China’s growing pressure on Taiwan is no longer confined to airspace violations and military drills; a renewed surge in espionage has forced Taiwan’s leadership to confront a deeper, systemic threat to its national security.
Key takeaways:
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Chinese espionage operations in Taiwan are systematic, long-running, and increasingly sophisticated, targeting both military and civilian sectors.
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President Lai Ching-te’s sweeping counter-espionage strategies represent a critical but challenging shift toward strengthening Taiwan’s internal defenses.
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Effective countermeasures will require clear enforcement, public vigilance, and close international cooperation to succeed against intensifying Chinese infiltration efforts.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) China Power initiative launched the Taiwan ADIZ Violations dataset in late 2020 to monitor Chinese incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). According to this dataset, the number of ADIZ violations by various aircraft, including fighter jets, electronic warfare planes, drones, and even balloons, rose sharply from 972 in 2021 to 3,075 in 2024. So far in 2025, the count has already reached 1,012, reflecting a significant escalation in Chinese military activity around Taiwan.
Beyond ADIZ violations, China has also intensified the frequency and complexity of its military exercises in the Taiwan Strait. Between 2018 and 2024, China conducted ten large-scale exercises near Taiwan, each designed to demonstrate its growing military capabilities and political resolve. These operations continued into 2025, with a joint combat readiness patrol held just 40 nautical miles off Taiwan’s coast on February 26th. This was followed by the launch of the “Strait Thunder 2025A” exercise on April 2nd, focusing on regional control, joint blockade operations, and precision strikes, underscoring China’s readiness to project power in the region.
The espionage threat
China’s broader unification strategy extends far beyond military posturing. It includes an aggressive campaign of cyberattacks, disinformation, and cognitive warfare, all designed to undermine Taiwan’s stability and erode public trust. Recently, Beijing has intensified its espionage operations—a tactic that, while not new, has evolved significantly in scale and sophistication. In January 2025, Taiwan’s National Security Bureau released a report titled “China’s Disinformation Dissemination Patterns in 2024,” highlighting a notable increase in both military pressure and espionage activities.
China’s infiltration of Taiwan’s military and society is not a recent phenomenon. As early as 2017, the Taiwanese government estimated that more than 5,000 Chinese spies were operating within its borders. However, the 2021 case involving General Zhang Zheping marked a turning point in public awareness of this threat. Zhang, once the leading candidate to become Taiwan’s chief of the general staff, was reassigned to a non-command role as president of the National Defense University after suspected ties to Chinese intelligence were discovered—an incident widely regarded as one of the largest espionage scandals in Taiwan’s history.
As China’s intelligence operations have expanded, espionage has emerged as one of the most pressing security challenges for Taiwan. Between 2022 and 2024, only four Taiwanese soldiers were convicted of spying for China. However, in 2024 alone, the number of prosecuted spies surged to 64, reflecting a dramatic escalation in counterintelligence efforts. Dr. Shen Ming Shih of the Institute for National Defense and Security Research noted that these spies included both active and retired officers, many of whom were motivated by financial incentives, sexual favors, or career dissatisfaction. In some cases, active-duty soldiers even filmed videos pledging loyalty to China and promising to defect in the event of war, which were later used in Chinese propaganda. While earlier trends focused on recruiting retired generals, recent patterns show Beijing’s increasing interest in middle-ranking active-duty officers to gain real-time insights into Taiwan’s combat capabilities and troop morale.
The years 2024 and 2025 have seen a surge in espionage-related trials in Taiwan. Numerous retired and active-duty officers have been sentenced to prison terms based on the severity of their crimes. In one notable case, a retired army colonel was convicted of bribery and loyalty to China. Three former military intelligence officers received prison sentences for developing a spy network and leaking sensitive information. Another major case involved eight individuals, including active-duty soldiers, who were sentenced to up to 13 years in prison for espionage. A retired Air Force colonel received a 17-year sentence, one of the harshest penalties for espionage in Taiwan to date.
Perhaps most alarming was the case involving the Presidential Office. In March 2025, four retired soldiers were prosecuted for leaking classified military data to Chinese agents. These soldiers were assigned to highly sensitive units, including the Presidential Office and the Defense Ministry’s telecommunications command. Chinese infiltration efforts have also extended beyond the military. In October 2024, ten individuals, including a temple chairman, were indicted for running a spy ring that exploited religious networks to gather intelligence and spread pro-China narratives within Taiwan’s civilian population.
Trials have revealed that many Taiwanese military personnel were not directly recruited by Chinese agents, but rather by fellow officers who had already been compromised and tasked with expanding the network. This decentralized approach has enabled Chinese intelligence to infiltrate deeply into Taiwan’s defense establishment, leveraging personal and professional connections to establish extensive spy rings.
Taiwan’s response
The sharp increase in espionage cases has prompted Taiwan to strengthen its counterintelligence capabilities. In March 2025, President Lai Ching-te announced a sweeping national security package following a high-level security meeting. Framing China as a “foreign hostile force” under the Anti-Infiltration Act, Lai laid out 17 strategies aimed at curbing internal subversion and espionage.
These measures target five key threat areas, including restoring the military court system to handle espionage and sedition cases, tightening retirement benefits for disloyal personnel, and amending laws to punish expressions of loyalty to China. The plan also includes closer scrutiny of Chinese-issued identity documents among Taiwanese civil servants and military members, as well as stricter residency and naturalization rules for individuals from China, Hong Kong, and Macau.
To counter United Front infiltration—a strategy employed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to co-opt influential groups and undermine Taiwan from within—Lai’s plan requires the full disclosure of cross-strait exchanges by public officials and NGOs. It also includes entry restrictions for Chinese nationals with known CCP affiliations and new regulations to prevent the politicization of cultural, academic, and religious exchanges. Additionally, Taiwan plans to restructure cross-strait trade and investment flows to reduce its economic dependence on China.
Conclusion
Chinese espionage in Taiwan is not occasional—it is systematic, continuous, and increasingly sophisticated. Taiwan’s introduction of new counter-espionage measures, including the reinstatement of military courts, reflects its shift toward a more assertive national security posture. Yet, despite recent assertive steps, the extent of infiltration across the military and society underscores an urgent need for broader legal reforms, institutional strengthening, and constant public vigilance.
President Lai’s policies represent a critical but overdue recognition of the threat; their success will depend on effective enforcement, strong political unity, and robust international support. The evolving nature of Chinese operations further highlights the indispensable role of Taiwan’s counterintelligence agencies and the delicate balance between maintaining internal security and preserving democratic freedoms.
