Cutting China routes is a strategic blunder by European airlines

1. The significant reduction in European flights to China and Chinese airlines’ monopolization of flight routes reflects a growing asymmetry in Sino-Europe relations.

2. Cutting aviation links with China will limit European businesses’ access to the Chinese market and diminish Europe’s physical visibility, economic relevancy, and geopolitical influence in the region.

3. Rebuilding air connectivity is crucial to counter China’s expanding influence and maintain balanced and meaningful engagement.

European policymakers and China watchers should be alarmed by recent decisions by European airlines to cut routes to Mainland China. Lufthansa has canceled flights between Frankfurt and Beijing, while British Airways has suspended its London-Beijing service. Major carriers such as Scandinavian Airlines (SAS), LOT Polish Airlines, and Virgin Atlantic have entirely withdrawn from the Mainland Chinese market, leaving Chinese airlines to dominate air travel between Europe and China.

This is more than a minor adjustment in travel logistics—it signals a growing imbalance in Europe’s engagement with China. While air travel between Europe and China is nearing pre-pandemic levels—reaching nearly 90% of 2019 travel—Chinese airlines have surged ahead. If Europe is serious about maintaining a meaningful and productive relationship with China, it needs a strong presence in the skies to keep up with China’s rapidly expanding market share.

Data from OAG, an aviation analytics firm, reveals the extent of the disparity. In Q3 2024, Chinese airlines operated 1.93 million one-way non-stop seats to Europe, a 43% increase over pre-pandemic levels. Meanwhile, European carriers have halved their capacity on routes to Mainland China, offering just 555,000 seats. As a result, Chinese airlines have expanded their market share from 57% to a market-dominant 78%. This is especially worrying given that the Chinese government owns a controlling stake in eight of the nine major Chinese carriers that fly between Europe and mainland China.

A similar disparity exists in the US-China market, primarily due to the suspension of the Sino-American bilateral air services agreement in 2020. Without the agreement, each country can operate 50 return flights per week. Even so, American carriers currently operate 35 return flights to Mainland China of the 50 allocated to them, compared to the 49 return flights operated by Chinese carriers.

Several factors contribute to this shift. Russian airspace remains closed to European airlines, forcing them to fly longer routes at higher costs, while Chinese carriers continue to benefit from shorter, more fuel-efficient paths over Russia. Additionally, state-owned Chinese airlines have been accused of undercutting prices and flooding the market with cheap seats, making it difficult for European carriers to compete.

Reducing flights will create logistical challenges for European businesses trying to maintain a presence in the world’s second-largest economy. The tourism and hospitality sectors will suffer, and European exporters and multinationals who rely on regular travel to sustain partnerships will face new complications. The ripple effects are clear: fewer routes mean fewer opportunities for European businesses and diminished visibility in the Chinese market.

The consequences extend beyond financial losses. The geopolitics of international aviation shape who controls the corridors for exchanging ideas, culture, and political influence.

Commercial aviation has reflected geopolitical dynamics since the dawn of the jet age. During the Cold War, access to airspace and routes signaled alliances and openness. Just after the Second World War, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt recognized commercial aviation as a valuable tool to build US foreign relations. On a visit to Saudi Arabia, Roosevelt gifted an aircraft to King Abdul Aziz as the first step in building Saudi-US relations. The two countries signed the 1951 Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement, a formal defense pact still in effect today, only six years after Roosevelt’s fateful visit. More recently, Beijing has promoted the Chinese COMAC C919 as a competitor to the American Boeing 737 and European Airbus A320, serving both as a prestige project and a business opportunity for Beijing.

De-coupling should not cost Europe’s influence and relevance

The one-sided air travel landscape between Europe and China is not merely inconvenient—it signals that Europe is retreating while China expands its reach. A Europe that pulls back is a Europe that becomes less visible and relevant in global geopolitics. The importance of reciprocity and exchange—foundations for stable, long-term international relationships—is often overlooked in European discussions on decoupling and de-risking.

This aviation imbalance mirrors the dynamics of student exchanges. More than 300,000 Chinese students are studying in Europe, compared to only about 38,000 European students in China. The imbalance represents a strategic disadvantage, as Chinese students return home with a deeper understanding of European values, societies, and business practices. Meanwhile, the relatively small number of European students in China means a missed opportunity to build relationships, gain cultural insights, and develop a nuanced understanding of China’s priorities. This disparity leaves Europe’s perspectives—and potentially its influence—absent from Chinese classrooms, boardrooms, and social circles.

The same applies to air travel. With fewer European flights to China, fewer Europeans from all sectors of society will engage directly with Chinese society, missing the chance to influence perceptions at the grassroots, educational, and business levels. If Europe wants to compete with China’s expanding influence, it must ensure that its people, ideas, and businesses remain visible, accessible, and relevant—not constrained by shrinking air capacity.

Re-engagement is not easy, but is needed

Retreating from China’s aviation market is a risky move. Amid tensions over human rights, trade, and technology, Europe must decide whether to be an active participant or a passive spectator in shaping the future of international relations. By ceding one of the largest aviation markets to Chinese carriers, Europe risks allowing China to dictate and monopolize Sino-European relations.

If Europe truly seeks a balanced, stable relationship with China, it must be willing to engage—both in policy discussions and in the skies. Airlines are more than transportation providers; they are connectors and intercontinental flag bearers. Expanding European air capacity to China would signal a renewed commitment to direct engagement, countering the narrative that Europe is retreating.

Re-engagement will not be easy. Rising fuel costs, longer detours around Russian airspace, and geopolitical tensions with China present serious challenges. However, avoiding these routes altogether is a strategic miscalculation. European governments must provide strategic and financial support for their airlines. European carriers should also explore creative solutions, including partnerships with other Asian airlines and joint ventures to reduce costs while maintaining a presence in China. Such strategies could help Europe stay competitive, even as the rules become more complex.

Decisions about air routes carry more weight than they might appear. If Europe is serious about engaging with China, it must ensure a presence in the skies—before finding itself completely grounded.