Bolstering European naval presence in the Indo-Pacific: What´s the state of play?

With global tensions rising and resources increasingly stretched, Europe would be better served by strengthening its own security posture rather than committing resources to largely symbolic naval deployments in the Indo-Pacific.

Key takeaways:

In recent years, several European states have increasingly turned their focus toward the Indo-Pacific. Reflecting this growing emphasis, there has been a surge in strategic documents on the region issued by European capitals. France was the first European country to adopt an Indo-Pacific strategy in 2019, followed by others including Ireland, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Germany, Czechia, and, most recently, Lithuania. In 2021, the European Union also released its own Indo-Pacific strategy. Notably, this rising interest has been accompanied by an enhanced European naval presence in the region.

So distant, yet so important

It’s no wonder that Europe has been paying increased attention to the Indo-Pacific. Between 2011 and 2022, imports from the Indo-Pacific to the EU grew by 117%, while exports increased by 59%. In 2022, total trade in goods between the EU and Indo-Pacific economies reached €1.765 trillion, double the EU’s trade volume with the United States, its top single trading partner. The Indo-Pacific accounted for 37% of all EU imports and a quarter of its exports. For the United Kingdom, the Indo-Pacific represents around 18% of total global trade. Moreover, the region generates 60% of global GDP and contributes two-thirds of global economic growth, underscoring its vital economic importance to Europe.

At the same time, European states are increasingly alert to the Indo-Pacific’s unstable security environment. The region is the primary stage for ongoing great power competition between China and the United States. In this context, persistent cross-Strait tensions and the potential for a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) invasion of Taiwan, China’s assertive maritime activities, and long-standing territorial disputes, notably in the South China Sea, form a volatile mix with the potential to ignite a major conflict, one that could severely disrupt Europe’s trade with the Indo-Pacific.

As contestation over maritime domains evolves into challenges to international law and restrictions on freedom of navigation, these developments also threaten to erode the rules-based international order. European states have a direct interest in preserving this order, as it safeguards them from external coercion and underpins their ability to advance economic and strategic interests globally.

Moreover, while the United States is increasingly reorienting its strategic focus from Europe toward the Indo-Pacific and its competition with China, European security architecture remains heavily dependent on US engagement. Were Washington to become embroiled in a major Indo-Pacific conflict, its ability (and possibly its willingness) to protect Europe could be significantly diminished. These concerns are particularly pressing in light of the persistent threat posed by Russian aggression.

The war in Ukraine has further revealed the growing convergence between developments in the European and Indo-Pacific theatres. Some Indo-Pacific actors have actively contributed to Russia’s war effort. China has reportedly supplied semiconductors for Russian weapons systems, and North Korean troops have been involved on the ground in Ukraine. These developments highlight that Europe’s economic and security interests are deeply entangled with events in the Indo-Pacific.

Bolstering European naval military presence

In response to these stark geopolitical realities, some European states have been stepping up their military presence in the Indo-Pacific, most notably through naval deployments. This increased engagement is not limited to traditional players like France and the UK, both long-term stakeholders in the region’s security environment due to their overseas territories. Rather, several non-traditional actors have also contributed to enhancing Europe’s military footprint in the region.

In recent years, for example, the German frigate Bayern conducted a cruise through the Indo-Pacific, marking the first deployment of a German warship to the region in nearly two decades. In 2024, Germany carried out its second Indo-Pacific deployment, sending the frigate Baden-Württemberg and the combat support ship Frankfurt am Main—a mission that drew criticism from China after the vessels transited the Taiwan Strait, the first time Germany had done so in decades. Berlin is expected to maintain this two-year deployment cycle, with another Indo-Pacific mission likely in 2026.

The Netherlands has also not remained on the sidelines. Its frigate HNLMS Evertsen joined the UK’s Carrier Strike Group (CSG) on a mission to Japan in 2021. The following year, The Hague announced that it would commit to sending a warship to the Indo-Pacific every two years. Staying true to this pledge, the Netherlands deployed HNLMS Tromp to the region in 2024. The Dutch presence was not without incident; Tromp was reportedly harassed by Chinese fighter jets and a helicopter while patrolling the East China Sea.

In 2025, several European navies continued to deploy assets to the Indo-Pacific. In January, the Italian frigate ITS Antonio Marceglia departed for an “operational projection campaign,” concluding its mission in July. For a country that has historically been absent from Asian security dynamics, Italy’s naval activity in the region has been remarkable. In 2024, the Italian Navy conducted multiple deployments, including the patrol vessel ITS Raimondo Montecuccoli and, notably, a CSG composed of the aircraft carrier ITS Cavour and the frigate ITS Alpino.

These missions demonstrated Italy’s growing capacity for hard power projection, with Montecuccoli and the CSG participating in a series of high-end multilateral exercises. At the same time, Rome also engaged in soft power diplomacy. The ITS Amerigo Vespucci, an iconic three-masted training ship, made several port calls across the Indo-Pacific throughout 2024, underscoring Italy’s broader strategic interest in the region.

Returning to the two countries mentioned earlier, France and the United Kingdom are the only European states with navies that possess a full spectrum of capabilities, including aircraft carriers and nuclear-powered submarines. France regularly deploys naval forces to the Indo-Pacific and maintains a strong maritime presence in the region. Most recently, in 2024, it dispatched a carrier strike group (CSG) as part of the “Clemenceau 25” mission. The deployment included the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier FS Charles de Gaulle, three frigates, a tanker, an offshore support and assistance vessel, and a nuclear-powered submarine. The mission concluded in April.

France also maintains more than 20 vessels permanently stationed in the Indo-Pacific to secure its overseas departments and territories. However, these forward-deployed assets generally lack high-end warfighting capabilities. Despite having the largest military footprint in the Indo-Pacific among European states, France faces significant capability constraints that limit its ability to project power effectively across the region.

The issue of limited resources also affects the UK Royal Navy, which, as of July 2025, is conducting “Operation Highmast” in Indo-Pacific waters. The operation involves a CSG led by the aircraft carrier HMS Prince of Wales, accompanied by a Royal Navy destroyer, a frigate, and a tanker—only half the number of accompanying ships compared to the UK’s previous CSG deployment to the Indo-Pacific in 2021. The current CSG also includes a Royal Navy nuclear-powered submarine, as well as vessels from partner countries, including Norway and Spain. The mission is expected to conclude in December.

A few years earlier, the UK renewed its permanent naval presence in the region with the deployment of two offshore patrol vessels, HMS Tamar and HMS Spey, signaling its commitment to the “Indo-Pacific tilt.” Alongside France, the UK remains the only European country to maintain a continuous naval presence in the region.

Much ado about nothing?

With China emerging as a principal challenger to regional stability, European naval deployments in the Indo-Pacific have increasingly taken on a signaling function. These missions challenge China’s territorial claims in the Taiwan Strait, conduct high-end military exercises with like-minded partners such as the United States, and deliberately avoid participating in joint drills involving the PLA. However, the question remains: are these signals strong enough to meaningfully support US and allied efforts to deter China from undermining the regional status quo?

Sebastian Biba and Rebecca Strating argue that without a willingness to materially challenge the regional balance of power or risk military confrontation, Europe’s naval presence in the Indo-Pacific amounts to a weak deterrent signal. Effective deterrence requires not only clarity about the object and boundaries of deterrence but also the demonstrable capability and political will to act if those boundaries are crossed. Current European engagement lacks these key elements.

European states typically frame their Indo-Pacific presence in general terms—upholding the international rules-based order and protecting freedom of navigation, for example—without explicitly directing their actions at any specific country. This ambiguity is most evident in their approach to a potential crisis over Taiwan. Top European leaders refrain from taking firm positions, often limiting themselves to generic affirmations of international law and condemnation of any disruption to the status quo, without outlining any concrete response.

This cautious posture reflects both a desire to avoid direct confrontation with Beijing, given Europe’s deep economic ties with China, and an awareness of Europe’s limited capacity for credible deterrence. European naval forces have significantly declined in size since the end of the Cold War, leaving them materially under-equipped for sustained power projection in the Indo-Pacific.

In this context, European states should reassess their Indo-Pacific posture. Rather than stretching limited naval resources across distant theaters, the most effective way to protect European interests is by assuming greater responsibility for their own security and defense. This would, in turn, allow the United States to more fully concentrate its military efforts on deterring China in the Indo-Pacific.

Despite repeated calls for a drawdown of US military forces in Europe, especially under the second Trump administration, the US still maintains a robust presence on the continent, including naval assets under the US Navy’s Sixth Fleet. A more effective division of labor should be central to the transatlantic alliance: Washington focuses its naval power on countering China in the Indo-Pacific, while Europe ensures maritime security in the Euro-Atlantic area, extending up to the western Indian Ocean.

As a first step, European navies should increase their operational contributions in areas such as the Red Sea, particularly in countering Houthi attacks, thereby countering accusations of “free-riding” from the Trump administration.

Despite their limited military capabilities, European states can still make meaningful contributions to Indo-Pacific stability, just not primarily through naval deployments. As Eva Pejsova notes, Europe’s comparative strengths lie in legal, normative, technological, and economic domains. One potential avenue is leveraging the power of the European market to discourage Beijing from coercively altering the regional status quo.