Developing security relations between South Korea and the EU under a “like-minded” paradigm

Amid escalating global security tensions, the EU-South Korea security partnership, built on shared values and multilateral cooperation, faces new challenges as geopolitical shifts—ranging from North Korea’s involvement in Ukraine to potential fractures in transatlantic relations—threaten to reshape the international order.

Key takeaways:

EU defense and security partnerships

In response to the crisis in European security following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the EU adopted the “Strategic Compass” in 2022, setting out a new framework for strengthening the bloc‘s security and defense. The strategy places particular emphasis on enhancing cooperation with other actors. The EU currently has security and defense partnership with six countries: Norway, Moldova, Japan, South Korea, Albania and North Macedonia. Among these partners, South Korea and Japan are the two countries considered to be external to Europe, in other words, whose geopolitical and security interests are not directly intertwined with those of the continent. Both countries have been recognized as like-minded partners of the EU since the 2012 “Guidelines on the Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia” and play a key role in EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy in working with the EU to support regional peace and security structures and initiatives.

In November 2024, South Korea and the EU signed a “Security and Defense Partnership” to strengthen bilateral cooperation in security and defense. This partnership provides for cooperation in 15 areas, including maritime, cyber, and space security, disarmament and non-proliferation. Moreover, the two sides have agreed to hold an annual Security and Defense Dialogue between the heads of the Korean ministries of foreign affairs and defense and their EU counterparts.

Partnership built on universal values

The meaning of “like-mindedness” in the context of the international relations of the EU is constructed according to the counterpart actor, based on common interests and shared values. In the EU’s relationship with South Korea, based on the establishment of a Strategic Partnership in 2010, the term “like-minded partners” has been an significant keyword, referring to a bilateral relationship based on shared values, principles and commitment to a rules-based international order. As stipulated in the EU-Korea Agreement signed in 2010, these values are embedded in democracy, human rights, fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, derived from the UN Charter.

Since the Maastricht Treaty of 1993, the EU has focused on universal values as an important pillar of its foreign and security policy, aiming to promote democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. These values, which were central to the creation and development of the European Community, are enshrined in the EU Treaties, reflecting that they form both the identity of the EU and the foundation of its foreign policy. South Korea began recognizing universal values in its diplomacy since 1993 following the coming to power of first civilian government with the aim of integrating into the international liberal order. The emphasis on universal values in foreign policy increased with the Kim Dae-jung government in the late 1990s and has continued to this day. For South Korea, the diplomatic focus on universal values is an effort to establish its identity as a democracy in the international order, while at the same time building an external political system consistent with adherence to universal values as international norm as part of its “middle power” strategy.

The security relations between the EU and South Korea, who do not share immediate security interests, have gained a broader meaning within this value perspective. This is a shift away from a state-centric approach to security and toward an expanded framework of “international security” that integrates human security at the micro level with global security at the macro level. Under such a concept, actors define and pursue their own identities and interests by recognizing common goals and shared values that resonate with all parties involved. 

Consequently, the value-based approach has fostered a mutual recognition of “promoting peaceful solutions to international or regional conflicts and enhancement of policy consultations on international security matters” from a multilateral perspective. This is reflected in the regular bilateral meetings between the EU and South Korea on international affairs of security and the Bilateral Agreement on EU Crisis Management Operations, establishing a framework for the participation of South Korea in EU peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, both civilian and military. 

North Korea’s intervention in the Ukraine war and a new like-mindedness paradigm

While the war in Ukraine is geographically confined to Europe, its aftermath has been global. The upgrade of the China-Russia partnership after the War in Ukraine and the conclusion of North Korea-Russia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership have indirectly created a “North Korea-China-Russia strategic partnership” intertwining the Indo-Pacific and Europe into one strategic region. In response, NATO has begun to expand its geographical reach from the Euro-Atlantic region to the Indo-Pacific, underpinned by the awareness of indivisibility of these two theaters, as acknowledged at the June 2022 Madrid Summit. As part of this strategy, NATO has pursued security cooperation through the Individualized Tailored Partnership Program (ITPP) with the liberal democracies of the Indo-Pacific region—South Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand—as the Indo-Pacific Partners (IP4). This has led to the strengthened cohesion between NATO and its allies as “like-minded partners” in the face of emerging security threats. The post-Cold War era is thus once again being reshaped by the formation of a “liberal internationalist coalition” that responds to the challenges of the new global security order.

The EU-South Korea partnership has also gained a new dimension within this deepened like-minded paradigm. South Korea’s conservative government that assumed power in May 2022 has supported Ukraine after the Russian invasion with a reference to the defense of “liberal democracy” and “solidarity and cooperation with the international community to protect universal values”. In terms of humanitarian aid and reconstruction funds, South Korea has provided Ukraine with $100 million in 2022, $150 million in 2023, and $300 million in 2024. Moreover, Seoul provided a $100 million loan to Kyiv in December 2024, and has pledged to provide additional $2 billion in long-term, low-interest loans through its Economic Development Cooperation Fund starting in 2025. The EU has also called for and welcomed the support of South Korea, to Ukraine, and this has been one of the key drivers for signing the Security and Defense Partnership between the EU and South Korea. Meanwhile, South Korea has avoided direct supply of arms to Ukraine, due to fears of igniting tension with North Korea and Russia and lack of domestic support.

After the deployment of North Korea’s troops to the Ukraine front in October 2024, the war in Ukraine has risen to the forefront of South Korea’s security concerns. With the US, the EU has called for South Korea to provide direct arms aid to Ukraine, insisting “North Korea’s support for Russia’s war in Ukraine threatens not only Europe, but also South Korea and global security.” Moreover, the  European Parliament adopted a resolution emphasizing “South Korea’s constructive role in the rules-based international order” reflected in its support to Ukraine, and advocating for the EU to “seek to shift its position on arming Ukraine”. This illustrates a significant step in EU-South Korea security cooperation, that is converging toward the pursuit of bilateral common interests. 

Like-mindedness under attack?

While the EU-South Korea security partnership has been growing more robust, it threatens to be upended by the dramatic geopolitical developments. The actions of the Trump 2.0. Administration are undermining the security framework of liberal international order, which has historically been vital to maintaining the cohesion between Europe and the US. Notably, it is being reflected in Trump’s proposal to end the war in Ukraine which excludes Europe and shifts the focus toward a US-Russia-led peace process. The risk is that the established international order based on international norms becomes reshaped by a power-based order. Meanwhile, the EU faces growing internal discord, as seen by an emergency meeting on February 17, 2025, between the EU, key European nations and NATO’s Secretary General in Paris, where divisions over security issues, especially regarding its relationship with the United States, where evident. For South Korea, with the suspension of President Yoon Seok-yeol, who is currently under impeachment trial by the Constitutional Court, the status quo is the best option for its foreign policy due to the limitations of “normal diplomacy” in the absence of a president and the possibility of a change of government in the near future. Accordingly, if tensions between the US and the EU intensify, South Korea will likely maintain rather than expand its current security relationship with the EU but prioritize its longstanding traditional security alliance with the US. In turn, the “like-minded partnership” between the EU and South Korea, is now challenged by a risk of shifting towards a power-based structure in international affairs.