Making Taiwan legible in Europe: Czech parliamentary diplomacy and the EU’s turn to de-risking

As the EU advances its de-risking strategy, Czechia illustrates how Taiwan’s longstanding significance in technology and democratic values has become increasingly relevant within Europe’s shifting security and resilience discourse.

Key takeaways:

Europe’s relations with Taiwan have undergone significant changes in recent years. Despite its relevance to Europe, Taiwan was, until recently, often featured in European debates primarily through the prism of its sensitive relations with China. Today, it is increasingly associated with technological security, supply chain resilience, protection of democratic institutions, and de-risking strategies. This shift cannot be attributed to a single event or political actor. It reflects a cumulative process shaped by European nations’ experiences with technological dependence and economic coercion in relations with China. The experience of Czechia fits into this pattern, serving as an early trigger that helped propel a wider European debate.

The Czech example is interesting because it illustrates how a small state within the EU can serve as an agenda-setter, not by its economic power, but through a blend of political signals, parliamentary diplomacy, media visibility, and experience with authoritarian pressures.

Domestic contestation and the emergence of Taiwan as an alternative frame

The debate about Taiwan did not emerge from a vacuum. In the 2010s, Czech foreign policy towards China was marked by the approach of President Miloš Zeman and a part of the Czech political and economic elites, who emphasized the economic opportunities of cooperation with Beijing. This approach, however, generated growing pushback, including from the parliamentary opposition, the media, and the expert community, who were concerned about security risks, the political conditions for Chinese investments in Czechia, and Beijing’s interference in democratic processes. Within this contested domestic environment, Taiwan emerged as a symbolic and political alternative to the China-oriented approach of the then-leadership.

In this context, the plans for an official trip to Taiwan led by Czech Senate President Jaroslav Kubera became a symbol of a challenge to this policy. The visit was the first of its kind by a sitting parliamentary leader. China reacted with pressure and threats to the planned visits, including warnings of “consequences” for Czech companies. When Kubera suddenly passed away from a heart attack shortly after receiving a warning letter from the Chinese embassy, his successor, Miloš Vystrčil, took over his initiative. In the end, the August 2020 visit to Taiwan became not only a foreign policy gesture but also part of a domestic dispute over sovereignty, resisting foreign pressure, and democratic resilience.

The Chinese response to the Czech steps (diplomatic protests, public threats, and warnings aimed at the business sector) had the opposite effect of what Beijing most likely intended. Instead of silencing the debate, it had intensified. The media began to focus more systematically on Chinese influence, security risks, and asymmetric economic dependency. Political support for the Taiwan visit intensified in the Senate and beyond, and the question of the relationship with China became a part of the broader discussion about democratic resilience. Moreover, Taiwan gained greater visibility, not only in the Czech Republic but also internationally.

Parliamentary democracy as a small state tool

Miloš Vystrčil’s visit to Taiwan marked a significant milestone in the Czech parliamentary diplomacy’s approach to international relations. His trip sparked a wave of political visits and interactions, paving the way for stronger connections between Czechia and Taiwan. It also represented a significant shift in how Czechia, under Prime Minister Fiala’s leadership between 2021 and 2025, approached its relationship with Taiwan. This trajectory indicates that Vystrčil’s visit was not just an isolated gesture. Parliamentary diplomacy has proven to be a valuable tool, especially when the foreign policy is constrained by the executive branch. It creates space for discussions on key issues without the immediate pressure to make formal commitments. In this regard, it did not create new instruments but rather enhanced Taiwan’s visibility and legitimacy within the evolving dialogue on security and resilience in the EU.

Similar approaches gradually took place at the European level. The European Parliament adopted the recommendation to strengthen ties with Taiwan and sent its own delegation to Taipei in November 2021. The Czech case served as an inspirational precedent towards this change. Through these processes, the discussions surrounding technological security, economic resilience, and political values have become increasingly intertwined. This development establishes a discursive bridge between earlier national debates, such as the Czech case, and the EU’s evolving de-risking strategy. Within this framework, Taiwan is now perceived not only as a symbol of democracy but also as a valuable partner in semiconductors, science, digitalization, and resilient supply chains.

From bilateral pressure to a systemic European concern

The backlash to China’s pressure on the Vystrčil visit was not unique to Czechia. We can observe similar patterns in other countries, for example, in Norway, after the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo in 2010 for his long, nonviolent struggle for fundamental human rights in China. At the time, the PRC reacted by freezing business relations, restricting imports of Norwegian salmon, and exerting prolonged diplomatic pressure. In 2020, the Australian government initiated a call for an international investigation into the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic. In response, China implemented a series of sanctions targeting coal, wine, barley, beef, and lobster imports, among others. In each of these cases, Chinese economic and diplomatic pressure contributed to the diversification of foreign relations, the deterioration of China’s public image, and the strengthening of the security framing of bilateral relations in the affected countries.

The 2021 incident involving Lithuania was a particularly important event in shaping the EU’s perception of economic security. In November 2021, Lithuania opened a “Taiwan representative office” in Vilnius; a move that did not go unnoticed by Beijing. In reaction, China applied pressure on multinational and European companies to exclude Lithuanian-made components from their supply chains. As a result, Lithuanian exports to China dropped by 80%. Such actions raised significant concerns within the EU due to the weaponization of the single market. Brussels initiated a formal complaint with the World Trade Organization, highlighting China’s restrictive trade practices and economic coercion. In response to these developments, the European Commission began drafting an Anti-Coercion Instrument, which came into effect in December 2023. This legislation aims to bolster the EU’s capabilities to address and counter coercive practices by foreign actors.

The EU’s reaction showed that the question of China was no longer a bilateral problem of individual states, but one that affected the whole EU. Together, these cases contributed to a growing European awareness that economic dependence could be weaponized, a realization that would later underpin the EU’s de-risking agenda. Even as Australia and Lithuania have since sought to normalize relations with China, the interpretive framework for understanding technological dependence and political pressure has not reverted to the pre-2020 status quo.

As the growing realization of the risks of dependence on China has become more widespread, Czechia has played a pioneering role not just through symbolic moves but also by actively setting the agenda. Czechia was a leader in the debate over the security of the Chinese 5G network supplier, as the EU grappled with whether to allow Chinese companies into sensitive critical infrastructure. The 2018 warning by the National Authority for Cyber and Information Security against the risks associated with Huawei and ZTE’s software and hardware effectively prevented their deployment in key national infrastructure. The warning was one of the first of its kind in the EU and served as a precursor to later European discussions on technological dependency and strategic autonomy. It also helped to normalize, within the European debate, a security-oriented vocabulary of technological dependence that later shaped the EU-level de-risking.

Czechia did not act in isolation in this context. Together with the Baltic states, the Netherlands, and the Nordic states, Czechia contributed to shifting the frame in which China is understood, not only as an economic partner but also as a source of political and security risks. This shift would later shape how partnerships with actors such as Taiwan were evaluated.

Making Taiwan legible in Europe

Taiwan’s growing importance in European discussions did not stem from a single policy decision. The shift in how we view concepts such as dependence, coercion, and partnership has occurred gradually over time. We have witnessed a slow evolution in our understanding and perceptions of these ideas. The Czech case illustrates how individual national experiences, along with parliamentary diplomatic efforts, can shape these interpretive frameworks. This helps us to understand how Taiwan’s important technological and democratic relevance has become politically legible and thus easier to articulate within Europe’s evolving discourse on resilience and de-risking.