotten how to exist as a power. In defense, geo-economics and foreign policy, objectives remain vague and are discordantly defined by national capitals through the European Council. Each government advances its own priorities and clings to them. Confronted with this national(istic) hullabaloo, the EU retreats into a **placebo strategy**: “the organizational tendency to follow the rituals of strategy-making without having the substance”.² Potential power is not the same as effective power; capabilities are essential but insufficient

² Lt. Col. ML Cavanaugh, “On the Perils of Placebo Strategy”, Modern War Institute, June 26, 2019.

unless they are mobilized and combined in a shared project, something that remains conspicuously absent at the European level.

Although the EU is a significant and respected economic and normative power, it lacks the **coercive** instruments necessary to engage in great-power politics on the same level as the United States, China, or Russia. Moreover, its commendable emphasis on a **values-based foreign policy** often sits uneasily with the logic of great-power competition. Yet, the current global order increasingly forces the EU, like other actors, to define and conceptualize its role in international affairs, particularly in the context of the Sino-American rivalry. Any new conception of the EU's role must rest on a clear-eyed assessment of its strategic objectives, core values, interests, and the practical means available for their implementation.

2

Assume strategic autonomy

While the concept of strategic autonomy—"the ability to act autonomously when necessary and with partners whenever possible"³—is divisive, it should nevertheless form the core of the EU's grand strategy, since it is ultimately about defending European interests. This is all the more true given that, although the concept was initially limited to the defense sector in 2013,⁴ it has since expanded to encompass the economic, energy, technological, and health (including pandemics) domains. The EU will not be able to develop a mature grand strategy until strategic autonomy is **clearly defined and broadly accepted** by both European institutions and member states.

If the instruments of grand strategy are to serve strategic autonomy as a long-term objective, then that objective can no longer remain open to constant debate. Achieving it may require the EU to evolve towards a more **federal model**, implying a greater transfer of powers to the European level. Only this would enable the EU to hold its own alongside powers such as Russia, China, the United States, and India. Ultimately, as Alvin Toffler warns, "if you don't have a strategy, you'll be part of someone else's strategy".⁵ This is precisely the EU's predicament if it fails to overcome sovereigntist reflexes and internal tensions.

³ Council Conclusions on Implementing the EU Global Strategy in the Area of Security and Defense Foreign Affairs Council, 14149/16, Brussels, November 14, 2016.

⁴ European Council Conclusions, Brussels, EUCO 217/13, December 19-20, 2013, p. 7.

⁵ Toffler, Alvin, *The Third Wave*, New York, William Morrow and Company, 1980.

3

Majority decision-making in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)

To implement the EU's foreign and security policy effectively, decision-making should shift to qualified majority voting, as is already the case in economic and environmental policy. Such a reform would also help curb the promotion of narrow national interests that often undermine the common European cause. In the case of the CFSP, the limitations of the *passerelle* clause are evident, making more fundamental reform necessary.

If no consensus can be reached among the EU-27 on moving towards a federal model or extending majority decision-making, an alternative would be to establish a “**coalition of the willing**” based on an opt-in principle, similar to the framework of the Eurozone. In this scenario, some member states would proceed with deeper integration and cooperation, while others could remain outside initially but retain the option to join at a later stage.

4

Adopting a principles-based hedging strategy to credibly balance values and interests

Even after Trump leaves office, the current world order, which is unfavorable to the EU, will not automatically improve. Strategic autonomy must, therefore, remain a core objective and guiding approach for the EU for years, if not decades, to come. One promising pathway towards this goal is a **hedging** strategy. This would allow Brussels to maintain close relations with both the United States and China across different policy areas, while gradually reducing its security and economic dependencies on each. Hedging enables the pragmatic and flexible use of both cooperative and confrontational tools, depending on the specific context.

What sets an EU hedging strategy apart from those driven purely by interests is the inclusion of **values**. A principles-based hedging strategy would ensure that the EU remains firmly anchored in the democratic camp, even as it navigates rivalry with authoritarian powers. Adopting such an approach would also signal the EU's willingness to learn from best practices in the Indo-Pacific, adapting successful strategies to its own particular needs.

Because deepening relations with other states and international organizations is essential for effective hedging, defining this strategy comprehensively would also provide clear guidelines for cooperation with **both like-minded and authoritarian actors**. Engagement with the latter is unavoidable, given that most countries are semi-democratic or authoritarian. However, while collaboration with like-minded partners,

including Taiwan, should be deep and wide-ranging, rooted in shared values, cooperation with non-democratic states should remain pragmatic, interest-based, and focused on carefully selected areas of common concern.

Recommendations to strengthen the role and strategic influence of the EU in the Indo-Pacific region

5

De-risking policy by engaging partners in the Indo-Pacific

In line with A) and B), the EU must adopt a policy of de-risking vis-à-vis **both China and the United States**. Given current tensions with Washington, there is a temptation in some European capitals to move closer economically to China—a serious strategic and economic mistake. Such a rapprochement would weaken the EU's status and international credibility. It would also allow Chinese products, such as electric vehicles and renewable energy technologies, to flood the European market, potentially harming European industries and ultimately weakening them. The EU needs to be able to better control its own economic ecosystem by reducing dependence on China through strategic partnerships for critical raw materials, semiconductors, and green technologies with states in the Indo-Pacific region.

Europeans have real opportunities in the Indo-Pacific, as demonstrated by the recent trade agreement with Indonesia, which followed nine years of negotiations. The EU must now take the next step and restart talks with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on a **comprehensive EU-ASEAN free trade agreement**. The second-best option would be to conclude a series of trade agreements with **individual states** to reach a critical mass, ensuring that essential parts of these agreements are similar so that they can be combined into broader regional frameworks in the foreseeable future.

Closer alignment with the **Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)** is also necessary. The EU's current absence from key trans-regional trade agreements undermines both its economic weight and its norm-setting power.

At the same time, the EU needs to reinforce its **Global Gateway Initiative (GGI)** in the region. The GGI offers Indo-Pacific governments an attractive alternative to China's Belt and Road Initiative in certain sectors. To further increase its appeal, some of the EU's high governance standards that do not fully align with local realities could be adjusted, and **bureaucracy** reduced, to streamline application, implementation, and audit procedures. **Tangible results** already achieved for local citizens should be **communicated more effectively**

and in accessible language. Key EU partners such as India and Japan have their own infrastructure and connectivity initiatives. To avoid duplication and prevent Indo-Pacific countries from competing against one another, closer coordination and cooperation are necessary—and, in some instances, pragmatic coordination with China is also required.

It is also crucial that the EU announces its intention to extend the **GGI beyond 2027** as early as possible and presents a concrete work program, giving its partners confidence in Brussels' long-term commitment to this scheme.

6 Adopt a more outside-in approach

The EU must develop an **outside-in approach** and not limit itself to an inside-out one. “Inside-out,” a concept borrowed from management theory, focuses on optimizing a state’s internal capabilities and strengths and then projecting the resulting policy outward. By contrast, an outside-in strategy starts by asking what partners expect and where their needs lie. In practice, this means listening to and **understanding local priorities**, avoiding the imposition of a Eurocentric vision, while remaining anchored in European values and norms. The EU must be attentive to the security, economic, and cultural concerns of Indo-Pacific countries and societies if it is to help ensure prosperity, peace, and stability in the region.

The opportunities for such an approach have not yet been fully seized by the EU, in part due to the war in Ukraine, despite the publication of the European Indo-Pacific Strategy in 2021. These opportunities nevertheless exist. Realizing them will require the EU to muster greater political will and enhance its capabilities to become a stronger and more reliable contributor to peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific.

7 Provide stronger support for regional attempts to strengthen the rules-based order

ASEAN is a key promoter of transnational cooperation and multilateralism. Diplomatic and practical support for **ASEAN’s regional centrality**, and in particular its efforts to mitigate tensions in the South China Sea, remains crucial if the EU is to be seen as a reliable partner committed to upholding the rules-based order and freedom of navigation and trade.

However, the “ASEAN Way” has notable limitations, especially its inability to effectively enforce rules and norms. Therefore, the EU should work closely with ASEAN and other key partners, such as Australia, Japan, India, and South Korea, within the framework of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and related institutions, including the

Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), to encourage a gradual shift towards **preventive diplomacy**.

The year **2027** will mark the **50th anniversary of EU–ASEAN Dialogue Relations**, offering the EU a major opportunity to deepen its ties with ASEAN and its member states. Alongside high-level meetings between heads of government and the President of the European Commission and their ASEAN counterparts, a broad range of engagements should be organized. These should include meetings among senior officials, experts, and civil society representatives across various fields to further enhance cooperation and dialogue. In the run-up to the EU–ASEAN Summit, the EU should also step up its diplomatic efforts to **secure membership in the annual East Asia Summit (EAS)**. To this end, it should strategically leverage the upcoming ASEAN chairmanships of the Philippines (2026) and Singapore (2027), both close partners of the EU.

8

Be present and active in the region and take local views seriously

Most Indo-Pacific states, and Southeast Asian countries in particular, are “swing states”: they do not wish to choose between Beijing and Washington and are keen to avoid alienating either of them. This creates **strategic opportunities** for the EU, provided it resists paternalistic reflexes and takes seriously the specific characteristics, constraints, and vulnerabilities of Indo-Pacific partners.

In the region’s diplomatic arena, demonstrating a consistent, long-term strategic commitment and deepening day-to-day engagement, including at key regional conferences, is essential. High-profile **visits by the President of the European Commission and Commissioners** offer valuable visibility and underscore the EU’s commitment to the Indo-Pacific, even if organizing such trips is logistically demanding.

The EU should also take **regional criticism seriously** and draw lessons from it. Indo-Pacific diplomats often accuse Europeans of “preaching” about democracy and human rights. Their message is not that the EU should abandon its values, but rather that it should take different development paths more seriously and examine the trajectory of democratic transitions, rather than expecting rapid convergence. This means recognizing that implementation of rights and norms will, in some places, take longer than it did in Europe. At the same time, economic and other sanctions against human rights violators must remain a core element of the CFSP toolbox, as should support for civil society organizations. Strengthening **Track 1.5 and Track 2 diplomacy** would be one useful way to bridge official and non-official dialogue.

The EU must, however, be more attentive to the **side effects** of its measures. Sanctions adopted in response to Russia’s war against Ukraine, for instance, created collateral damage in parts of the Indo-

Pacific. Brussels should avoid pushing countries into China's orbit by leaving them with no viable alternatives. Sanctions must, therefore, be as targeted and calibrated as possible.

It is equally important that the EU only makes **promises**, whether on specific cooperation projects or economic commitments, that it can realistically **fulfil and that deliver tangible benefits for citizens**. This reliability can distinguish the EU positively from other major powers, including China.

Finally, the EU should pay closer attention to the **unintended impact of its internal regulations** on third countries. Some partners may struggle to comply with high standards and, as a result, may seek alternative support and market access.

9

Increase the security and defense cooperation with the Indo-Pacific region, applying a Team Europe approach

While US allies in the region are not questioning their military alliances with Washington, there is a clear desire from Canberra to Tokyo to Seoul to develop a "plan B." Europeans, however, should not present themselves as an alternative to the United States—an implausible claim given geographical distance and limited military power—but as a **credible complement**, including in relation to China, that reliably delivers on its commitments.

In security and defense, Europe should pursue a **Team Europe** approach that combines the specific strengths of the EU and its member states. For this, the coordination between the EU institutions, including the EU delegations in the Indo-Pacific, and the EU member states should be further improved. Cooperation with the Indo-Pacific countries should encompass regular strategic dialogues, training and capacity-building, as well as joint military and naval exercises, including in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. Strengthening maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation and trade are vital interests for both Indo-Pacific partners and the EU.

The EU and its member states have also gained substantial experience in **countering hybrid warfare**, including cyberattacks, disinformation and propaganda campaigns, as well as threats to undersea cables. Many countries in the region, including like-minded partners such as Taiwan, face similar challenges. By sharing experience, exchanging best practices, and deepening cooperation, the EU and Indo-Pacific partners can mutually reinforce their ability to address these threats. The ASEAN Regional Forum offers one suitable platform for such engagement. In addition, both sides should collaborate in international forums to update and **refine international law**, ensuring that legal norms are better equipped to address these emerging challenges.

Deepen relations with Australia, India, Japan, and South Korea as key economic and political partners

Europe, Australia, Japan, and South Korea face different versions of the same dependence. All rely on the United States for security guarantees and access to the US market, and all have been squeezed by Washington's growing linkage of trade and technology to security. Europe's response to Trump's tariff threats and pressure on NATO and Ukraine assistance has revealed how little leverage it has when core security is at stake. Japan's concessions to protect car exports demonstrate a similar vulnerability. Yet alongside this shared exposure, these actors also share core democratic values and a common interest as principal beneficiaries of the post-war, rules-based order. This shared political and economic outlook can serve as the foundation for an increasingly close relationship in the years to come.

At the bilateral and minilateral levels, **Japan** is already deepening its ties with Europe through joint exercises, procurement, and even the development of a next-generation fighter with Italy and the UK. The Economic Partnership Agreement and the Strategic Partnership Agreement have strengthened the relationship at the EU level, and 2024 saw the signing of the Security and Defense Partnership. However, this agreement remains broad and vague. The EU can do more by using the existing EU–Japan framework to translate shared values into **visible political action**. The same logic applies to relations with **India**, a rising economic power and increasingly ambitious security actor.

Speaking out jointly in defense of the rules that underpin open trade and maritime order, and **coordinating responses to coercion**, whether from China or the United States, is the core shared interest of the EU and Japan. Therefore, Europe and Japan should take a coordinated stance that aligns with both sides' Indo-Pacific strategies: offering support to vulnerable partners in Southeast Asia and beyond and signaling that the rules protecting global trade are not optional. Such support would be economic, diplomatic, and political—squarely within the EU's strengths. Coordinated financing, market access, and political cover for states targeted by coercive trade measures would demonstrate that Europe and Japan can act not only for themselves, but for the open order on which they depend—an order that also benefits Indo-Pacific nations.

The signing of the Security and Defense Partnership with **Australia** in June 2025 was an important step, but it must be followed by an ambitious **free trade agreement**. Cooperation with **South Korea** should also be deepened comprehensively, with a particular focus on defense cooperation that leverages South Korea's **considerable expertise as a defense industrial power**. Strengthening bilateral ties with these key actors will enable the EU to work with them in flexible **minilateral formats** across a range of policy areas, thereby contributing more

effectively to the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific subregions and the wider region.

11

Rebalancing values and interests in a credible manner

The EU's values-based approach can irritate some Indo-Pacific partners, especially when it is perceived as carrying a "sense of superiority." Josep Borrell, the EU's then-High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, understandably sparked outrage when he remarked in 2022 that "Europe is a garden ... the best combination ... that humankind has been able to build," while "most of the rest of the world is a jungle".⁶ The EU would be well advised to adopt more respectful language and treat its partners as equals, thereby avoiding antagonism. It should also adopt a more pragmatic approach, not least because **interests**, rather than values, primarily guide policy choices in the Indo-Pacific. The EU and its Indo-Pacific partners share substantial interests in economic and security realms that can drive a more positive dynamic and refocus attention on what matters most: building pragmatic relationships that deliver mutual benefits.

One of the most significant sources of misunderstanding today is that the EU expects Indo-Pacific partners to condemn Russia's aggression, while many Indo-Pacific countries expect the EU to speak out more forcefully against China's violations of international law. Since both sides have a strong interest in upholding a rules-based multilateral order, they should defend it consistently, wherever it is challenged. This would reduce the risk that the EU applies (or is perceived as applying) **double standards**. At the same time, the EU should not hesitate to point out when partners in the Indo-Pacific themselves appear to be applying double standards.

12

Create a positive narrative of the EU's contributions to peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific

With the launch of its Global Governance Initiative in 2021, along with other highly publicized efforts to promote multilateralism and elevate the role of the "Global South" in the world order, China has moved swiftly to capitalize on the unpredictability of the Trump administration. In this context, the EU must counter Chinese narratives not only through concrete action but also through more **effective, audience-specific communication**. It should highlight its strong, long-term commitment to the region and clearly showcase the positive, tangible impact of its

⁶ Borrell, Josep, European Diplomatic Academy: Opening remarks by High Representative Josep Borrell at the inauguration of the pilot program. Brussels, EEAS, 2022.

policies, such as the Global Gateway Initiative, on the daily lives of citizens.

The EU should showcase its economic, security, academic, technological, cultural, and civil society ties with the region by presenting objective data in clear, user-friendly formats, both in print and online. Moreover, EU-funded projects that deliver tangible benefits to citizens in the region should be prominently showcased at public events and actively promoted through testimonials on social media, using clear and straightforward language to maximize their visibility and impact.

Authors

ALFRED GERSTL • President, CEIAS

Alfred Gerstl is President of CEIAS and an Associate Professor at Palacky University Olomouc (Czechia). Being a specialist on international relations in the Indo-Pacific, notably in Southeast Asia, he heads two EU-funded research projects on the role of the EU in the Indo-Pacific and on (Central) Europe's relations with Southeast Asia. Alfred is also an Adjunct Professor at the University of Vienna and a lecturer at the Vienna School of International Studies (Diplomatic Academy of Vienna) and was previously a Visiting Professor at Nihon University in Tokyo (2025) and an Associate Professor in Russia (2018/19).



gerstl@ceias.eu



[Alfred Gerstl](#)

TANGUY STRUYE DE SWIELANDE • Université Catholique de Louvain

Tanguy Struye de Swielande is professor of international relations at UCLouvain and Senior research fellow at the Egmont Institute. He is the director of the Scène internationale collection at the Presses universitaires de Louvain. His areas of expertise include geopolitics, geoeconomics, and the foreign and defense policies of major powers, the Indo-Pacific region, decision-making analysis, strategic foresight, and the impact of new technologies on the global order. For the past 20 years, he has published regularly in French, Dutch, and English in a variety of formats and outlets, including policy papers, working papers, academic articles, books, and newspaper columns. In 2021, he co-chaired the strategic committee of the Belgian Ministry of Defense responsible for updating the country's strategic vision.



tanguy.struye@uclouvain.be



[Tanguy Struye de Swielande](#)

About CEIAS

Central European Institute of Asian Studies (CEIAS) is an independent think tank focusing on Europe-Asia relations and developments in the Indo-Pacific region. Originally founded in 2007 in Slovakia, CEIAS is today a **transnational think tank with main branches in Bratislava (Slovakia), Prague (Czech Republic), and Vienna (Austria)**, and further regional presence in Poland, Hungary, Canada, Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and beyond.

We strive to combine **academic and policy advisory role**, producing **data-driven, methodologically rigorous, reliable, and practically relevant research** that is highly valued by experts and policymakers.

Our activities focus are **focused into several research programs and centers:**

- **Global Perceptions of China Center**
- **Geo-economics & Technology Center**
- **EU-Taiwan Center**
- **Indo-Pacific Program**
- **EU-China Relations Program**
- **Southeast Asia Program**
- **Human Rights & Law Program**

Since its establishment in 2007, CEIAS has consistently worked towards becoming a **go-to think-tank in the CEE for matters related to East Asia and the Indo-Pacific region**. We have a track record of successful project implementation

supported by regional and international donors, including the European Commission; Government of Taiwan; US State Department; UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office; the Government of Japan; the Government of Slovakia; National Endowment for Democracy (NED); the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE); Konrad Adenauer Stiftung; Fridrich Naumann Stiftung; International Visegrad Fund; International Republican Institute (IRI); Korea Foundation, and many others.

CEIAS is **embedded into the key European networks of premier East Asia scholars**. Examples include the European Think-Tank Network on China (ETNC), European Association of Taiwan Studies (EATS), or China in Europe Research Network (CHERN).

CEIAS researchers regularly comment for and publish op-eds in leading CEE and international media. Our work has been featured in the Wall Street Journal, Foreign Policy, South China Morning Post, NHK, Deutsche Welle, Euractiv, CNA, The Diplomat, Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Euractiv, and other media.

Our outputs are referred to in the work of other thinktanks, e.g. Brookings (USA), Clingendael (Netherlands), MERICS (Germany), Institute for Security & Development Policy (Sweden), IFRI (France), ISPI (Italy), Global Taiwan Institute (USA), Prospect Foundation (Taiwan), ISEAS (Singapore), Elcano Royal Institute (Spain) and many others.

CEIAS analysis was also highlighted in the outputs of the **European Parliament** and the **U.S. Congress**.

Connect with us online

-  office@ceias.eu
-  [linkedin.com/ceias-eu](https://www.linkedin.com/company/ceias-eu)
-  [instagram.com/ceias_eu/](https://www.instagram.com/ceias_eu/)
-  [youtube.com/@CEIAS_eu](https://www.youtube.com/@CEIAS_eu)

-  ceias.eu
-  [facebook.com/CEIASeu](https://www.facebook.com/CEIASeu)
-  x.com/CEIAS_eu
-  bsky.app/profile/ceias-eu.bsky.social

About EUVIP

The EU in the Volatile Indo-Pacific Region (EUVIP) is a project funded under the Horizon Europe program, Twinning call. Coordinated by Palacký University Olomouc, the project brings together four research-intensive European universities and seven external partners. The main goal is to raise awareness of the strategic, political, and economic significance of the volatile Indo-Pacific region for Europe and for a values-based European approach towards this region.

The EUVIP project analyzes the evolving relationships among major powers and their impact on regional stability, explore the economic interdependencies between Europe and the Indo-Pacific, and propose strategies for cooperation and conflict resolution. The research will also focus on democracy and human rights issues in post-coup Myanmar.

EUVIP project aims to fulfill four objectives:

- **To transfer** the partners' knowledge to UP: Strengthening of Indo-Pacific and EU competencies and research skills of senior researchers, ECRs, and PhD students.
- **To exploit** the academic potential of Indo-Pacific Studies, increase the academic impact of the UP research team in this new field, develop the consortium to a European network and knowledge hub of Indo-Pacific experts, and establish a Myanmar Centre at UP.
- **To strengthen** UP research management capacities for pre-award agenda, science communication and implementation of open science policy, and other horizontal principles within new EU framework program.
- **To disseminate, communicate and exploit** the innovative research results in EUVIP member states and at EU level.



www.euvip-project.com

EUVIP project partners:



Palacký University
Olomouc



HELSINGIN YLIOPISTO



LUND UNIVERSITY

UCLouvain

EUVIP dissemination partner:



CEIAS

Central European Institute
of Asian Studies

From strategy to actions: The European Union in the Indo-Pacific

Authors: Alfred Gerstl, Tanguy Struye de Swielande

Design: Matej Šimalčík

Copyediting: David Hutt

Cite as: Alfred Gerstl, Tanguy Struye de Swielande (2025). *From strategy to action: The European Union in the Indo-Pacific*. Central European Institute of Asian Studies (CEIAS).

Published by:

Central European Institute of Asian Studies
Murgašova 2, 811 04 Bratislava, Slovakia
www.ceias.eu
office@ceias.eu

All rights reserved.

© Authors

© Central European Institute of Asian Studies, 2025

Funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Research Executive Agency (REA). Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.



**Funded by
the European Union**

This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon Europe coordination and support action 101079069–EUVIP–HORIZON-WIDERA-2021-ACCESS-03.



CEIAS

Central European Institute
of Asian Studies

www.ceias.eu