Lawfare across the Strait: Taiwan’s legal resilience and China’s expanding rule-of-law narrative

During the author’s recent research stay in Taipei, conversations about China rarely began with military exercises. They began with law, constitutional interpretation, amendments to national security legislation, and judicial independence. In Taiwan, however, the law is not a technical matter; it is a frontline.

Key takeaways:

International commentary often frames cross-strait tensions in military terms, which is understandable given the repeated People’s Liberation Army (PLA) exercises conducted near Taiwan, clearly rehearsing capabilities for a blockade or invasion of the island. The PLA’s Justice Mission operation in December 2025 was among the most daring to date.

However, the contest between Beijing and Taipei is also about something less visible but equally consequential: the meaning of the rule of law. Beijing promotes a model in which law reinforces Party leadership and sovereign authority. Taiwan operates within a constitutional democracy in which courts constrain executive power and civil society scrutinizes security policy.

This divergence is no longer merely a cross-strait issue as it reflects a broader competition over legal norms in global governance. China has advanced initiatives, such as the Global Civilization Initiative and other governance proposals, that promote alternative interpretations of international law and the international order. Chinese official commentary often contrasts these ideas with what it describes as a Western-led “rules-based order,” which it portrays as reflecting Western dominance rather than universal principles.

Law as strategy

The concept of lawfare, first articulated in contemporary terms by Charles J. Dunlap Jr. in his essay Law and Military Interventions, describes the strategic use of legal instruments in geopolitical competition. In China’s case, lawfare does not primarily unfold in international courts. Rather, it unfolds through legislative design and institutional engineering.

The steady expansion of national security legislation under President Xi Jinping has been carefully documented. Jamie P. Horsley’s Brookings paper, “ We can observe these tactics in practice in a case of transnational repression in which the CCP targeted Democratic Progressive Party legislator Puma Shen and threatened him with a global arrest warrant.

Internationally, Beijing positions this framework as compatible with global rule-of-law standards. The United Nations’ own definition of the rule of law provides the reference point against which such claims can be assessed. As the author discussed elsewhere, China is developing its own version of the rule of law, characterized by a state-centered, non-democratic system with the CCP at its core. Reports such as MERICS’ analysis of China’s global governance push show how legal concepts travel alongside economic and diplomatic initiatives. China is not rejecting the law, but it is redefining its institutional core.

China has increasingly advanced its own governance language in international forums and used its discursive power to promote its preferences and leadership role within the 

Taiwan’s constitutional shield

Taiwan’s trajectory since the lifting of martial law in 1987 tells a different story. Democratic consolidation has gone hand in hand with judicial strengthening and constitutional reform. Taiwan’s Constitutional Court has shaped key areas of governance, from administrative law to civil rights.

Comparative constitutional scholarship highlights the role courts can play in preventing democratic backsliding. Taiwan illustrates this in practice, and the contrast with Hong Kong is instructive. Freedom House’s latest report on freedom in Hong Kong documents the institutional effects of the 2020 National Security Law. In Taiwan, debates over security legislation frequently refer to this experience. The National Security Law in Hong Kong created a parallel legal mechanism that allows certain cases to be transferred to Mainland China. It also weakened due process guarantees and has had broader societal spillover effects, eroding democratic competition and encouraging self-censorship.

Crucially, in Taiwan, cross-strait relations are not treated simply as a foreign policy issue as they intersect with questions of constitutional identity. Taiwan’s legal order does not recognize subordination to the Chinese system. That distinction is structural, not rhetorical, as law draws the line.

Taiwan’s resilience does not rest solely on institutions, as civil society also plays a sustained monitoring role. Organizations such as the Taiwan FactCheck Center provide public analysis of disinformation and regulatory responses. Democratic theory often emphasizes institutional guardrails, arguing that norms and institutional constraints work together. Taiwan demonstrates how legal literacy reinforces both.

In Taiwan, security legislation is debated in terms of proportionality, constitutional review, and oversight. Executive power is expected to justify itself within a legal framework. Security and rights are not framed as opposites. They are negotiated through the law.

Despite this, Taiwan’s legal order continues to encounter challenges. Several recent espionage cases in Taiwan have involved both political insiders and non-state networks, including former government aides accused of passing diplomatic information to China and a criminal group recruiting soldiers through a temple. In response, the Taiwanese government has strengthened national security legislation, including the Anti-Infiltration Act, increasing penalties for leaking sensitive technologies and defense information, and expanding counterintelligence training and public awareness campaigns.

Authorities describe these measures as a whole-of-society effort to counter Chinese influence. However, critics warn that some proposals, such as These concerns highlight a broader dilemma of how a democratic legal system, operating under constitutional and rights-based constraints, can respond effectively to external pressure without eroding the very legal principles and civil liberties it seeks to defend. 

Why Europe should care

For European policymakers, Taiwan’s legal trajectory offers more than symbolic value. First, engagement with Taiwan should include judicial and academic cooperation. Exchanges between constitutional courts, legal scholars, and civil society actors reinforce institutional resilience. Second, debates over the definition of the rule of law within multilateral institutions are politically consequential. Competing interpretations shape international standards. Europe cannot take conceptual consensus for granted when engaging in multilateral legal diplomacy. It must actively articulate and defend its preferred understandings, while recognizing the ongoing normative competition within international institutions. Third, Taiwan demonstrates that democratic legality and national security can coexist. This lesson matters for European states seeking to address foreign interference while preserving civil liberties. Taiwan is often discussed as a security flashpoint, but it is also a constitutional case study.

The future of international order will not be shaped solely by military balances. It will also depend on how states define and institutionalize the rule of law. Across the Strait, the struggle is not only about territory, but also about the architecture of governance. Taiwan’s experience shows that legal resilience can be a strategic asset. The question for Europe is whether it recognizes that the contest over the rule of law is already underway.