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Assertion and alignment: Sanae Takaichi and Japan’s new strategic posture
Nov 5, 2025 in CEIAS Insights

Assertion and alignment: Sanae Takaichi and Japan’s new strategic posture

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s early diplomacy underscores Japan’s emerging strategic posture: tightening the alliance with the United States, sustaining pragmatic dialogue with South Korea, and pushing back against China’s assertiveness. Her actions indicate continuity in Japan’s outward-looking security strategy, only with sharper edges and a more pronounced role in regional affairs.

Key takeaways:

  1. Despite her reputation as a staunch nationalist, newly-appointed Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s posture so far has been restrained and pragmatic, while still hardline on key geopolitical issues.
  2. Early diplomacy with Donald Trump and her cabinet choices signal that the Japan–US alliance remains the cornerstone of her foreign policy, while economic and defense commitments underscore Japan’s bet on Washington, even at significant fiscal cost.
  3. Her assertive agenda promises greater visibility and confidence for Japan, but it also risks regional friction, economic strain, and domestic division. Whether her leadership delivers lasting stability or renewed tension will define her legacy—and Japan’s trajectory in the decade ahead.
  4. Takaichi’s Europe policy extends her broader security agenda: firm on Russia, supportive of Ukraine, and geared toward deeper defense and tech cooperation with the EU. This pragmatically embeds Japan in Europe’s security networks while advancing shared Indo-Pacific goals.

This is the second article of a two-part series on the election of Sanae Takaichi as Japan’s new prime minister and its impacts on Japanese politics and governance. Part one focused on Prime Minister Takaichi’s domestic political agenda.

Japan’s newly appointed prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, is known for a nationalist agenda and a hawkish foreign-policy bent. A close ally and protégée of the late Shinzo Abe, a former premier, she inherits both his vision and the controversies that accompany it. Her rise marks a pivotal moment for Japan’s foreign and security policy—one that could significantly reshape relations with partners, neighbors, and the broader Indo-Pacific order.

Continuity with Abe

Takaichi embodies the vision of former Prime Minister Abe for a stronger, more assertive Japan. She inherits his “proactive pacifism,” pressing to expand the Self-Defense Forces’ role, tighten national-security laws, and protect classified information through a long-advocated anti-espionage bill.

Her push to revise Article 9 (the pacifist clause) carries forward Abe’s unfinished goal of normalizing Japan’s military status. The alliance with the right-leaning Japan Innovation Party reflects the same constitutional ambition and a shared belief that Japan must be able to defend itself amid growing regional threats.

By reinstating Abe-faction loyalists and consolidating conservative power, Takaichi has effectively revived Abe’s political network—and with it, his strategic blueprint. That continuity extends beyond Tokyo: Abe re-anchored Japan’s foreign policy in the US alliance, and Takaichi is now enlarging that legacy, making alignment with Washington the central pillar of her premiership. The seemingly odd choice of Koizumi as defense minister, her rival in the leadership race, appears to be a strategic move to ease factional tensions within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).

Alliance first: Takaichi’s Trump diplomacy in action

In her first call with US President Donald Trump, Takaichi declared that “strengthening the Japan–US alliance is the top priority” of her foreign and security policy. She underscored those priorities with key cabinet picks—Shinjiro Koizumi as defense minister, Toshimitsu Motegi as foreign minister, and Kimi Onoda as minister for economic security—a blend of renewal and conservative discipline. Together, they anchor a team built to harden Japan’s stance and deepen coordination with Washington.

At their summit on 28 October in Tokyo, Takaichi and Trump signed three landmark documents: a reaffirmation of the alliance, “Implementation of the Agreement—Toward a New Golden Age for the Japan–US Alliance”; a framework for securing critical minerals; and a memorandum on shipbuilding and technology cooperation. Takaichi echoed Shinzo Abe’s personal style in dealing with Trump—mixing flattery, casual charm, and pointed symbolism. She reportedly promised to nominate him for the Nobel Peace Prize and pledged to purchase more American goods, even staging Ford F-150 trucks outside the venue. The message was clear: like Abe, she knows how to convert Trump’s optics into diplomatic leverage.

Economically, both governments announced plans to “accelerate development of diversified, liquid, and fair markets” for critical minerals and rare earths, responding to Chinese export-control pressures. The summit’s mission statement also highlighted emerging technologies, such as AI and shipbuilding, and broader economic security.

The harder part comes at home. To ease tariff pressures, Takaichi has tied Japan to costly purchases of US products—from Japan-branded vehicles made in America and aircraft to fuel and other energy resources—alongside a reportedly $550 billion investment package. The arrangement seeks to preserve goodwill in Washington without overburdening Japan’s fiscal and industrial base. The balancing act recalls the trade tensions of the 1980s, but today it is shaped as much by regional security imperatives as by economic considerations.

Juggling between pragmatism and personal beliefs: South Korea and China

Takaichi’s revisionist stance on Japan’s wartime past has been a long-standing source of controversy. She has questioned the scale of wartime atrocities, rejected the view that the Second World War was an act of aggression, and called for withdrawing the 1995 Murayama apology. Her revisionism is also evident in practice. She has pushed to remove references to “comfort women” from textbooks, dismissing them as “self-deprecating.”

Her regular visits to Yasukuni Shrine—where Japan’s war dead, including Class-A war criminals, are enshrined—have further burnished her nationalist credentials. Former prime ministers Junichiro Koizumi and Abe both faced fierce backlash from China and South Korea over their visits; Koizumi persisted despite criticism, while Abe halted his visits after 2013 to avoid further tensions. As a minister, Takaichi’s visits drew limited attention, but as prime minister they would carry far greater diplomatic weight. After taking office, she prudently skipped a visit and made a monetary offering instead. Her nationalism, however, informs her foreign policy—especially toward neighbors with whom Japan has historical and territorial disputes.

These positions have long strained ties with China and South Korea, yet her early statements as prime minister strike a more pragmatic tone. At her first press conference, she acknowledged that her appointment was met with both “hope and concern” in Seoul, offered lighthearted remarks about enjoying Korean dried seaweed and dramas, and affirmed a “stable, future-oriented” approach. South Korean President Lee Jae-myung adopted a similarly pragmatic stance, emphasizing “mutually beneficial cooperation.”

Their October 30 meeting at the APEC Summit in Gyeongju appeared constructive, as both parties agreed to continue reciprocal visits—revived by their predecessors, Kishida and Yoon—and signaled a willingness to advance ties. Lee even presented Takaichi with seaweed and cosmetic products, in a nod to her comments. Still, reconciliation will be difficult. Her revisionist reputation lingers, and any misstep on historical issues could quickly reverse fragile progress—especially with South Korea now led by the Democratic Party, which has historically taken a tougher line than the previous government and criticized Yoon’s outreach to Japan as “humiliating and subservient.”

Relations with Beijing look even thornier. Before her appointment, Takaichi criticized China’s human rights record in Inner Mongolia, drawing sharp rebukes from the Chinese Foreign Ministry for “interference.” After she took office, spokesperson Guo Jiakun said China “considers it Japan’s internal affair” but expects Tokyo to “honor its political commitments” on Taiwan and history—signals that ties will remain cool. Takaichi’s focus on strengthening defense—particularly cybersecurity and other emerging technologies—reads as a response to China’s hybrid and gray-zone tactics. In her inaugural speech, she stressed fortifying Japan’s defense-industrial and technological base. In this light, a hawkish posture toward Beijing alongside a more conciliatory line toward Seoul reflects a cautious strategy: bolstering Japan’s capacity to counter Chinese assertiveness while aligning more closely with South Korea, which shares Japan’s security concerns.

By contrast, her stance on Taiwan is consistently supportive. She met President Lai Ching-te earlier this year and has advocated a “quasi-alliance” among Taiwan, Europe, Australia, and India amid perceived U.S. unpredictability under the Trump administration. Her appointment of Minoru Kihara, a strong supporter of Taiwan, as chief cabinet secretary reinforces that orientation. While analysts such as Takayuki Igarashi caution that Japan is unlikely to intervene militarily in a Taiwan conflict, her endorsement of Abe’s line that “a Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency” clearly positions Japan closer to Taipei—further straining relations with Beijing.

Bridging the Indo-Pacific and Europe

Takaichi’s assertive worldview extends beyond East Asia. In the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Japan’s territorial dispute with Moscow over the Kuril Islands/Northern Territories has re-emerged as a point of friction. True to her nationalist instincts, she shows no inclination toward rapprochement with Russia. (She was barred from entering Russia for 22 years by the Foreign Ministry in 2022, making a summit with Vladimir Putin unlikely.) On October 24, she signaled strong support for Kyiv by joining online the Coalition of the Willing—a group of 33 countries pledging continued backing for Ukraine—her first diplomatic appearance since taking office. At the same time, she has underscored Japan’s sovereignty and energy imperatives, telling President Trump that Tokyo will not withdraw from the Sakhalin-2 LNG project given Japan’s fragile energy security.

This renewed focus on Europe through the lens of the Ukraine war is also shaping Japan’s outreach to the European Union. It is too early to define Japan–EU relations under Takaichi, but early signals indicate cautious yet active engagement. In her first call with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, she reaffirmed the EU and Japan as “important strategic partners in maintaining and strengthening a free and open international order.” She is expected to advance the Japan–EU Security and Defence Partnership, covering maritime security, hybrid threats, and defense-industry dialogue, pursue the long-planned Security of Information Agreement (SIA), and deepen selective cooperation with France and Germany through defense-industry exchanges and joint exercises.

On the economic-security front, Takaichi is set to reinforce the Japan–EU Competitiveness Alliance, expanding cooperation on supply-chain resilience, critical minerals, and digital infrastructure. Potential projects include Arctic-route submarine cables, semiconductor and rare-earth networks, and quantum or AI partnerships. While her Europe policy is still taking shape, her early moves suggest a pragmatic bid to align Japan more closely with Europe’s security and economic frameworks, while extending its Indo-Pacific reach.

 The making of a ‘normal’ Japan—and its new risks

Takaichi’s premiership marks both continuity and rupture in Japan’s postwar trajectory. Ideologically, she extends Abe’s vision of a “normal” Japan, one which is unafraid to project power, revise constitutional constraints, and assert a distinct national identity. Yet, unlike Abe’s often cautious pragmatism, Takaichi pairs that vision with unapologetic nationalism and a readiness to use political theatre as statecraft.

Her foreign policy rests on two interlocking axes: assertion and alignment. Assertive toward China and intent on strengthening Japan’s regional presence, she seeks to project confidence in the Indo-Pacific. At the same time, her careful outreach to Seoul—alongside a deepening of the US alliance, reinforced by symbolic gestures toward Trump and major defense and investment commitments—reflects an understanding that Japan’s security and influence hinge on sustained partnerships. While her past rhetoric has signaled openness to historical revisionism, it remains unclear whether her premiership will translate that inclination into policy.

Domestically, her consolidation of Abe-faction loyalists and pursuit of constitutional revision signal a government determined to harden Japan’s defense posture and political identity. But these ambitions carry risks: the economic costs of alliance maintenance, potential diplomatic backlash in East Asia, and the delicate task of balancing nationalism with pragmatism.

In short, Takaichi is not merely inheriting Abe’s legacy; she is accelerating it. Her Japan seeks strength and recognition in a harsher world; whether that assertiveness brings stability or renewed friction will determine how her tenure is remembered.

Key Topics

Geopolitics • SecurityJapanChinaSouth Korea

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