France’s academic ecosystem is distinctive, comprising universities (such as Sorbonne Université), prestigious public institutions (École Polytechnique) or semi-private “grandes écoles” (Sciences Po), and private higher education institutions, including business schools like HEC. Most academic bodies within the public sector are funded by the Ministry of Higher Education and Research, although there are exceptions. École Polytechnique, for instance, receives funding from the Ministry of Armed Forces
In addition to these teaching and research institutions, France hosts a number of research-only organizations. The most prominent are collectively referred to as the “G5,” which includes CNRS (multidisciplinary research), CNES (space), INRAE (agriculture), INSERM (health), and INRIA (computer science). Far from being centralized, these institutes maintain a nationwide presence through labs hosted within public universities.
Given the number of universities potentially involved, this study focuses on a sample that includes both the G5 and France’s so-called “conglomerate” universities—institutions that have formed clusters to compete in international rankings, especially the Shanghai Ranking. These include both applied (I-SITE) and research-intensive (IDEX) university clusters. The sample also includes universities that host a Confucius Institute but are not part of a cluster. In total, 25 academic institutions were selected: 9 IDEX clusters, 8 I-SITE clusters, the G5, and the Universities of Angers, Poitiers, and Rennes.
Data gathering
Obtaining data on the cooperation between French academic institutions and their Chinese counterparts proved challenging. We applied three methods where applicable: open-source intelligence (OSINT), direct requests for information via email, and Freedom of Information (FOI) requests submitted through France’s Madada platform. (French public institutions have an obligation to disclose administrative documents if they are requested by citizens.) While university websites often provide general information on international cooperation, access to specific contracts or cooperation agreements is limited. Most universities and research centers did not respond to bilateral requests. FOI requests were either ignored (such as by CNES, CNRS) or explicitly rejected (by INSERM).
Since the 2007 reform enhancing university autonomy, the Ministry of Higher Education and Research has exercised less control over academic institutions. As a result, guidelines for international academic cooperation are opaque and loosely enforced. Institutions initiating cooperation with a foreign entity undergo an internal vetting process conducted by a Defense and Security Official, typically a university vice president. If concerns arise, the official may consult a special advisory unit within the Ministry, tasked with safeguarding France’s scientific and technological assets. This advice, however, is non-binding.
A second procedure intended to ensure the conformity of cooperation agreements requires academic institutions to submit all newly signed contracts to the international department at the Ministry of Higher Education and Research. The Ministry may oppose a posteriori the agreement within a month. If the agreement raises an issue, the Ministry may turn to the special unit and request its non-binding advice. However, contracts are seldom sent to the Ministry or may be shared with the wrong focal point, and in any case, are usually archived without thorough review. As a result, the central administration does not have a comprehensive understanding of academic institutions’ cooperation with third countries, particularly at the university level. Bigger agreements between the G5 and Chinese institutions are typically shared and discussed with the Ministry. In fact, they are often left to be signed for State or Ministry visits abroad instead of being signed right away between the two research institutions.
Confucius Institutes – risky Confucius Institutes have been closed down
There are currently 15 Confucius Institutes in mainland France: 9 structured as associations and 6 hosted by universities or higher education institutions. The association-based institutes often involve partnerships with municipalities, such as the French Riviera Confucius Institute, created by the city of Nice, Xiamen University, and the Chinese International Education Foundation. Some associations include French universities as members, but the institute itself does not have influence over academic governance or curricula. Other types of Confucius Institutes also include French universities as partners within the association, such as the Clermont-Ferrand Confucius Institute, which collaborates with public universities in the region and the city on the French side. However, in these cases, the universities are members of an association and not hosts of the Confucius Institute, which gives the institute little say in how the universities operate. Of the two types, Confucius Institutes hosted at French universities are the most vulnerable to potential interference because of the alleged capacity of the institutes to modify the higher education curriculum from within.
French universities have documented that a significant proportion of students enrolled in Chinese courses at Confucius Institutes in France come from the Chinese diaspora. The rest consists of retirees and other students. Bigger universities have a specific China studies department. This is the case in Lyon, Marseille, and Paris, for instance. However, medium-sized or smaller universities often utilize the services of Confucius Institutes for teaching Chinese in their degree programs, although not exclusively. For instance, the University of Pau & Pays de l’Adours provides A1 and A2 level Chinese while the Confucius Institute of the city provides Chinese classes for both levels, an “advanced Chinese” class (which seems to be a B1; A1 being called “beginner” and A2 “intermediate”) as well as “Chinese for business” and “Chinese for tourism” crash courses.
Historically, local authorities and communities have been strong supporters of Confucius institutes. French regions and municipalities, in particular, have partially funded them, often contributing more than their Chinese counterparts.
Two university-based Confucius Institutes have closed in the last few years, namely those in Lyon and Nanterre, due to allegations of the institutes’ attempts to influence the academic content of the departments of Chinese studies in those universities. Currently, active university-based Confucius Institutes are located in universities that do not have a department of Chinese studies. According to a 2021 report on foreign interference, the risk posed to universities is relatively low because there are no Chinese studies departments to influence in these cases, and the Institute’s financial contributions to universities are too marginal to create meaningful dependencies. In fact, the financial imbalance over time means that host universities are spending more on the Confucius Institutes than the Chinese National Bureau for the Teaching of Chinese (Hanban). The primary issue at present is that, particularly in smaller universities, there are no alternative curricula available for students enrolling in more advanced Chinese courses beyond those offered by the Confucius Institutes.
Academic and scientific cooperation – risk assessments are in progress
Academic cooperation between China and France encompasses both national and local components. At the national level, officials from the Chinese and French Ministries meet every few years to determine common scientific priorities. In 2024, the two countries agreed to prioritize climate change and carbon neutrality, environmental sciences and biodiversity, aging (health), and theoretical chemistry. Before that, from 2019 to 2021, priorities included more strategic research subjects, such as space research, particle physics, advanced materials, and artificial intelligence. One possible interpretation is that the French national system of research has become increasingly wary of official state-level scientific cooperation with China over the past five years. At the local level, China and France have established a significant network of cooperation, encompassing both international student exchanges and research.
Within the sample, there were 189 agreements for student exchanges between French and Chinese institutions. Over 27,000 Chinese students studied in France during the 2023-2024 academic year, making it the ninth most preferred destination for Chinese students. Chinese students were the third-largest cohort from a third country, only preceded by Morocco and Algeria, despite a sharp 5 percent decline over the last five years. In 2023-2024, 51% of the Chinese students in France were completing a bachelor’s degree, 35% were pursuing a master’s degree, and 14% were doctoral students. Most of them studied languages, STEM, economics, or business.
On the other hand, China seems to be less attractive to French students. China does not provide data on visiting students. According to French data, China is not among the top 10 most popular destinations for French students. France appears to be a significantly more attractive destination for Chinese students than the other way around. It is unknown whether the smaller number of French students going to China is caused by the language barrier, administrative red tape, security issues, etc—and most likely a combination of several of these factors.
Research cooperations between French universities and research centers and Chinese universities take two main forms: joint research projects or so-called “international laboratories”—these research projects are often pluri-annual and involve important financial and human contributions from both parties; and memoranda of understanding whereby two institutions agree to exchange academic personnel to carry out joint research projects in defined areas of interest. The cooperation spectrum is wide, encompassing all subjects within STEM, including artificial intelligence and quantum research. Out of the 484 identified cooperations, 93 are with institutions ranked as “very high risk” by the ASPI Academic Tracker. Of those 93, 24 structured cooperation links have been established with Chinese institutions known to have deeper ties to the Chinese military, also referred to as the “Seven Sons of National Defence.” These 24 links mainly pertain to the field of engineering and aeronautics, domains in which France has a strong technological edge. It appears that Chinese military institutions have cultivated preferential ties with French universities, potentially collaborating on the development of Chinese military capabilities, without French institutions being aware of this arrangement. However, due to our limited access to the agreements, it is often impossible to determine in many cases whether these cooperations have been suspended or are ongoing.
Finally, academic cooperation between France and China has a specific component: the Franco-Chinese institutes. These teaching institutions, based in China, are the heirs of cooperation agreements launched in the early 2000s. Today, these institutes focus mainly on engineering. They accommodate Chinese student cohorts and teach them the French expertise in their specific areas of knowledge. Franco-Chinese institutes are typically subsidiaries of French “grandes écoles,” the most competitive higher education institutions. Two of these institutes have been established in collaboration with Chinese universities that are known to have ties to the Chinese military. For instance, prestigious French engineering schools École Centrale, École Polytechnique, and Centrale Sup’Elec have partnered with Beihang University to create the Franco-Chinese Institute École Centrale de Pékin. The almost free-of-charge transfers of French know-how to Chinese student cohorts raise questions about current challenges.
Recommendations
Academic cooperation between China and France is not new, but has taken a U-turn at the beginning of the decade. Prudence has come to characterize the last state-level negotiations on common scientific priorities. Vigilance when dealing with China is also progressively becoming the norm in France, both in the administrative and academic spheres. However, the decentralized nature of the French higher education and research system creates multi-level vulnerabilities to unwanted academic cooperation with China.
Existing national guidelines, if followed meticulously, should help prevent major risks. Scientific cooperation is also a useful asset in this bilateral relationship. The French diplomatic service utilizes academic cooperation to smooth the otherwise somewhat rocky relationship, particularly when political and economic discussions are stalling. This explains in part the continuation of Franco-Chinese Institutes. However, cooperations that are too strongly skewed in favor of China, or those concluded with institutions closely tied to the Chinese army, should be systematically reevaluated.
More reciprocity in specific sectors where China has a competitive edge could also be an avenue to rebalance this scientific relationship, if China is open to such negotiations, which is highly unlikely. In the social sciences, for example, it is crucial to strike a balance between the risks of collaborating with China in the academic sphere and safeguarding a pool of French students who are proficient in Mandarin Chinese and have gained field experience, thereby preserving France’s future capacity to develop sound China policy.
Considering the almost systematic and tacit refusal of universities and research institutions to disclose the agreements signed with China, it is difficult to assess the degree to which this reevaluation is already underway. This silence might also suggest, encouragingly, that awareness of the potential risks posed by cooperating with China is now acute across major French research actors.
Explore more data on France-China academic engagements here.
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