What’s behind Spain’s pivot to China

The newly adopted Spanish external action strategy portrays China in a rosy light and places it on the same level of importance as the US, reflecting the ripples of the Transatlantic rift under Trump 2.0.

Key takeaways:

On June 10, Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez’s government approved Spain’s new external action strategy. The document not only outlines Spain’s foreign policy guidelines for the 2025–2028 period, but also ranks China as a prominent strategic partner, almost on par with the US in terms of international power and significance for Spain’s interests.

Spain’s relations with China, similar to EU–China ties, have long been framed within the EU–US–China triangle, and European relations with the two great powers have tended to fluctuate depending on who occupies the White House. As ties between Washington and its allies grow contentious over trade and other issues, Madrid is not alone in reconsidering its policy on China. Recent overtures by Australia, the UK, and others show that some liberal Western democracies are seeking to court Beijing amid US President Donald Trump’s overhaul to US foreign policy. 

Spain’s new strategy marks a relative departure from earlier documents that emphasized transatlantic cooperation and prioritized NATO-centered security and economic frameworks. It also aligns with Spain’s recent opposition, alone among NATO members, to the 5% GDP defense spending compromise at the recent NATO summit in The Hague.

The inclusion of China as a focal point for Spanish foreign policy reflects Madrid’s adaptation to a changing global landscape that is becoming more multipolar. The decision stems from several pragmatic considerations: China’s growing influence in global governance, its role as a major trading partner, and its potential as a diplomatic counterweight to an increasingly unpredictable US, including in multipolar fora.

New positioning for a new era

The most important factor driving Spain’s pivot is the economy, as Madrid seeks to diversify its trade ties in the wake of tensions with Washington. As a long-time exporter of pork to China, the Spanish government aimed to salvage these trade relations when it decided to vote against countervailing tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles in 2024. Chinese investments are also on the rise, and Spanish institutions such as the ICEX trade institute are prioritizing the attraction of Chinese capital.

Spain is particularly interested in technology cooperation with China. The new strategy puts China and the US on equal footing in innovation and AI development, noting that “China controls around 75% of lithium batteries and approximately 80% of solar panels,” while making no reference to the US in this field. Madrid’s strategy also aims to leverage “technological dialogue” mechanisms with China, a longstanding contentious issue in broader EU–China relations. A recent example is the contract awarded to Huawei for the management and storage of wiretaps in court cases, a decision that raises national security concerns.

China’s large and relatively affluent middle class is also an attractive target for Spain’s tourism industry, one of the most important in the world. The recent visa waiver for Spaniards and other Europeans may further mutual rapprochement by also boosting travel to China. The strategy places emphasis on cultural cooperation, too. Cultural exchanges through the recently opened Cervantes Institutes in Beijing and Shanghai are expected to enhance Madrid’s public diplomacy capacity.

The document recognizes China’s leadership in multilateral forums and in certain regions of the world, particularly Central Asia and the Asia-Pacific. China is mentioned 22 times in the text, while the US is referenced only 17 times—less than half as often as in the 2014 strategy. References to China are second only to Europe and Latin America, Spain’s traditional foreign policy priorities. Notably, other important actors such as Morocco, India, and Russia appear relegated to secondary positions. Compared with the 2014 and 2021 strategies, China’s weight in the document has clearly grown. 

Some omissions also signal a more accommodating stance toward China. Absent are any references to Hong Kong, a potential invasion of Taiwan, or the treatment of Uighurs in Xinjiang—all issues included in earlier strategies.

Overall, the adopted text seeks to strengthen Spain–China and EU–China relations by setting a positive agenda instead of focusing on existing differences, reversing the previous trend. The document should also be read in the wider context of Madrid’s recent diplomatic activity in relation to Beijing.

The bigger picture

Numerous visits by Spanish representatives to China in recent years highlight the pursuit of its own definition of strategic autonomy for both Spain and the EU under Prime Minister Sánchez, who has visited China three times in the past three years, signaling that Beijing is a clear priority for his foreign policy. On each occasion, he emphasized the positive aspects of existing economic interdependence and the need to further strengthen commercial ties.

Sánchez has also used these trips to raise Spain’s international profile. In 2023, he attempted to pressure China to act as a mediator in the Ukraine–Russia conflict. The request yielded no significant Chinese action but reflected the ambitions of a medium-sized power like Spain. In 2024, Sánchez pushed for closer trade ties with China within the EU amid discussions on electric vehicle duties. He visited China again this year, during the EU–US economic standoff. These visits have been reciprocated by Chinese authorities, reinforcing the perception of a blossoming Spain–China relationship.

Sánchez is not alone in rethinking relations with Beijing. While the results of the EU–China summit in July 2025 were ambiguous, the European Commission has shown interest in re-engaging with China. The European Parliament is also cautiously re-establishing ties. Spain’s approach could influence the drafting of a new EU strategy toward China. Still, a more positive tone from Brussels is far from guaranteed. In the latest EU–China human rights dialogue in June, the EU criticized China for deteriorating human rights in Tibet, Hong Kong, and Xinjiang, as well as its crackdown on activists. There is no consensus among member states, with some remaining highly skeptical of any re-engagement.

Whether Spain’s new external action strategy reflects a long-term shift or a temporary deviation remains to be seen. Traditionally, the West has maintained unity when facing external threats, from the USSR to, more recently, Russia. Yet systemic signals from across the Atlantic suggest that Trump is more a symptom than the cause of current political instability in the US. If this is confirmed by the 2026 midterm elections or the 2028 presidential race, Spain and the EU may look to other actors, such as China, to uphold aspects of the international order that benefit them.

In sum, the new strategy captures the zeitgeist of the third decade of the 21st century and the slow decline of US influence worldwide, even from the perspective of one of its traditional allies.