A strategic partnership agreement signed in 2008 was meant to usher in a new era of research cooperation between Denmark and China. Danish officials had spent years courting the “new global superpower,” and the deal placed particular emphasis on education, innovation, and research cooperation with China. It promised greater student mobility and easier access for Danish universities to recruit talented Chinese researchers.
Nearly two decades later, there is broad agreement across university leadership, experts, and politicians that Denmark’s approach was naïve—and, in some cases, irresponsible. Within Danish authorities, a new consensus has taken hold: China offers opportunities, but it must also be treated as a potential security threat to Danish research.
A paradigm shift in international cooperation
In recent years, the Danish government and the country’s eight public universities have introduced a series of tightening measures designed to increase vigilance toward collaborations with Chinese research institutions. When the latest set of guidelines was published in 2022, Denmark’s Ministry of Higher Education and Science, argued that stronger safeguards were necessary for national security, competitiveness, fundamental values, and trust in Danish research.
Under the updated framework, universities are expected to identify and protect research considered strategically important. That includes data or research with high global value, as well as research that could be used for military purposes. Universities have also been given lists of predefined sensitive technologies intended to support screening and risk assessments. Beyond this, institutions must demonstrate a thorough understanding of their partners and cultivate a culture of awareness to reduce the risk of espionage.
The shift reflects Denmark’s strong position in areas such as the green transition, quantum technology, and wind energy—fields closely tied to prosperity, social development, and international competitiveness. Few in Copenhagen want to jeopardize that advantage.
Several factors accelerated the change in course. Danish media have repeatedly scrutinized questionable research partnerships, Confucius Institutes, and what they described as inadequate control over the activities of prominent Chinese researchers, as well as links to programs such as the Thousand Talents Plan, a program by the government of the People’s Republic of China to recruit experts in science and technology from abroad.
At the same time, Danish intelligence services have raised their focus on the issue through information campaigns and progressively stricter risk assessments of educational and research cooperation with Chinese entities. In 2024, the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) published a 24-page guide for research institutions titled “Is your research in danger?”, outlining risks of espionage, potential consequences, and practical recommendations for academics.
Confucius Institutes
Confucius Institutes never gained a stable foothold across Denmark’s major universities. Over the years, the University of Copenhagen, Roskilde University, and Aarhus University all declined to host an institute, citing concerns over academic independence. The University of Southern Denmark also rejected a proposal, stating that Hanban (the Chinese government body that oversees Confucius Institutes) made demands regarding teaching materials and literature. As one senior university figure put it when the issue surfaced publicly in 2018, “there was a strong influence that if we were to be a Confucius Institute, we would have to pull it in certain directions.”
Even so, two institutions did host Confucius Institutes for extended periods. Aalborg University ran one from 2009 to 2019, then terminated the collaboration, saying it wanted to reprioritize. During that decade, the university received more than €1.3 million from Hanban, which was used to purchase teaching materials and pay Chinese guest teachers. The Copenhagen Business School hosted a Confucius Institute from 2007 to 2017 and received roughly 1.1. Million EUR (DKK 8.25 million) over that period.
Although both institutions closed their institutes voluntarily, heightened public attention to censorship, influence, and espionage risks, alongside growing political skepticism toward China, formed part of the broader context. Today, there are no Confucius Institutes at Danish universities.
Key findings
Danish research and education are typically characterized by transparency, and Denmark’s Freedom of Information Act often provides the public with access to administrative records. Yet a comprehensive mapping of Danish universities’ collaboration with Chinese entities has proven difficult. Several universities said internal search systems could not conduct broad queries across cooperation agreements with Chinese partners. The alternative—a manual review of all agreements—would take more than 25 hours, allowing universities to refuse requests under rules related to disproportionate administrative burden.
As a result, the available mapping covers 453 university collaboration agreements with Chinese entities, drawn primarily from Aarhus University, the University of Copenhagen, and Aalborg University. The Technical University of Denmark (DTU) and the University of Southern Denmark were unable to provide complete data on their partnerships, though a smaller number of collaborations could be identified through publicly available university webpages.
Within the 453 agreements, 41 were signed with Chinese universities categorized by the ASPI tracker as “high-risk” institutions, while 40 involved “very high-risk” institutions. In 58 cases, Danish universities collaborated with Chinese university units that had previously been linked to espionage or misconduct. The projects covered fields such as science and technology, energy engineering, electronic systems, health, and technical sciences. However, the universities could not provide granular detail on whether these agreements included especially sensitive areas such as artificial intelligence, quantum technology, semiconductors, or neuroscience.
The mapping also indicates 12 instances of collaboration with China’s so-called “seven sons of national defense,” a group of universities closely associated with China’s defense-industrial ecosystem. Five of those cases involved the Harbin Institute of Technology, and they were described as focusing on science and technology. Danish universities did not provide further details on the specific research.
The most striking finding concerns DTU: it had collaborated with all “seven sons” over several years. DTU described the scope as research and innovation within energy engineering and computer science. In 2024, the university terminated all agreements with the “seven sons,” explicitly citing concern about contributing to China’s military industry. A vice-rector said DTU had been too naïve. DTU maintained that, to its knowledge, its work had not contributed to military products in China, but the decision was taken to reduce risk.
Another notable case involves Aalborg University’s long-running cooperation with Huawei. The university entered into 67 agreements with Huawei on research, including wireless communications, energy, and data storage. In many instances, the partnerships were covered by non-disclosure agreements. Aalborg University’s China partnerships have repeatedly drawn critical scrutiny in Danish media, and in 2020, the university conducted a broad review of existing agreements. It later tightened internal controls so that all new formal collaborations with Chinese partners require dean-level approval.
Overall, Denmark’s approach to China in research and education has shifted dramatically in just a few years—from openness and optimism to heightened caution and institutionalized control. Danish universities now conduct automatic background checks and screening of researchers from China seeking to work in Denmark. In early 2025, the Danish government further tightened cooperation with China through a new agreement limiting opportunities for joint research in areas including quantum, space, and defense.
Recommendations
The effort to compile data on university partnerships has also exposed a basic administrative weakness: large differences in how universities record and retrieve information about cooperation agreements. In some cases, universities could not provide elementary details, not because disclosure was legally prohibited, but because internal systems made it technically difficult or time-consuming.
There is clear scope for improving transparency. Standardized record-keeping, consistent journaling practices, and uniform search functions across universities would make it easier for the press and the public to scrutinize cooperation agreements, not only with China but globally. Universities already maintain public databases of research publications; adding a parallel layer for formal collaboration agreements and key partnership details, including contracts and funding arrangements, could strengthen accountability.
Denmark’s new academic approach to China is among the most restrictive in Europe. While it enjoys broad political support, it has also generated unease within parts of the research community. Critics worry that intensified security procedures could gradually constrain academic freedom or discourage international collaboration. The challenge in the coming years will be finding a workable balance between preventing foreign influence and protecting open research. Universities will also have to ensure that screening processes are robust without becoming indiscriminate, so legitimate researchers are not wrongly excluded.
For now, Danish universities are conducting extensive background checks on researchers from China, Iran, and Russia. Yet the broader dilemma remains: science is global, and risks of influence and espionage can emerge from many directions. Managing that risk, without undermining the openness that underpins research excellence, will be a lasting test for Denmark’s universities.
Explore more data on Denmark-China academic engagements here.
