How Taiwanese emotions shape views of Cross-Strait relations

Cross-Strait relations are usually discussed in terms of military risk, diplomacy, and great-power politics. But survey data from Taiwan show that the relationship is also deeply emotional, shaped by anxiety, threat, helplessness, and a fragile sense of peace.

Key takeaways:

Cross-Strait relations are often analyzed through the lens of military balance, diplomatic signaling, party politics, or the strategic calculations of Beijing, Taipei, and Washington. These dimensions matter. Yet they can obscure something equally important: how ordinary people in Taiwan emotionally experience the relationship with China.

This is not a soft or secondary question. In politics, emotions are not merely private feelings; they shape how people perceive threats, imagine the future, and support or reject policy options. In the Taiwan Strait, where the possibility of conflict is constantly discussed, public emotions are part of the political landscape. They influence resilience and the room available for compromise or escalation.

A survey (N = 1,350) conducted in Taiwan between April and June 2022, as part of the Sinophone Borderlands Indo-Pacific Survey, offers a revealing snapshot of how Taiwanese citizens viewed cross-Strait relations before the major escalation that followed then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022. The timing matters. The pessimism captured in the data was not a reaction to any dramatic crisis; it reflected a deeper emotional climate that already existed before the visit.

When respondents were asked to describe cross-Strait relations in one word, the most common answer was “tense.” Other frequent descriptions included “terrible” and “complicated,” while many respondents chose words such as “dangerous,” “hostile,” “volatile,” or “incompatible.” Some even suggested that war could break out at any moment.

This matters because these were not only analytical judgments. More than half of the valid answers used emotive language rather than cognitive descriptions. In other words, respondents did not simply describe cross-Strait relations as a political arrangement, a diplomatic dispute, or a strategic problem; they described them as something felt.

Among those emotive answers, negative emotions overwhelmingly dominated. Positive terms such as “good,” “love,” or “alright” appeared only marginally. By contrast, negative descriptions such as “tense,” “terrible,” or “cold as ice” were widespread. The result is striking. From the Taiwanese public’s perspective, cross-Strait relations are not merely difficult; they are emotionally heavy.

The metaphors used by respondents are perhaps even more revealing than the frequencies. Some described the relationship as “turbulent as waves,” with “dark tides lurking underneath the surface.” Others compared it to “walking on ice,” being at a “frozen point,” or being “cold as ice.” Other respondents relied on interpersonal metaphors. Taiwan and China were compared to “brothers that don’t get along,” “a married couple in disharmony,” or “bad neighbors.” Some metaphors implied a much more unequal relationship, such as “mother-in-law and daughter-in-law,” or even “abusive lover.” These descriptions point to something important: many Taiwanese do not necessarily describe China only as a distant external enemy. The relationship is often imagined through proximity, shared history, family, hierarchy, resentment and coercion.

Peace also appeared repeatedly in the responses, but rarely in a straightforwardly optimistic way. Respondents referred to “peaceful coexistence,” “temporary peace,” a “wish for peace,” or a situation that was “peaceful on the surface.” The recurrence of peace-related language does not indicate confidence. Rather, it shows that peace is present as an aspiration, a fragile condition, and a possible loss. Taiwan and China are not currently in a full-scale military conflict, but many Taiwanese respondents seemed to experience peace as conditional and unstable.

This emotional pessimism also extended into how respondents thought about Taiwan’s future. When asked about Taiwan’s political and economic future and about cross-Strait confrontation, negative emotions overshadowed positive ones. Anxiety, feeling threatened, and helplessness were prominent. Cross-Strait confrontation additionally triggered anger. This combination deserves attention. Anxiety and threat may produce caution and vigilance. Helplessness, however, is more politically dangerous. A society that feels threatened but also capable of shaping its future may build resilience. A society that feels threatened and helpless risks exhaustion or polarisation. For Taiwan, which depends not only on military deterrence but also on social confidence and democratic cohesion, this distinction matters.

The survey also asked respondents about their attitudes toward unification or independence under two different conditions. In the current political reality of cross-Strait relations, more respondents favored independence over unification, although the middle ground remained significant. This is broadly consistent with long-term public opinion trends in Taiwan, where maintaining the status quo remains the most common position.

Yet the picture changed when respondents were asked what they would prefer if they could choose freely without repercussions. Under this hypothetical condition, support for independence increased noticeably, while the middle-ground responses declined. This does not mean that Taiwanese society is rushing toward a formal declaration of independence, but it does suggest that some support for the status quo is not simply a positive preference; it is also shaped by constraint.

This is one of the most important findings. The status quo is often treated in international debates as a stable consensus or a moderate political center. For many Taiwanese citizens, however, it may also be a defensive position under pressure. The fact that more respondents leaned toward independence when the threat of repercussions was removed indicates the deterrent effect of Beijing’s pressure. External observers should therefore be careful not to reduce Taiwanese public opinion to a binary choice between “pro-independence” and “pro-unification.” The more important story may be how people navigate their preferences under threat.

The findings also suggest that Beijing’s pressure is not producing affection or persuasion among Taiwanese citizens. If the goal is to win hearts and minds, the emotional data point runs counter to that. Coercion may deter formal moves toward independence, but it also deepens fear, anger, distrust and emotional distance. It may constrain Taiwan’s choices, but it does not make unification more attractive.

For Taiwan’s partners, the lesson is not simply that Taiwan needs more military or diplomatic support, although both remain important. It is also that Taiwan’s resilience depends on whether Taiwanese society retains a meaningful sense of agency over its own future. A society that believes it has choices is better positioned to withstand pressure. A society that feels its future is decided elsewhere becomes more vulnerable to polarization and manipulation.

Cross-Strait relations are often described as frozen, tense or unstable. These words are accurate, but incomplete. For many Taiwanese citizens, the relationship is also anxious, coercive and emotionally exhausting. To understand the Taiwan Strait, we need to look not only at aircraft, missiles and diplomatic statements, but also at the emotional climate in which Taiwanese people imagine their future.

This article is based on the academic book chapter “Looming Pessimism? Taiwanese Perceptions and Emotions of Cross-Strait Relations” by Rong Chen and Kristina Kironska, published in Taiwan in the New World Order: The Legacy of Tsai Ing-Wen (Brill, 2026).