Taiwan’s defense chief, Koo Li-Hsiung, has initiated a series of military reforms aimed at modernizing the defense sector, but these efforts have been hindered by persistent organizational challenges, which are obstructing the full implementation and effectiveness of the proposed changes.
Key takeaways:
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The appointment of a civilian as the minister of national defense signals the new government’s strong commitment to military reform
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Key proposals include abolishing outdated formalism, implementing real-time exercises, and enhancing the focus on an asymmetric strategy.
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Despite these innovative reforms, persistent organizational problems could pose significant challenges and potentially undermine their effectiveness.
In May, Wellington Koo Li-Hsiung was appointed Taiwan’s new defense minister, marking a significant shift in Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense. Koo’s appointment is notable as he represents a rare case of a civilian assuming this critical position, and, unlike previous civilian appointments, Koo is seen as the first truly empowered civilian minister with decision-making authority. As a lawyer by training, Koo is expected to lead significant reforms in Taiwan’s military amidst escalating tensions with China. His proposals are viewed as crucial steps toward transforming the military’s rigid and conservative culture. But what was the message behind this appointment? What are the changes in the military and how effective are they? And what are the challenges ahead?
A short history of military reforms in Taiwan
Military reform has been a central focus of Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) since now-former President Tsai Ing-Wen entered office in 2016. In 2022, she announced a structural adjustment of the armed forces, notably extending compulsory military service from four months to one year. This change was part of a broader national defense strategy that integrated both armed forces and civil defense organizations and increased the annual defense budget to 2.5% of GDP.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine intensified discussions in Taiwan about the potential for a Chinese invasion, given the parallels between the threats faced by both countries from neighboring authoritarian regimes. This has prompted Taiwan to consider new forms of modern warfare, such as asymmetric tactics and hybrid warfare, leading to accelerated reforms within the Taiwanese military since many people were concerned about the military’s outdated facilities, arms, and philosophy. It was in this context that Taiwan’s new president, Lai Chin-Te, appointed Koo and tasked him with facilitating unconventional changes within the military.
What’s new about the appointment?
President Lai emphasized that Koo’s appointment symbolizes the achievement of “civilian control over the military” (文人領軍), a goal that has been pursued since Taiwan’s democratization. The National Defense Act, passed in 2000, sought to bring military power under the control of democratically elected civilian leadership. However, this objective has rarely been fully realized, with military leadership traditionally held by generals or retired generals. Koo’s appointment is, therefore, seen as a significant milestone in aligning Taiwan’s military leadership with the principles of democratic governance.
Koo’s background as a lawyer and his active role in social reforms make him uniquely qualified for this role. He was part of the Judicial Reform Foundation, working on the miscarriage of justice and abolishing the death penalty. He was invited into cabinet during Tsai’s presidency in 2016. Initially dealing with an assets settlement involving the Kuomintang (KMT), which handles the party properties acquired illegally during the authoritarian period, he then worked on the Financial Supervisory Committee. In 2020, he became the head of the National Security Council. His track record in successfully implementing complex policy reforms was a key factor in Lai’s decision to appoint him, particularly given the intertwined nature of national defense, security, and diplomacy.
Major changes
One of Koo’s initial proposals was to eliminate outdated practices within the military. For example, he announced the cessation of bayonet training, which had long been criticized as unrealistic. He also ended the requirement for military personnel to submit mandatory reports during holidays. These formal changes were accompanied by more substantive shifts, such as transforming the annual drills into real-time exercises with decentralized command structures. During the Han Kuang Exercise (漢光演習), Taiwan’s largest annual military drill, soldiers were not informed in advance of the exercise scenarios, challenging the military’s ability to respond rapidly and cohesively to unexpected situations.
Koo has also deepened the military’s commitment to asymmetric warfare, or the “porcupine strategy,” which relies on small but effective weapons to counter a more powerful adversary. This strategy is particularly relevant for Taiwan given the power imbalance with China. However, as many analysts pointed out, China will struggle to invade Taiwan as it would be a complex plan to land thousands of soldiers on the island in a full-scale amphibious invasion. Vessels and other large vehicles are vulnerable when crossing the Taiwan Strait to reach viable ports on the island’s west coast. This makes Taiwan an ideal ground for implementing asymmetric tactics. Koo’s approach builds on the work of former General Staff Admiral Lee Hsi-Min, who developed the Overall Defensive Concept (ODC) emphasizing asymmetric warfare. Koo has proposed the establishment of an advanced defense unit dedicated to developing and implementing asymmetric warfare tactics, focusing on unmanned vehicles, AI-driven target detection, and advanced communication systems.
As presented by the Ministry of National Defense to the Legislative Yuan in 2024, the overarching strategy prioritizes precision, mobility, lethality, and survivability. The goal is to repel any rapid invasion attempts and interventions by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Koo has also emphasized the importance of national defense autonomy (國防自主), advocating for increased domestic production within Taiwan’s defense industry.
Challenges and problems
Despite these promising reforms, several challenges threaten their successful implementation. One of the most significant issues is the lack of adequately trained personnel to execute the new strategies. Junior officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) in Taiwan’s military are reportedly overburdened with tasks, leading to extreme overtime and mental health challenges. This organizational strain risks undermining the effectiveness of Koo’s reforms, as soldiers may lack the time and motivation to adapt to new tactics and technologies.
Moreover, the real-time drills have highlighted flaws in the military’s training, particularly in addressing Chinese “gray zone” aggression—non-traditional forms of conflict such as misinformation, public manipulation, and cyberattacks. During the most recent Han Kuang exercise, scenarios were tested that involved responding to PLA misinformation campaigns, such as a simulated-panic in Taipei triggered by false reports of an imminent Chinese invasion. It also tested the capacity of decentralized command under large-scale invasions. While these drills exposed vulnerabilities, they also served their purpose by identifying areas for improvement, such as communication failures during missions, which are difficult to detect in scripted exercises.
Conclusion: The long road ahead
Wellington Koo’s appointment as Taiwan’s Minister of National Defense marks a significant political and strategic shift. Politically, it represents the realization of the National Defense Act’s goal of civilian control over the military, a milestone in Taiwan’s democratic development. Strategically, Koo’s reforms reflect the new government’s determination to accelerate military modernization in response to growing tensions with China. Within his first 100 days in office, Koo has implemented changes that had been stagnant for years, recognizing the urgency of adapting to the evolving security landscape.
However, these reforms are not without cost and challenges. Koo must address the deeply entrenched organizational issues within the military, particularly the shortage of trained personnel. Without resolving these structural problems, the effectiveness of the new strategies may be compromised. The success of Taiwan’s military reforms will depend not only on the soundness of the strategies themselves but also on the capacity of the military’s infrastructure to support and sustain these changes.
