Europe is increasing its military engagements with ASEAN states

France, Spain, and Italy primarily export naval and air platforms to Southeast Asia, whereas the Visegrád Four, primarily Czechia and Poland, focus on armored vehicles and drones.

Key takeaways:

Europe’s engagement with Southeast Asia’s defense sector has entered a new phase, characterized by increased arms sales, technology transfers, and industrial partnerships. As Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states pursue military modernization and enhanced regional security, European states are establishing distinct roles within the region’s evolving arms market.

Before 2020, trade between the European Union (EU) and ASEAN states was often stifled by various political disagreements, mainly over human rights and democratic principles, such as the arms embargo on Myanmar, in place since the early 1990s, and the partial withdrawal of Cambodia’s tariff preferences in February 2020. Nonetheless, the deteriorating security environment in East Asia during the 2010s, notably due to China’s more assertive foreign policy and escalating territorial disputes in the South China Sea, led ASEAN states to diversify their military acquisitions, with the EU member states as important partners.

This diversification and outreach to EU member states on a bilateral basis is consistent with how ASEAN has long conducted its external relations. Consensus and non-interference in members’ internal affairs, codified in the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and restated in the 2008 ASEAN Charter, leave procurement to individual governments, and a study by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) found that most Southeast Asian states buy arms from many sources, “attempting to underline their non-aligned status and to spread the risk of negative relations with supplier states.” For example, Indonesia learned the cost of dependence in the 1990s, when US sanctions grounded much of its American-built fleet due to a lack of spare parts, and now buys combat aircraft from France, Türkiye, South Korea, and the United States at once.

The mutual interest in a deeper, more institutionalized relationship led to the establishment of a Strategic Partnership framework of relations between the EU and ASEAN in 2020. Security cooperation, notably regarding maritime security, cybersecurity, and counterterrorism, is one of the main areas of this partnership. Additionally, in 2021, the Council of the European Union adopted conclusions advocating for a deeper security and defense role in the region, emphasizing maritime security and a rules-based order. While the EU provided a policy basis for more defense cooperation, it has no common arms-contracting authority, and defense sales remain a national competence.

Western Europe dominates air and naval systems

The most prominent defense deals in Southeast Asia originate from the European Union’s traditional exporters, particularly France and Spain, and are concentrated in air and naval power. The disputes predominantly driving Southeast Asian modernization are maritime, from Chinese coast guard and fishing vessels operating inside Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone around the Natuna Islands to the standoff at Scarborough Shoal that reoriented Philippine defense planning.

What these states need is the ability to monitor and to reach across sea space, which translates into maritime patrol aircraft, surveillance radars, transport and refueling aircraft, submarines, and frigates. In recent years, multiple generations of Airbus Helicopters, manufactured in France, have been ordered by Brunei and delivered to Singapore, Thailand, and Indonesia. Deliveries range from the heavy tactical H225M used for combat and rescue missions to the lighter H135 used by law enforcement and medical services in central European countries such as Poland. The popularity of Airbus helicopters in Southeast Asia reflects a preference for versatile, multi-role platforms that can perform military transport, combat search and rescue, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and maritime operations thanks to their capability to operate from ships, allowing armed forces resources to consolidate multiple capabilities within a single fleet.

In 2022, Indonesia ordered 42 versatile Dassault Rafale fighters, six of which have been delivered this year. This huge defense spending forms part of Indonesia’s broader effort to modernize and expand its air force while diversifying defense suppliers and reducing reliance on aging Russian platforms. In the context of the war in Ukraine, Indonesia, under US pressure, canceled a purchase of Russian SU-35 fighter jets and proceeded to buy Rafale jets instead. In 2023, Thales, another French company, received orders for long-range air surveillance radars GM400ɑ, known for high situational awareness and survivability, from Malaysia and Indonesia, the latter having already received the first batch. This 3D radar can detect and track aircraft, cruise missiles and unmanned aerial systems at ranges of up to 515 km, while its associated SkyView command-and-control system provides operators with a single integrated air picture across Indonesia’s archipelago, enabling earlier threat detection and faster decision-making.

Besides helicopters, Spain, through Airbus Defense and Space, provides transport aircraft to several Southeast Asian states, including Airbus C295 to the Philippines, Brunei, and Thailand. In November 2025, Indonesia’s Ministry of Defense reported the handover of its first Airbus A400M heavy airlifter, a platform capable of carrying up to 37 tons of cargo and operating from short or unprepared runways, enhancing both military mobility and disaster-response capabilities across the archipelago.

In 2025, Sweden’s Saab signed a contract to supply four Gripen E/F fighters to the Royal Thai Air Force, which had previously used the older-generation Gripen fighters, similarly to Czechia and Hungary. Thailand had used Gripen since 2011, so the choice preserved an existing training and maintenance base, but it might also have been motivated by the United States declining its request to buy eight F-35A fighters.

In the context of maritime operations, Denmark’s Terma provided SCANTER 6002 surveillance radars for Indonesia’s hospital ships in 2021 and delivered C-Guard mechanical decoy launching systems for multiple Indonesian Navy vessels in 2023. The C-Guard system improves naval defense against incoming anti-ship missiles. In 2024, France’s Naval Group and Indonesian state shipbuilder PT PAL signed a contract to build two Scorpene Evolved submarines, equipped with lithium-ion battery energy systems incorporating local production and technology transfer, as required by Indonesia’s laws. In 2025, Singapore ordered two more Type 218SG Invincible-class submarines, increasing the planned fleet to six vessels from Germany’s ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems. The Type 218SG incorporates an air-independent propulsion system that enables significantly longer submerged operations, and it is tailored for operations in the region’s shallow tropical waters. Indonesia purchased two multipurpose combat ships from Italy’s Fincantieri, which were delivered in 2025. Rather than constructing new vessels from scratch, Indonesia acquired ships that had originally been built for the Italian Navy, shortening delivery times. Italy’s Leonardo is also set to deliver an ATR 72 maritime patrol aircraft to Malaysia in 2026.

These agreements typically include production localization, technology transfers, and training. With few exceptions, the contracts primarily involve air and naval systems, which are the military domains prioritized by Southeast Asian states for modernization to secure maritime boundaries, address regional tensions, and project influence in contested waters.

Central Europe’s focus on land systems

Central European countries approach the Southeast Asian defense markets with a focus on land-based systems. The Visegrád Four, comprising Czechia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, primarily export armored vehicles, self-propelled artillery, rocket launchers, trucks, and small reconnaissance drones.

Czechia is the most active Central European defense partner in Southeast Asia and builds on defense ties and industry capabilities established in the 20th century. Czechoslovakia ranked second only to the Soviet Union as an arms producer within the Warsaw Pact, and it was the world’s seventh largest arms exporter in the 1980s with customers beyond the Soviet bloc, including Vietnam and Indonesia. Instead of exporting single finished military systems, Czech firms provide a platform ecosystem centered on Tatra trucks and the Czechoslovak Group (CSG), with integration into local assembly processes. This integration is structured as kit delivery with final assembly on site: Czech firms ship chassis, hulls, and subsystems, and a local state-owned partner completes the vehicle. In some cases, such as Indonesia’s, this approach answers a buyer requirement, since its 2012 defense industry law mandates all defense procurements to include technology transfer and joint production agreements.

Czechia’s main contracts have been signed with Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines. In 2024, CSG companies Excalibur Army and Tatra Defense Vehicle supplied 23 highly maneuverable, amphibious Pandur II 8×8 wheeled armored vehicles, used also by the Czech army, to Indonesia. Such an amphibious vehicle is crucial for Indonesia’s geography, as it serves an army and marine corps that take care of 17,000 islands. Excalibur Army also signed an agreement with PT Republik Defensindo in 2021 for joint production of 122mm RM-70 Vampire self-propelled rocket launchers on Tatra chassis. CSG also announced a medium-range air-defense system (MRAD) using Czech Retia and Eldis radars on Tatra chassis, and the KHAN tactical ballistic missile system, also mounted on a Tatra chassis, with deliveries planned to Indonesia from 2023 onwards.

The KHAN missiles can reach a range of about 280 kilometers, giving Indonesia the first modern solid-fuel ballistic missile capability in Southeast Asia. In 2024, the Royal Thai Army’s Defense Technology Institute delivered a prototype D11A rocket launcher mounted on a Tatra 6×6 chassis. In 2025, the Royal Thai Navy showcased six locally produced 155mm M758 self-propelled howitzers, based on the Israeli ATMOS design and integrated onto Czech Tatra 6×6 trucks. These collaborations stem from a memorandum on military and military-technical cooperation signed in March 2024 by the Czech and Thai defense ministers, which included handing over a Tatra truck prototype to the Thai institute for evaluation.

The Philippines cooperates with Czechia’s Excalibur Army, which supplies the Pandur II 8×8 platform for the wheeled version of the Philippine Army’s Sabrah light tank, led by Israel’s Elbit Systems. This deal is part of the Philippine military’s modernization, which shifted procurement away from decades of counter-insurgency toward territorial defense.

Finally, in Vietnam, the longest-standing Czech relationship in the region, Aero Vodochody completed delivery of twelve L-39 Skyfox trainer and light-attack subsonic jet aircraft in early 2025, finishing a contract first signed in 2021. Vietnam received 24 L-39C Albatros trainers from Czechoslovakia in the 1970s and 1980s, which makes the new aircraft a generational replacement. Vietnam represents Czechia’s second-largest arms export market, taking 14% of Czech arms exports between 2021 and 2025, behind only Ukraine. Hanoi’s interest in European suppliers has also grown as Russian equipment, historically the source of most Vietnamese arms, has become harder to buy since 2022. Vietnam held its first international defense expo in December 2022, described as an occasion to diversify suppliers for the armed forces.

Slovakia’s artillery and Poland’s drones

Slovakia’s presence in the region is limited. Since 2023, defense cooperation between Slovakia and Indonesia has gradually deepened through a Memorandum of Understanding on cyber cooperation and a Defense Cooperation Agreement outlining defense-industry collaboration, listing Slovakia’s offers to cooperate in field artillery, demining robots, munitions and military software. However, the agreement has yet to produce a delivery. Similarly, a defense-oriented Memorandum of Understanding was signed with Vietnam in 2026. Malaysia considered buying 18 Slovak EVA M2 self-propelled howitzers produced by Konštrukta-Defence in 2024. However, due to domestic political disagreements surrounding the procurement, Malaysia later chose France’s KNDS-produced Caesar for the acquisition in June 2026.

Poland has an even more limited presence in Southeast Asia. Its only notable cooperation involves unmanned systems, as the Polish WB Group delivered the first batch of FlyEye reconnaissance drones to the Malaysian Armed Forces in December 2024, with operator training in Poland. Poland’s absence from Southeast Asian markets is more striking than that of other countries, given that it fields one of the largest armies in Europe and the region’s biggest defense-industrial bases. However, in SIPRI’s figures for 2021 to 2025, Poland ranks 14th among arms exporters with 1% of the global total, and 94% of those exports went to Ukraine.

Despite limited exports, Poland maintains an extensive arms relationship with South Korea since 2022, including acquisitions of K2 tanks, K9 howitzers, FA-50 light combat aircraft, and Chunmoo rocket artillery to support rearmament against Russia. Poland is now South Korea’s largest customer, accounting for 58% of Korean arms exports over the same period, and this partnership is shifting from imports to co-production within Poland. Consequently, Poland’s defense-industrial capacity and political focus are directed toward Seoul and domestic modernization rather than exports to Southeast Asia. Within the Visegrád Four, Poland mainly acts as a buyer from Asia rather than a seller.

Hungary is essentially absent from the Southeast Asian defense market. Engagement with Asian defense partners has not progressed beyond preliminary discussions and no concrete Hungarian defense transactions with Southeast Asian states were recorded between 2020 and 2025.

A complementary European presence

The European defense companies in Southeast Asia do not compete so much as occupy different parts of the market. Whereas Western Europe sells the platforms that dominate the air and the sea, Central Europe, mainly represented by Czechia, sells the vehicles and weapon systems that operate on land. All 29 deals involving Western European countries recorded in a dataset gathered for this article are air, naval, space, or sensor systems, while nine of the 12 Central European ones are land systems. This means that the cooperation patterns are distributed among specific countries that do not necessarily meet in the same tender. Across Europe, providers are increasingly selling through the local industry and incorporating technology transfers.

The examples above show that cooperation between Europe and ASEAN states in the defense domain has intensified significantly and includes the active involvement of multiple European, including Central European, countries. Czechia’s accumulation of deals in Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Vietnam shows that smaller European states can build defense-industrial relationships in the region, especially when localization of production or assembly is attached, building domestic industrial capacity and employment in the buyer country.