Taiwan and Central and Eastern Europe should intensify their collaboration to protect regional and minority languages, recognizing the role of multilingualism in bolstering democratic resilience.
Key takeaways:
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Taiwan and Poland’s transitions to democracy marked significant shifts in language policies, leading to the recognition and protection of marginalized languages like Hakka and Kashubian.
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The inclusive language policies in Taiwan contrast with Poland’s narrower approach, highlighting differences in geographic scope and the extent of language rights protections.
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Cooperation between Taiwan, Poland, and other CEE countries in safeguarding minority languages offers potential for educational exchanges, cultural diplomacy, and joint efforts to counter disinformation.
Democracy thrives on a symphony of diverse voices, and the historical and contemporary developments in language policies in Taiwan and Poland, which evolved alongside their democratic transitions, exemplify this dynamic.
In Taiwan, the post-Chinese Civil War Republic of China implemented a monolingual Guoyu Zhengce (National Language Policy), elevating Mandarin, a colonial language, at the expense of other languages like Hakka, a Sinitic language spoken by the second-largest ethnic group in Taiwan. Similarly, in post-World War II Poland, the authoritarian Polish United Workers’ Party viewed the Kashubian community’s linguistic distinctiveness as a barrier to creating a homogeneous Polish state.
However, as Taiwan and Poland transitioned to democracy, the status of these marginalized languages began to shift. In Taiwan, three pivotal legal acts—the 2000 Act of Broadcasting Language Equality Protection in Public Transport (ABLEPPT), the 2018 Hakka Basic Act (HBA), and the 2019 Development of National Languages Act (DNLA)—laid the groundwork for protecting the linguistic rights of the Hakka community. In Poland, the 2005 Act on National and Ethnic Minorities and on the Regional Language (ANEMRL) officially recognized Kashubian’s linguistic rights—and as the country’s sole “regional language”—and allowed its use in schools and municipal administration. These changes align with broader international frameworks for safeguarding minority languages, such as Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML). Thus, the protection of minority languages is a promising yet underexplored field for cooperation between Taiwan and Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries.
Authoritarian homogeneity, democratic plurality: multilingualism amid regime change
In Taiwan, the gradual opening of civic space, marked by the partial lifting of martial law in 1987, sparked a “popular upsurge” of social movements advocating for the protection of Taiwan’s diversity and the restoration of minority rights, including linguistic rights. For instance, the late 1980s saw Indigenous activists protesting against racism in textbooks, which led to broader discussions about the status of Indigenous languages. In 1989, Kavas Takistaulan became the first Indigenous person to insist on using the Bunun language during an interrogation by Taiwanese authorities, marking a significant moment in the recognition of Indigenous languages. Similarly, in 1988, over 10,000 Hakka people marched in Taipei demanding the government restore their mother tongue. As Taiwan’s electoral democracy consolidated, its two main political parties recognized the importance of language rights in appealing to multilingual voters. The Kuomintang administration passed the ABLEPPT in 2000, and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) subsequently introduced additional legislation to advance linguistic diversity, including the 2017 Indigenous Languages Development Act, the HBA, and the DNLA.
Poland’s transition to democracy in 1989 also led to a shift away from the homogeneity promoted by the Polish United Workers Party. Piotr Brzeziński, an expert on the modern history of northern Poland, notes that the authoritarian regime viewed Kashubian activists as a threat to their power until the very end. The democratic transition provided an opportunity to challenge the ideology of an ethnically homogenous Poland. The Contract Sejm, the parliament elected in 1989, established the National and Ethnic Minorities Committee in 1989. The following year, the chamber held an ex-situ session in Kashubia, allowing the members to understand the “Kashub issue” better. Whether Kashubs constitute an ethnic minority has remained contentious, and the ANEMRL found a workaround by novelly categorizing it as a “regional language” in ANEMRL. Nonetheless, the subsequent passage of the ANEMRL underscored the importance of linguistic rights as a pillar of Polish democracy and aligned Poland’s legislation with international frameworks like the ECRML.
Shared challenges, divergent outcomes: contrasting national languages policies in Taiwan and Poland
Comparative studies of democratic transitions often place Taiwan and CEE cases within a Huntingtonian framework, categorizing them as part of the “third wave” of democratization. This perspective allows for a comparative analysis of national language policy changes in Taiwan and Poland, facilitating the development of actionable policy ideas that bridge language communities in both countries.
Two key differences in Taiwan’s and Poland’s approaches to national language policy include the inclusiveness of the policy framework and its geographic scope. Taiwan’s framework, including the DNLA and the 2022-2026 National Languages Development Plan, aims to preserve “all natural and sign languages” used in Taiwan, covering minority ethnic groups—there are 16 officially recognized Indigenous groups—and language minority groups like the Hakka and residents of the Matsu Islands. In contrast, Polish legislation provides a narrower definition of protected languages, with Kashubian being the sole regional language recognized under ANEMRL. Moreover, the Polish framework does not explicitly mandate actions for language development, viewing it primarily as a cultural right. The limited scope of protection for Poland’s linguistic diversity was further exacerbated in April 2024 when President Andrzej Duda vetoed a proposed amendment to ANEMRL that would have expanded the law’s scope to safeguard the linguistic rights of Silesian (Ślůnsko godka) speakers.
Geographically, Polish legislation imposes stricter limitations than Taiwan. In Poland, the presence of minority languages as “supporting languages” in the public sphere is limited to municipalities where the users of this language exceed twenty percent of residents. According to a 2022 government report, only 33 out of 2477 municipalities in Poland adopted a supporting language. In contrast, Taiwan’s national languages development framework applies uniformly across all twenty-two counties and cities. While some Taiwanese legislation allows for geographical variation—Mindong is only used in public transportation in Lienchiang County under ABLEPPT, for instance– the DNLA established a comprehensive framework for national languages development, including minority languages, to be implemented vertically across the multi-level government structure of Taiwan.
Despite these differences, there is significant potential for Taiwan and Poland—and other CEE countries increasingly reconnecting with their multilingual heritage—to bolster their collaboration on protecting minority and regional languages as a part of the broader endeavor to deepen and broaden the scope of people-to-people exchanges. This cooperation could include educational exchanges, public diplomacy initiatives through youth dialogues and capacity building for minority language instructors, incorporation of multilingualism in cultural diplomacy programs, cooperation on addressing disinformation targeting speakers of minoritized languages, and sharing best practices in governance to safeguard linguistic diversity such as creating language commissioners.
Leeks and plums: Welsh-Taiwanese cooperation on language preservation
Advocating for closer cooperation between Taiwanese and European stakeholders in regional and minority language promotion is not unprecedented. The partnership between Taiwanese Hakka and Welsh language authorities offers a positive example to emulate in other contexts.
One notable area of cooperation is the exchange between elementary schools that use Hakka and Welsh as their primary languages of instruction. In February 2024, Chiao Yu Multiple Intelligence Experimental Elementary School in Miaoli and Ysgol Gynradd Plascrug Primary School in Aberystwyth, Wales, signed a memorandum of understanding to institutionalize the exchange of best practices in bilingual education and mother tongue preservation.
This sister school partnership builds on a legacy of expert visits between Taiwan and Wales to strengthen minority and regional language development in educational institutions. In 2016, Yung-Te Lee, then Minister of the Hakka Affairs Council, led a historic, high-profile delegation to Wales, including a visit to the School of Welsh at Cardiff University, to share experiences in language revival. More recently, in 2023, a delegation of 40 Hakka language educators traveled to Wales to engage in exchanges with their counterparts at various educational levels, from kindergartens to Aberystwyth University. These exchanges extend beyond education and include media platforms, among other stakeholders. Since 2008, Taiwan’s Hakka TV has cooperated with S4C, a Welsh-language channel in the UK.
Notably, the cooperation between Taiwanese institutions promoting the Hakka language and their Welsh counterparts occurs almost exclusively at the grassroots level or occasionally with the direct involvement of the Hakka Affairs Council in a “Track 1.5” format. The Welsh government, which maintains 20 overseas offices in 12 countries, including three in China and one in Japan, does not engage publicly with Taiwan. This demonstrates that minority language development offers a unique area where partners can exercise considerable flexibility, even when domestic political considerations in the partner country limit semi-official engagements with Taiwan through public institutions.
Path forward
The parallels in Taiwan’s and Poland’s efforts to craft more diversified and inclusive national language policies, as well as the strong track record of cooperation between Taiwan’s Hakka-language institutions and their Welsh-language partners in the UK, highlight the untapped potential for joint initiatives between Taiwan and CEE to safeguard multilingualism.
A natural starting point for enhanced cooperation in this domain would be strengthening ties between educational institutions dedicated to promoting minority languages. In Poland, key institutions could include the Kashubian Studies program (kaszëbistika) at the University of Gdańsk and research associations like the Kashubian Institute. Such collaboration could facilitate the exchange of best practices for integrating minority languages into school curricula. Additionally, cooperation between museums, such as the Taiwan Hakka Museum in Miaoli and the Museum of the Kashubian-Pomeranian Literature and Music in Wejherowo, could foster joint efforts in language research, preservation, and broader cultural promotion. These initiatives would complement education-focused efforts and build broader institutional capacity on both sides.
Beyond tried and tested approaches, there is ample room for innovation. Amid global challenges to democracy, promoting and protecting minority languages can be crucial for Taiwan and CEE countries in countering disinformation and FIMI. In Taiwan, the information space has increasingly seen content supportive of the Chinese Communist Party being disseminated in minority languages, notably including speeches in Hakka by Zhu Fenglian, deputy director and spokesperson of the Information Bureau at the Taiwan Affairs Office, accusing former President Tsai Ing-wen’s administration of pursuing “divisive de-Sinicization policies.” In Poland, President Duda explicitly cited concerns about “hybrid threats” when justifying his veto of a bill seeking to expand regional and minority language rights. While malign actors can weaponize the status of minority languages, there is a viable alternative to an administrative clampdown on linguistic diversity under the guise of fostering cohesion. Instead, democratic actors must recognize that multilingualism is a reality and dedicate resources to empowering NGOs, media, and local authorities to safeguard information integrity—potentially also within the frameworks for Taiwan-Europe cooperation on tackling FIMI.
By embracing these partnership opportunities, Taiwan and CEE countries can advance their efforts to safeguard minority languages, thereby enriching their democratic processes and institutions and strengthening mutual cultural ties. In healthy democracies, diversity is a source of strength.
