While China’s influence in the Myanmar conflict is often in the spotlight, Thailand’s unique and pivotal position in the crisis should not be overlooked.
Key takeaways:
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Thailand remains one of the Myanmar junta’s most crucial allies, providing financial and diplomatic support, but carefully managing its role to avoid damaging its reputation.
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Bangkok also wields influence over Myanmar’s revolutionary groups, offering them a safe haven and neutral ground for their operations and negotiations.
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Thailand is in a prime position to mediate the conflict by leveraging its ties with both the junta and the revolutionaries, starting with smaller initiatives that could lead to broader, meaningful change.
In August, international media turned its gaze toward Myanmar when China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, visited the country and met Min Aung Hlaing, the military leader who seized power in the February 2021 coup. For decades, China has been a staunch ally of Myanmar’s military, shielding the generals from United Nations Security Council sanctions by using its veto power and providing financial and material support when Western democracies refused to engage with the military regime. More recently, Myanmar has played a key role in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), further cementing China’s importance in Myanmar’s politics. However, this focus on China has obscured the role of a less obvious yet equally significant player: Thailand.
Since the 2021 coup, Thailand has neither severed ties with the Myanmar junta nor significantly increased its engagement. Instead, it has adopted a cautious approach, maintaining just enough connection to benefit economically, while avoiding actions that could harm its international standing. In April 2023, Thailand’s then-foreign minister, Don Pramudwinai, visited Myanmar and advocated for deeper engagement with the military regime to address the crisis. However, this visit did not receive the same attention as similar trips by Chinese officials, reflecting Thailand’s more understated but no less crucial role in the conflict.
Thailand’s position is unique. It supports the Myanmar junta financially and diplomatically while maintaining leverage over Myanmar’s revolutionary groups. Thailand’s investments, particularly in Myanmar’s oil and gas sector, have been critical for the junta’s continued operations. After major companies like Chevron and Total withdrew, Thailand’s state-owned PTTEP became one of the few remaining foreign entities in Myanmar’s energy sector. According to independent NGOs, Thailand provides the junta with approximately $1 million in rent for fuel terminals alone. Moreover, Thailand’s diplomatic support is visible—last year, it was one of six ASEAN countries to send representatives to the ASEAN Air Chief Conference in Myanmar, demonstrating its quiet but sustained support for the regime.
Unlike more distant allies such as Russia, whose support is seen as symbolic, Thailand’s proximity and financial contributions have made it a vital partner to the junta. Yet, Thailand’s influence extends beyond the military regime.
A lifeline for Myanmar’s revolutionaries
Thailand is not just aiding the junta—it also serves as a lifeline for Myanmar’s people and the anti-junta resistance movement. Following the 2021 coup, the cost of living in Myanmar skyrocketed, with consumer goods, mostly imported from Thailand and China, experiencing sharp price increases. The Thai baht surged to record highs in August 2024, further straining the Myanmar economy, where the kyat weakened dramatically. The country also witnessed shortages of gasoline and petroleum. From late July to August 2024, people slept in front of gas stations to fill up their vehicles.
In response, many Myanmar citizens moved their assets to Thailand, investing in real estate to preserve their wealth. By late 2024, Myanmar nationals ranked third among foreign buyers of Thai property. In addition, Thailand became a refuge for young people fleeing mandatory conscription from early 2024 onwards. Some pursued one-year diploma programs simply to obtain visas, while thousands more crossed the border illegally to find work.
Although Thai law enforcement occasionally raids restaurants and factories searching for illegal workers, Myanmar migrants are generally left alone unless they engage in activities that threaten Thailand’s political stability, such as anti-monarchy protests. The presence of large Myanmar migrant communities, the availability of schools, restaurants, and healthcare facilities catering to their needs, and the ease of converting Myanmar currency into Thai baht have made Thailand an attractive destination for those seeking to escape Myanmar. To maintain goodwill among the Thai population, Myanmar migrants often avoid actions that could jeopardize their community’s status in Thailand, such as criticizing the monarchy. These factors combined have made Thailand a key player in the Myanmar crisis.
It’s not just regular migrants who avoid challenging Thai political and cultural norms. Many exiled activists, politicians, and intellectuals operate from Thailand, with most Myanmar think tanks, media outlets, and NGOs based in Thailand. These groups understand that their ability to remain active in Thailand relies on the government’s tolerance. Conversations with several activists suggest that those who are vocal about Myanmar’s junta and its human rights abuses remain curiously silent on issues like Thailand’s suppression of Muslim rebels or criticism of its monarchy. One political organization even prohibits its members from criticizing Thai culture, including the monarchy, despite having harshly criticized the junta’s glorification of Burma’s monarchs. This is particularly ironic, given the organization’s opposition to the military regime’s use of historical symbolism.
Beyond political exiles, the Thai-Myanmar border is home to long-standing ethnic rebel groups, such as the Karen National Union and the New Mon State Party. These groups depend on Thailand for arms, food, medicine, and other supplies, and Thailand also serves as a neutral ground for meetings between rebel groups or between ethnic armed forces and the Myanmar government. This reliance has placed both Myanmar’s exile activists and some rebel groups under Thailand’s influence. While China also exerts influence over ethnic armed groups, particularly the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA), its sway over other key political players is limited. In contrast, Thailand’s influence extends across both sides of the political divide. Most recently, China’s efforts to end the conflict in northern Shan State have faced criticism from the National Unity Government (NUG), Myanmar’s shadow government.
In short, Thailand’s proximity to Myanmar, along with the dependency of both the junta and the revolutionaries in the country—financially for the military and operationally for the resistance—has given Thailand considerable power. This influence may be even more potent and far-reaching than that of China.
Resolving the crisis
How should Thailand use its influence to help resolve the Myanmar crisis? While Bangkok’s unique position as an intermediary has been emphasized, much of the argument has focused on its ties to the military, with less attention paid to its relationship with the NUG and revolutionary groups. Unlike China, Thailand’s attempts to mediate between the parties in Myanmar have not led to significant backlash. While the resistance rejected former Prime Minister Thaksin’s involvement in the conflict, this was largely due to his personal connections with the junta (he allegedly referred to Hlaing as a “close friend”). Myanmar’s distrust of China also stems from its authoritarian political system, further complicating Beijing’s mediator role.
With the recent election of a new prime minister in Bangkok, Thailand is in a prime position to take a more active role in resolving the Myanmar conflict. However, it must carefully navigate the differing worldviews of the stakeholders involved. The military views the resistance as foreign-backed insurgents threatening national unity, while the resistance believes the conflict is unsolvable as long as the military remains in power. To mediate effectively, Thailand should avoid pushing for major reforms immediately, as both sides will likely view such efforts with suspicion. Instead, a more practical approach would be to start with smaller, manageable initiatives—such as advocating for the release of political prisoners.
