Finland’s academic engagement with China has a long and active history. In recent years, concerns among academia and the public have emerged on the nature of cooperation, especially with respect to Chinese institutions with known military affiliation. Due to these concerns from both the government and academics, universities were expected to increase scrutiny when forming cooperation with Chinese institutions.
Warnings about China’s research espionage by intelligence services and public discussion around partnerships like LUT University’s joint programs with Chinese institutions brought questions of dual‑use technology and research security into the spotlight. National recommendations and internal university guidelines shifted accordingly.
The aim of this report is to assess whether practices have evolved in recent years, analyze the breadth and scope of academic cooperation with China, and examine how Finnish universities balance academic freedom and security concerns.
Finland has 14 public universities, one of which is the National Defense University, which is excluded from this report because it primarily trains officers for the Finnish Defense Forces and much of its research is classified. Universities of Applied Sciences also do not fall under the scope of this report. All 13 universities surveyed responded to a freedom of information request on the topic, at least in part. Additionally, University of the Arts Helsinki reported no cooperation of any form with Chinese institutions.
Most institutes of higher education in Finland are public and, as such, are bound by the Act on the Openness of Government Activities. Under this legislation, everyone has the right to obtain information from official documents, including the universities’ engagement with Chinese academia, with the caveat that broader requests for information may incur costs related to the resulting workload. The universities surveyed for this report were cooperative and transparent, and the practices and guidelines for deciding on academic cooperation with Chinese institutions were clearly informed by the earlier government guidelines, with increased scrutiny and clear guidelines reported by all.
Government guidance and governance
In 2021, the Ministry of Education and Culture, in cooperation with universities and research institutes, released recommendations for academic cooperation with China. The recommendations were made to ensure that Finnish higher education institutions are themselves proactive in monitoring risks and the scope of their engagement with China’s academic institutions. The development of the guidelines resulted from both broader scrutiny of Chinese academic engagement at the EU level and espionage concerns within the Finnish intelligence community.
The recommendations are divided into three goals: safe cooperation and partnerships based on institutions’ own principles and positions; ethical and value-based choices; and awareness of risks. In principle, the guidelines form only a broad baseline for academic cooperation and research security. The principles and decisions still fall within the purview of the individual university’s administration. Several universities reported that they operate a trans-administrative working group or a cross-departmental body to ensure that these kinds of guidelines are met in international cooperation. In practice, this means that universities analyze risks and potential issues in cooperation on a much broader scale, incorporating expert input from across the university’s staff. Key decisions on cooperation are made by the rectorate, the deans, and the heads of departments.
Indeed, the year after the guidelines’ release, the University of Helsinki, Finland’s oldest and largest, discontinued cooperation with the Confucius Institute by not renewing the cooperation agreement. Before this, Finnish staff at the institute, as well as university leadership, had expressed criticism about hosting the institute at the University of Helsinki. Concerns ranged from the inherent conflict between preserving academic freedom at the institute and receiving the funds necessary to run it from a foreign government, to issues with freedom of speech and research, and to perceived unacademic practices by the Chinese vice-chairman. The Confucius Institute had been established at the University of Helsinki in 2007 in collaboration with Renmin University and was the only one of its kind in Finland. No Confucius Institutes have been established at Finnish universities since then.
This increased awareness, following the publication of the guidelines on academic engagement with China, was also evident in the universities’ current situation for this report, as most universities had clear procedures in place when considering cooperation with Chinese institutions and used internationally established processes and databases. Practically all of the surveyed universities conducted some form of risk analysis when evaluating cooperation with Chinese institutions, and many used databases such as the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) China Defense Universities Tracker to gain insight into their prospective academic partners.
Academic cooperation
In total, 101 links were found between Finnish universities and Chinese partners. Some 22 of the links were with Chinese universities deemed high or very high on the ASPI university defense tracker. 17 links were with Chinese universities with a history of espionage or misconduct, according to the ASPI data.
The University of Helsinki, as well as the University of Turku, engages most with Chinese partners on a bilateral level. Most of the cooperation is through student exchange agreements, as well as in education and health sciences. Aalto University is particularly active in design and fashion with China through its School of Arts, Design, and Architecture. LUT University was found to be active in areas of aeronautics, robotics, and AI. LUT University was also the only link to a Chinese university among the “Seven Sons of National Defense,” universities closely linked to the People’s Liberation Army.
A large portion of academic cooperation in China occurs through large university consortia, such as Fudan University’s Fudan Nordic Center and the Sino-Finnish Joint Learning Innovation Institute with Beijing Normal University. Similarly, the University of Helsinki, University of Lapland, and University of Eastern Finland cooperate with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and others through the Finnish China Law Center, based at the University of Helsinki. A broader collaboration and footprint in China for a single university is rare, with the exception of Shanghai International College of Design and Innovation (Shanghai D&I), formed by Aalto University in collaboration with Tongji University. Shanghai D&I, based at Tongji University, offers master’s programs accredited either through Aalto or Tongji University. The college is also a medium through which the universities collaborate on research.
Academic cooperation is especially prevalent in health sciences and education, though areas of cooperation vary across universities. Universities with strong engineering programs cooperate with their partners in China, often in chemical and electrical engineering, and research projects concerning green tech and renewables. Finnish media has previously reported that the University of Helsinki has cooperated with the Chinese genomics firm BGI Group and has reportedly purchased services from the firm for over €2 million. Other universities have cooperated with the firm as well, though on a smaller scale, and have reportedly ceased cooperation in recent years, as has the University of Helsinki. The firm utilized aggressive pricing tactics to win contracts, and approached many institutes known for having large health and genetic datasets.
LUT University is also among the few who offer complete degree programs in collaboration with a Chinese institution. LUT University has four bachelor’s programs offered together with Hebei University of Technology (HEBUT) in energy technology, as well as in mechanical, electrical, software and systems engineering. The collaboration recently made headlines when Finnish students enrolled in the program mistakenly received an email from an HEBUT coordinator stating that supporting the leadership of the Communist Party of China is a requirement for receiving the degree. The email, meant for students from HEBUT enrolled in the program, though erroneous, followed earlier media reports about spying by Chinese students and research espionage. Additionally, LUT University has signed a memorandum of understanding with Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics (NUAA) for general academic collaboration, and an agreement for a joint doctoral program, in which LUT University will supervise a doctoral candidate conducting research in mechanical engineering and robotics. NUAA belongs to China’s “Seven Sons of National Defense.”
Finnish universities are very aware of the risks that they might face when cooperating with Chinese institutes and universities, and aware of the boundary between academic freedom and security concerns. Still, risks emerge. Health data and projects in engineering and medicine are likely to be more sensitive research topics, potentially involving data from Finnish citizens or innovations that could be used in military applications. Universities must exercise due diligence when cooperating in these more sensitive areas and understand whom they are partnering with.
Recommendations
More centralized understanding of the breadth and areas of cooperation. Some universities reported having no complete databases on research collaboration with China. Although general guidelines on academic cooperation with China are in place at the surveyed universities, key decision-makers, such as the rectorate and deans, need the knowledge to guide decisions.
Avoid becoming dependent on Chinese funding. Though not prevalent at present, expanding collaboration to seek additional funds without proper vetting can prove harmful. Budget concerns may drive some universities to seek partnerships with Chinese institutions that offer funding or tuition-paying students. This can leave Finnish universities playing second fiddle to avoid losing out on much-needed extra cash, thereby compromising academic integrity.
Explore more data on Finland-China academic engagements here.
