Welcome to the 76th issue of the CEEasia Briefing.
In this issue, we dissect the following topics:
- China imposes export sanctions on Czech companies
- Poland strengthens its relations in East Asia during PM Tusk’s visit to South Korea and Japan
- Vietnam and Slovakia upgrade ties to strategic partnership during Fico’s visit
- CEE leaders attend the EU-ASEAN ministerial forum
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1. China imposes export sanctions on Czech companies
What’s going on? On April 24, China’s Ministry of Commerce imposed export restrictions on seven EU-based defense and aerospace companies, citing arms sales to, or collusion with, Taiwan. Four of the entities are based in the Czech Republic, which has in recent years emerged as one of Taiwan’s closest partners in Europe, expanding ties across multiple domains, including security cooperation.
Going deeper… Beijing’s move followed the EU’s 20th sanctions package targeting 27 entities from mainland China and Hong Kong over alleged links to Russia’s war effort in Ukraine. In response, China banned exports of dual-use items to seven European entities, including Czech arms firms Excalibur Army and Omnipol, the national center for research, development, innovation and testing in the aerospace industry, VZLU AEROSPACE and the Czech branch of satellite imagery intelligence company SpaceKnow. It is possible that Czech companies were so prominently targeted because they are among the most active European actors engaging with Taiwan, making such links easier to identify publicly. In 2023, Taiwanese media reported that Czechia was negotiating with Taiwan on the potential supply of missile trucks and self-propelled howitzers produced by Excalibur Army, although no further progress has been publicly confirmed. In parallel, SpaceKnow has expanded into the Taiwanese market and partnered with Air Asia, an aircraft maintenance company [not to be confused with Malaysian airline AirAsia], while Taiwan’s space agency has publicly referred to exchanges with VZLU AEROSPACE. It is also possible that Czechia was targeted deliberately because of the planned trip to Taiwan by Senate Speaker Miloš Vystrčil at the end of May.
Paradoxically… Beijing’s move comes at a time when the Babiš government has signaled a willingness to pursue a more pragmatic approach to Beijing, and several Czech media outlets reported Babiš’s intention to visit China, leaving the Czech government blindsided by the Chinese export restrictions. Czech Foreign Minister Petr Macinka publicly demanded explanations for the sanctions imposed on Czech companies and tasked the Czech ambassador in Beijing with seeking answers. On May 3, Macinka said in a TV interview that Babiš was not planning a trip to China in the upcoming months. It is unclear whether this was connected to Beijing’s sanctioning of Czech companies.
This means… Such targeted export controls on European, and in particular Czech, companies are unprecedented and show that export controls are becoming China’s tool of choice in coercing Europe. The restrictions seek to deter any defense and arms companies interested in expanding to the Taiwanese market. Taiwan receives most of its weapons from the US, as selling military hardware to Taiwan is still treated as taboo in most European capitals, and Beijing likely wants it to stay that way.
Even though the ban covers exports (even via third countries) of all items, software, and technologies that can be used for both civilian and military purposes, including certain rare earth elements used in the production of drones and semiconductors, the targeted companies claim that their operations will not be impacted. The CEO of SpaceKnow said the decision came as a surprise, noting that the company’s Czech branch has never purchased or shipped anything from China. Thus, he considers the ban on dual-use goods “laughable”. He also emphasized that, as an American company, SpaceKnow has operations in Taiwan, which he views as independent of the PRC. According to Andrej Čírtek, a spokesperson for CSG Group, the parent company of Excalibur Army, the company does not expect an impact on its business, as it does not source any dual-use goods from China. It is also possible, however, that Czech companies are downplaying the impact of the restrictions. In any case, even if the targeted entities are not directly affected, the episode highlights the European defense industry’s broader dependence on Chinese components and underscores the need to de-risk supply chains in sectors critical to Europe’s security and defense, in order to reduce vulnerabilities and limit Beijing’s ability to weaponize these dependencies.
2. Poland strengthens its relations in East Asia during PM Tusk’s visit to South Korea and Japan
What’s going on? During his trip to East Asia between April 12 and 15, Poland’s Prime Minister Donald Tusk visited South Korea and Japan, meeting with their respective leaders and deepening Warsaw’s relations with both countries. During the visit, Poland and South Korea elevated their relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership, with a significant focus on defense cooperation, as well as on strengthening cooperation in digitalization, AI, semiconductors, space exploration, energy, infrastructure, and transport. The Polish Prime Minister’s visit to South Korea is the first of its kind in 27 years.
Going deeper… Over the last few years, Poland has significantly deepened its relations with East Asian countries. South Korea is the largest Asian investor in Poland, with a significant €3 billion investment in an LG plant in the southwestern Polish city of Wroclaw. Seoul is already a significant supplier to Poland’s defense industry, with Poland accounting for 96.4% of South Korea’s arms transfers to Europe between 2014 and 2023. In December, for example, Poland signed a KRW 5.6 trillion (€3.2 billion) contract with the South Korean defense company Hanwha Aerospace to import rocket launch systems.
This means… With regard to the defense industry, the cooperation will likely entail technology transfer and the relocation of part of the production to Poland, expanding the cooperation under a €39.6 billion framework agreement signed in 2022. The visit also showcases the growing importance of the Indo-Pacific for European politics. With Seoul being the key defense technology supplier for Poland’s army’s modernization, Tusk’s description of South Korea as Poland’s “most important ally after the United States, especially in the defense industry” rings quite true. Furthermore, during the visits, both South Korea and Japan have affirmed their stances towards Ukraine, highlighting the significance of Poland’s role as a hub for support to Ukraine.
However… Tusk’s visit to Japan paled in comparison to his visit to South Korea. While the two countries still agreed to upgrade their relations to a “comprehensive strategic partnership,” as well as signed a specific agreement on social security or a joint statement on potential civilian cooperation in the space sector, the lack of heft in cooperation between Warsaw and Tokyo, akin to the defense cooperation with Seoul, is quite telling. Relations between Japan and Poland are primarily trade-based, with Poland a significant exporter of automotive components and food products to Japan. One wonders whether Japan’s recent decision (which became public only after Tusk’s visit) to expand Japan’s ability to export advanced defense equipment may allow Warsaw to diversify its range of East Asian defense suppliers.
3. Vietnam and Slovakia upgrade ties to strategic partnership during Fico’s visit
What’s going on? Slovakia and Vietnam upgraded their relations to a strategic partnership during a three-day official visit by Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico to Vietnam conducted between April 12-14. In Hanoi, Fico met Vietnamese President To Lam and held talks with Prime Minister Le Minh Hung, announcing cooperation in areas including nuclear energy and the defense and arms industry.
Going deeper… Fico was the first foreign leader to meet Le Minh Hung in his capacity as prime minister since the latter was sworn in on April 7. The Slovak delegation included several senior ministers, among them Foreign Minister Juraj Blanár, Culture Minister Martina Šimkovičová, Defense Minister Robert Kaliňák, and Agriculture Minister Richard Takáč. The two sides signed six agreements and memoranda covering defense and the arms industry, foreign affairs, culture, economic and scientific cooperation, standardization and quality management, and nuclear energy. Fico was accompanied by a business delegation of around 100 participants, which he described as the largest of his career, though the government did not publish a full list of attendees.
This means… The upgrade in relations with Vietnam aligns with Slovakia’s Indo-Pacific strategy, which identifies Vietnam as an important partner and one of the world’s fastest-growing economies. The move reflects a broader effort by the EU and European capitals to diversify partnerships and deepen ties with middle powers amid intensifying geopolitical rivalry. Slovakia follows Czechia, which upgraded its relations with Hanoi in January 2025, and builds on the EU’s own elevation of ties with Vietnam to a comprehensive strategic partnership earlier this year. In this context, Bratislava has expressed ambitions to position itself as a bridge between the EU and Vietnam. Vietnam is Slovakia’s third most important trade partner in Asia, although the relationship is highly imbalanced. In 2025, bilateral trade reached $1.78 billion, with Vietnam recording a surplus of around $1.7 billion.
However… The upgrade of relations and the visit itself are clouded by the presence of the controversial figure Quang Le Hong, who appeared in photos from the trip as part of the Slovak delegation. A former advisor to Robert Fico, Quang Le Hong is considered by German police to have been among the organizers of the 2017 kidnapping of Vietnamese citizen Trinh Xuan Thanh from Berlin and to have acted as a liaison for Vietnamese intelligence services. The case concerns the abduction of Trinh Xuan Thanh in Berlin during an official visit by then-Vietnamese Minister of Public Security To Lam, now President. Trinh Xuan Thanh was reportedly transported via Czechia to Bratislava and subsequently flown out aboard a Slovak government aircraft following a meeting between To Lam and Slovak Interior Minister Robert Kaliňák. Eventually, in 2020, Slovakia expelled a Vietnamese diplomat in connection with the kidnapping. To Lam himself was indicted in Slovakia in May 2024, but the charges were dropped after he assumed the presidency, thereby granting him protection under international immunity as a head of state. However, unlike Germany, Slovakia has not conducted a thorough investigation into the case, and Kaliňák has never adequately addressed the questions surrounding it. As a result, compared with Czechia, where there is a broad political consensus to deepen ties with Vietnam, the Slovak government’s engagement with Hanoi remains a contested issue between the coalition and opposition parties.
4. CEE leaders attend the EU-ASEAN ministerial forum
What’s going on? Between April 27 and 28, Brunei hosted the 25th ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting. The EU was represented by Kaja Kallas, alongside several foreign ministers from EU member states, including Czechia, Lithuania, and Slovakia. As in previous meetings, discussions covered a wide range of issues, from maritime security and the ongoing energy crisis to the green transition and people-to-people relations.
Going deeper… Given its format—focused largely on diplomatic communiqués and symbolic gestures—the meeting was not expected to produce any substantive outcomes. Yet the joint statement’s emphasis on economic and security issues, as well as on multilateralism and the rule of law, is noteworthy, not least because both regional blocs have consistently expressed interest in deepening and widening their inter-regional cooperation. As highlighted in our recent report “Getting de-risking from China right: What ASEAN and cannot do for Europe,” it is in the EU’s interest to finalize its outstanding FTAs with Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Combined with existing FTAs with Indonesia, Singapore, and Vietnam, these would cover the majority of EU-ASEAN trade. ASEAN, as the EU’s third-largest trading partner (and vice versa), offers significant opportunities for the EU’s ongoing de-risking efforts, provided these are approached on equal terms, with ASEAN’s economic and security interests, as well as broader geopolitical preferences, such as industrial upgrading and hedging, taken into account. This also necessitates greater EU support for European investors in the region, both financial and non-financial.
This means… Considering the significant roles that EU-ASEAN economic ties play in each region’s overall growth, including final-demand exposure, both sides have clear incentives to strengthen cooperation. Indeed, the 50th anniversary summit, due to take place next year, is expected to upgrade their relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. At the same time, the EU should be cautious that its renewed push to advance FTAs with Southeast Asian states, many of which have been stalled for years, does not appear driven solely by access to the region’s vast mineral and metal resources, which are essential for its green and digital transitions. Such an approach risks echoing colonial-era patterns of resource extraction without generating local value. Similarly, calls for greater EU involvement in ASEAN’s intra-regional integration, driven by European economic interests, need to be aligned with ASEAN’s distinct model of intergovernmental regionalism. This includes both its normative principles of non-use of force, non-interference, and regional autonomy, and its decision-making practices based on informality, consultation, and consensus. The EU thus needs to avoid reverting to its past tendency to impose its own model of regional integration on others.
Quick takes on CEEasia developments
TAIWAN | While political relations between Czechia and Taiwan may cool under the current government, Taiwan’s investment footprint in the Central European country continues to grow. Taiwanese company Foxconn is significantly expanding its production of AI servers in Kutná Hora, and Taiwanese company Jmem Technology opened a chip security center in Brno.
CHINA | A Chinese national was detained by the Polish police after taking photographs of railway infrastructure in the village of Kowalów, near the border with Germany. Poland has doubled down on monitoring and protection of critical infrastructure following a rail track sabotage act carried out by operatives working for Russia last November.
TAIWAN | According to media reports, the Czech Republic has denied the Taiwanese president transit at a local airport during his planned trip to Eswatini. Taiwan allegedly turned to European countries after some African countries refused Lai Ching-te to fly through their airspace at the last minute. However, the Czech Foreign Ministry denies having received a similar request.
INDONESIA | Indonesian Deputy Minister of Higher Education, Science and Technology, Stella Christie, and Slovak Ambassador Tomas Ferko discussed expanding nuclear energy and tech cooperation in Jakarta on April 2. The partnership focuses on diversifying Indonesia’s energy sources to address electricity shortages outside Java and Bali. Both nations will also boost academic exchanges in biotechnology, AI, and cybersecurity.
INDONESIA | To strengthen bilateral food security, Indonesian Deputy Agriculture Minister Sudaryono and his Polish counterpart Małgorzata Gromadzka advanced trade discussions in Jakarta. While Poland seeks to export commodities like beef and dairy under strict Indonesian health standards, Jakarta aims to leverage the partnership to access broader EU markets. The officials agreed to establish a technical working group to accelerate trade protocols and explore future investments.
CHINA | Chinese automaker SAIC Motor is reportedly selecting Spain over Hungary for its first European EV factory to produce MG models. The pending decision aims to bypass high EU tariffs and leverage Spain’s established automotive ecosystem. This move marks a strategic pivot away from Hungary, until recently the primary hub for Chinese EV investments, after the electoral loss of Viktor Orbán.
