Welcome to the 68th issue of the CEEasia Briefing.
In this issue, we dissect the following topics:
- Slovak PM Fico at China’s Victory Day celebrations
- China–Czechia diplomatic freeze over Dalai Lama
- Slovakia–Indonesia cooperation on strategic materials
- Poland–South Korea arms deal
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1. Slovak PM Fico at China’s Victory Day celebrations
What’s going on? Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico took part in China’s Victory Day celebrations and military parade in Beijing as the only head of state from EU and NATO countries, appearing alongside Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. His presence underscores the ongoing shift in Slovakia’s foreign policy away from the positions of its Western allies.
Going deeper… Fico’s participation is unprecedented in the EU context. Other European leaders deliberately avoided what is widely seen as a propaganda spectacle. The last time China hosted a Victory Day military parade was ten years ago, when Czech President Miloš Zeman attended during the “golden era” of Sino-Czech relations. Beijing consistently uses such foreign appearances to project its power and legitimacy at home and abroad. Today, however, European leaders largely boycott these events, as China has become a key supporter of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine—a war that threatens not only Ukraine but also Slovakia and the rest of Europe. The guest list in Beijing revealed how sharply the divide between China and the West has deepened, especially as Xi Jinping, Putin, and Kim Jong Un appeared publicly together for the first time, signaling unity in their vision for a new world order tilted in favor of major powers at the expense of smaller states.
This means… Since returning to office in 2023, Fico has pursued what he calls an “all-azimuth” foreign policy. In practice, this means turning increasingly toward the East and courting authoritarian regimes. Fico has long emphasized the need to align foreign policy with economic opportunities, but he now seems eager to play on the geopolitical stage, cultivating ties with Russia and China as a way of boosting his image as a global statesman. For his domestic audience, meetings with leaders such as Putin and Xi strengthen this image. Yet these moves erode EU unity. Earlier this year, Fico already appeared at a military parade in Moscow. In Beijing, he not only met Xi Jinping and Vice-President Han Zheng but also spoke with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and with Putin himself. Opposition MPs in Slovakia and MEPs had urged him beforehand to use the trip to press for peace, human rights, and restraint over Taiwan. Instead, Fico prioritized pragmatic cooperation. According to the Slovak press comuniqué, the two leaders discussed opening a direct air line between Beijing and Bratislava. President Xi promised cooperation in issuing licenses for the export of Chinese rare earths and minerals to Slovakia—resources essential for the functioning of the Slovak industry. Fico also announced that Xi would visit Slovakia during his next trip to Europe. So far, however, the commitments remain at the level of vague assurances, with no concrete outcomes materializing.
Moreover… Bulgarian Deputy Prime Minister (although as a representative of his party) and Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó also joined the celebrations in Beijing. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán himself did not attend, wary of provoking his political allies in Washington. Orbán’s balancing act worked out as Szijjartó’s presence went largely unnoticed by international media and Budapest was thus able to please both of the sides of the Pacific. The contrasting approaches within Central Europe underscore a widening rift in the Visegrád Group: while Czechia and Poland remain firmly supportive of Ukraine and critical of China’s role, Slovakia and Hungary are increasingly engaging with Moscow and expanding ties with Beijing.
2. China–Czech diplomatic freeze over Dalai Lama
What’s going on? China cut all contacts with Czech President Petr Pavel after his private meeting with the Dalai Lama in India. Beijing strongly denounced the meeting, while the Czech public remains supportive of Czech politicians meeting the spiritual leader.
Going deeper… Pavel visited India on July 27th, following a state visit to Japan, to congratulate the Dalai Lama on his 90th birthday. His audience was the first meeting between the Dalai Lama and a sitting Central European head of state since 2016, and the first ever held with him in India. Although the meeting was private, the reaction of the Chinese Embassy in Prague was stern, calling it a provocation and interference in China’s domestic affairs. Czech views on China are the most negative among the V4 countries, which aligns with their unfavorable perceptions of Beijing’s policy in Tibet. A total of 55% of Czech respondents evaluate China’s policy toward Tibet negatively—the highest share in Central Europe—while only a negligible fraction views it positively. At the same time, Czechs support their politicians in meeting the Dalai Lama, even in the face of criticism from China: 57 percent of respondents are in favor, while fewer than 10 percent oppose.
This means… Beijing’s reaction reflects its ongoing concerns over the Tibet issue on the global stage. The rupture with Pavel highlights both Czechia’s uncompromising stance on Tibet and China’s continued inability to win over Czech public opinion. Negative views of Beijing persist across most party lines, from government supporters to opposition voters. This broad political consensus limits China’s capacity to leverage domestic divisions, further underlining the diplomatic challenges in Czechia. According to the Office of the Czech President, there has been no direct presidential-level communication with China, so the freeze does not alter the status quo. The real question is whether further steps will follow and lead to a broader suspension of Czech–Chinese diplomatic ties.
Moreover… Pavel’s visit commemorated the legacy of Václav Havel, who maintained close ties with the Dalai Lama and promoted values-based foreign policy. The gesture also underscores Czechia’s recent divergence from the other Visegrad states, where governments tend to be less assertive toward Beijing.
3. Slovakia–Indonesia cooperation on strategic materials
What’s going on? Slovakia and Indonesia signed an MoU on exploring partnership in the development and production of critical and strategic materials, focusing on EV battery components. This deal is part of Slovakia’s broader efforts to strengthen its electromobility supply chain and build closer ties with Indonesia, a key partner in the Indo-Pacific region.
Going deeper… Slovakia’s Economy Ministry and Indonesian partners (DeaLab and Medco Group) agreed to strengthen cooperation on strategic minerals. As part of the ceremony, Slovak company Envien Group also signed a framework cooperation deal on biofuels, while the Slovak Investment and Trade Development Agency (SARIO) continues discussions with Indonesian investors on establishing a cathode precursor production facility in Slovakia. This is part of Slovakia’s bid to anchor itself in the EV-battery value chain. Last year, Slovakia secured a €1.2 billion investment (the second largest investment in its history) from Chinese company Gotion High-Tech to build an EV-battery plant in Šurany. Apart from Gotion High-Tech, companies such as Volvo Cars and Hyundai have also been active across the country’s EVs supply chain in the last few years.
This means… By partnering with Indonesia on critical and strategic materials, Slovakia takes a significant step toward the much-needed transition from a traditional, combustion-engine-focused auto industry toward a future anchored in electromobility. The MoU also points to a broader interest in deepening bilateral relations with Indonesia and exploring cooperation in areas of mutual benefit, from energy to food systems. The two countries have also begun exploring cooperation in the defense sector as Slovak Defense Minister Robert Kaliňák met with the Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto just ten days ahead of his inauguration in October 2024.
Moreover… In June this year, Indonesia eased its import regime: a new framework regulation, effective August 29th, 2025, will streamline licensing across ten commodity groups, including technology, chemical products, and machinery. That could be a tailwind for Slovak exports to Indonesia, where machinery currently dominates. Additional momentum is expected from the EU–Indonesia free trade agreement, slated for finalization in September 2025.
4. Poland–South Korea arms deal
What’s going on? On August 1st, Poland signed a deal to acquire 180 K2 Black Panther tanks and 81 accompanying vehicles from the South Korean industrial and defence group Hyundai Rotem. The contract, worth around $6.5 billion, highlights expanding role of South Korea in European defence procurements.
Going deeper… The battle tanks are expected to be delivered between 2026 and 2030. 116 of them will be produced in the K2GF variant, and 64 in the K2PL version, a Polish-specific variant of K2. All the contracted K2GF tanks, as well as 3 K2PL tanks, will be manufactured in South Korea. As Warsaw strives to expand the Polish defence industry, the remaining 61 K2PL units will be produced by the Bumar-Łabędy plant in Gliwice.
The deal takes place amid Warsaw’s surge to modernize the Polish Armed Forces in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine—Poland plans to allocate 4.7% of GDP to defence this year. As the European defence industry struggles to meet arms demand from European capitals, Poland has taken advantage of South Korea’s prolific defence industry, establishing itself as a major importer of South Korean weaponsBetween 2014 and 2023, as much as 96.4% of South Korea’s arms exports to Europe went to Poland. South Korea also ranked second among the top 10 biggest arms suppliers of EU and European NATO member states
Furthermore… Poland and South Korea concluded a defence framework agreement in 2022. Warsaw plans to acquire up to 1,000 K2 tanks and more than 600 K9 howitzers. The first set of executive contracts signed under the framework agreement included provisions of 180 tanks, 364 self-propelled howitzers, 288 multiple rocket launchers and 48 light combat aircraft. The August order is Poland’s second executive contract of K2 tanks under the framework agreement.
This means… Blooming industrial and defence cooperation with South Korea enables Poland to modernize its armed forces and enhance military capabilities. Also NATO allies will benefit from Polish procurement of South Korean weapons, as it ultimately bolsters the Alliance’s deterrence vis-à-vis Russia. The Polish defence industry will also benefit from technology transfers, while boosting the Polish economy. Since South Korea is regarded as EU’s like-minded partner, it emerges as a favorable alternative to other arms-supplying countries, allowing European states to avoid overreliance on US weapon systems.
Moreover… With Warsaw as a key partner, the recent arms deal will further solidify Seoul’s position in the European defence market, allowing it to utilize Poland as a gateway for further engagement in Europe. However, South Korea’s future in the European defence ecosystem will also be affected by EU policies, notably the EU’s bid for strategic autonomy. For example, last year’s European Defence Industrial Strategy urges member states to procure more European––not Asian––weapons to mitigate fragmentation of the European defence industry.
Quick takes on CEEasia developments
INDIA | IVECO, an Italian manufacturer of commercial, industrial, and military vehicles, was split into two divisions. The civilian division—which includes the plant in Vysoké Mýto, Czechia—was acquired by Indian company Tata Motors for €3.8 billion. The defense division was purchased by Italian company Leonardo, which is partially owned by the state.
JAPAN | Czech Minister of the Environment Petr Hladík and his delegation visited Japan. He opened the Czech–Japan Circular Economy and Sustainability Forum 2025 in Tokyo and then continued to Osaka, home to Expo 2025. His mission aimed to deepen Czech-Japanese cooperation in the fields of circular economy, sustainability, and modern solutions for waste and water management.
VIETNAM | Vietnam granted visa-free entry for up to 45 days to citizens of twelve additional European countries, including the Visegrád Four. The exemption will remain in effect until August 14th, 2028, bringing the total number of visa-exempt countries to 24.
JAPAN | Panasonic opened a new heat pump factory near Plzeň, Czech Republic. The new site also includes a European research and development center, which will create more than 80 new jobs within three years. The investment of 8 billion CZK (327 million EUR) confirms Japan’s position as the second-largest investor in Czechia.
CHINA | Czech National Cyber and Information Security Agency (NÚKIB) issued a warning against the risks associated with data transfers and remote administration originating from China, Hong Kong, and Macau. The agency highlights that a broad spectrum of technologies—ranging from IP cameras and smart meters to medical devices, cloud storage, personal electronics, connected vehicles, and even large language models—could be exploited.
