Belarus’ hopes of becoming a key node in China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Europe may be rekindled once Russia’s war against Ukraine comes to an end.
Key takeaways:
-
In June 2025, China and Belarus reaffirmed their strategic relationship. During President Lukashenko’s “family-style” visit to China, both leaders emphasized their “all-weather comprehensive strategic partnership” and pledged long-term cooperation.
-
China officially designates Belarus as an important strategic partner. This reflects mutual political alignment and sustained although limited economic partnership despite Western pressure and Belarus’s deepening isolation from the EU.
-
While Belarus was until recently the key overland corridor for railway trade between China and the EU, the closure of the border with Poland in September shows that Russia’s war on Ukraine and EU-Russia/Belarus tensions continue to frustrate Belarus ambitions.
Since the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has sought reliable and efficient connections to European markets. Early on, Belarus seemed an ideal candidate: geographically well-positioned, eager to diversify its economy, and led by a government willing to cooperate with Beijing.
Belarus embraced this role enthusiastically. Success would not only secure a powerful partner in Beijing but also help reduce Minsk’s long-standing economic dependence on Russia. The Great Stone Industrial Park, located near Minsk, was chosen as the flagship project, envisioned as a hub for Chinese firms producing for the European market.
China has long offered Minsk more favorable prospects than the EU, whose Eastern Partnership initiative tied deeper engagement to democratic reforms, market liberalization, and a more balanced foreign policy. For Belarus, China represented an alternative: a powerful economic partner that might offset reliance on Moscow. Still, Beijing has remained cautious, careful not to antagonize Russia by overreaching in what is clearly Moscow’s sphere of influence.
The impact of sanctions and the war in Ukraine
Belarus’s desire to deepen ties with China has grown alongside its international isolation after Minsk’s support for Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Earlier EU sanctions, imposed after Belarus’s disputed 2020 elections, mainly targeted individuals and left trade intact. But post-2022 sanctions hit much harder, banning key exports, including gold, coal, oil, and potash, while also restricting imports of dual-use goods.
For Beijing, these developments have undercut Belarus’s potential as a bridge to Europe. Moreover, Belarus is not particularly attractive to Chinese private investors, and the relationship is highly unequal, favoring China.
Still, cooperation has not stalled. In August 2024, Belarus became the first Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) member to sign a landmark agreement with China on free movement of services and investments. More importantly, Belarus became the only major active rail corridor between China and the EU. The China–Europe Railway Express, a core element of the BRI, runs through Belarus, with cargo volumes rising despite sanctions on Belarusian goods, including those produced by Chinese firms at Great Stone. This railway provides a vital overland link to Europe, bypassing maritime chokepoints and unstable regions. Yet the route remains vulnerable to geopolitical tensions, particularly with Poland. The risk was driven home by the Polish decision to close its border with Belarus in September, which effectively cut off the China-Europe railway trade. So far, no reopening date has been announced.
The Belarus-China economic partnership is asymmetrical. In May 2025, Chinese exports to Belarus reached US$550 million, while Belarusian exports to China stood at just US$87.5 million, leaving Minsk with a trade deficit of about $463 million. Over the past two decades, Belarus has launched 27 projects with Chinese support, securing more than US$5 billion in investments and tied loans. Yet, only US$461 million has come as direct investment, with the rest as loans that force Belarus to spend a significant portion of the funds on Chinese goods.
Great Stone continues to expand, with more than 150 resident companies by mid-2025 and expectations of 170 by year’s end. Since September 2022, China has officially classified its ties with Belarus as an “all-weather comprehensive strategic partnership,” signaling a stable, long-term alliance anchored in mutual opposition to Western pressure.
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s June 2025 “family-style” meeting with his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, underscored Beijing’s continued interest in Belarus despite its isolation from the European market. Xi congratulated Lukashenko on his reelection and praised Belarus as a “true friend and good partner,” reaffirming the China-Belarus “all-weather comprehensive strategic partnership.”
A new opening?
Belarus’s future role in the BRI will depend largely on the outcome of the war in Ukraine. A ceasefire or settlement could reopen discussions on easing Belarus’s isolation from the European market. Any lifting of Western sanctions would raise Minsk’s value in Beijing’s eyes: the more access Belarus has to Europe, the more useful it becomes as China’s gateway. Minsk is already testing the waters by signaling a willingness to discuss sanctions relief. Authorities have even announced amnesties for some political prisoners, including three US citizens—one release came shortly after a February 2025 visit by US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Christopher W. Smith.
Still, challenges remain. Western governments remain opposed to Lukashenko’s authoritarian rule, and questions about regime stability are mounting. As Lukashenko enters his fourth decade in power and approaches his eighties, succession looms ever larger. Just as critical is Minsk’s relationship with Moscow: it remains uncertain how much autonomy Belarus would be allowed in any post-war settlement.
