Hungary’s Indo-Pacific positioning is focused on China, and shaped less by mutually beneficial relations than by structural dependence. The incoming Magyar government would most likely not alter this position, but it may begin to redefine its limits.
Key takeaways:
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Incoming Hungarian Prime Minister Péter Magyar is unlikely to break with Chinese economic relations but will place them within clear regulatory frameworks. Chinese investment, most notably the strategic projects by Chinese investors CATL and BYD, is expected to remain, but under stricter regulatory oversight.
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Hungary’s Indo-Pacific orientation can be expected to become more diversified, with greater emphasis on other Asian partners, particularly in technological sectors. But any changes will be gradual due to the structural constraints of Hungary’s embeddedness in Chinese economic networks.
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It will be important to see whether a Magyar government shifts from the outgoing administration’s One-China principle toward the EU’s One-China policy. In the case of Taiwan, the current model of “strategic silence” is likely to remain, but complemented by more active, functionally driven cooperation.
Hungary’s Indo-Pacific position: embedded, not chosen
Péter Magyar, the incoming prime minister, and his Tisza party’s election program, like the campaign itself, was primarily focused on domestic issues. Foreign policy considerations were on restoring Hungary’s position within the Western alliance system, rather than on a dedicated Indo-Pacific strategy. As of now, Hungary does not have a standalone Indo-Pacific strategy, and its engagement with the region is embedded within broader foreign economic policies, particularly the China-centered “Eastern Opening” policy. Nevertheless, a possible future Indo-Pacific strategy could be constructed from the party’s electoral program and public statements, including the first international press conference following the April 12 elections.
This emerging direction combines Western reorientation with a recalibrated form of economic pragmatism. The former reflects a strategic intent to reintegrate Hungary into the EU’s political and institutional framework, while the latter acknowledges the continued relevance of Asian economic partnerships. A key distinction lies in the reinterpretation of “pragmatism.” While the outgoing Orbán government frequently invoked the term in relation to its Eastern Opening policy, in practice, this often entailed political alignment rather than neutral economic engagement. The incoming Magyar administration would need to restore pragmatism as an economically interest-driven cooperation, constrained by existing European regulatory and political frameworks.
For Hungary, the Indo-Pacific is not a distant geopolitical concept but a structured system of economic and political relations, currently centered on China. The strategic question is, therefore, not how Hungary “enters” the Indo-Pacific, but how it repositions itself within an already deeply embedded network of Chinese and East Asian investments, battery and automotive supply chains, and EU-level regulatory constraints.
The legacy of Orban’s Eastern Opening Policy
Under the Orbán government, Hungary’s economic model has undergone a significant transformation, shaped by the Eastern Opening policy and the concept of a “work-based society,” which emphasizes employment over welfare provision. Together, these developments suggest an economic model characterized by foreign capital integration through the Eastern Opening, a parallel restructuring of the labor regime, and a shift in social policy toward supporting an FDI-driven industrial structure. This transformation does not merely reflect diversification, but a structural repositioning of Hungary into the lower segments of Indo-Pacific-driven global value chains. The country has increasingly become a European manufacturing hub for electromobility and battery production, driven by global industrial shifts originating in the Indo-Pacific region.
Through successive investments by Chinese and South Korean companies, Hungary has emerged as a key node in European supply chains. However, this role is structurally constrained. Production is concentrated in low-value-added activities, while higher-value functions, such as research, development, and strategic decision-making, remain located abroad. At the same time, this industrial expansion has been supported by significant state subsidies, including tax incentives, direct financial support, and infrastructure development.
Crucially, this expansion has outpaced the development and enforcement capacity of regulatory institutions. Labor and environmental standards remain contested, while the workforce increasingly relies on guest workers and vulnerable social groups. The result is a structurally asymmetric model. Hungary has become a major manufacturing base for East Asian industry, while local value capture remains limited and environmental and social externalities are increasingly borne domestically. In many regions, this already raises serious ecological and public health concerns.
Industrial, logistical, and financial integration has deepened to the point where China is Hungary’s primary Indo-Pacific partner, while Hungary functions as a strategic entry point into the EU market. This is particularly evident in the battery and EV sectors. CATL’s plant in Debrecen and BYD’s facility in Szeged are not only large-scale investments but also structurally significant projects. While the CATL investment embeds Chinese battery production within the EU’s industrial and supply chain structures, BYD goes a step further by positioning Chinese firms as direct competitors within the single market. At the same time, infrastructure projects, such as the Budapest–Belgrade railway and the integration of Budapest Airport into the “Air Silk Road,” further embed Hungary into Chinese trade and logistics networks. As such, Hungary’s Indo-Pacific positioning is structurally mediated through China, rather than representing a genuinely diversified regional engagement.
Possible future trajectories: Correction rather than rupture
The Tisza party’s program frames its foreign policy as a correction rather than a break. Its statement “We choose the West over the East” signals a shift in geopolitical orientation, not a disengagement from Asia. The critique focuses on dependency. Tisza’s program argues that the outgoing government had placed Hungary in a “dangerous dependence on Eastern autocracies” and aims to rebalance the country’s position.
This critique is reinforced by statements from the anticipated future foreign policy leadership. As highlighted in Anita Orbán’s (the future foreign minister, not related to outgoing Prime Minister Viktor Orbán) previous communication, Hungary’s Eastern Opening has produced a structural imbalance: exports to China have stagnated or declined, while imports and the trade deficit have increased significantly, reinforced by investment patterns with low domestic value added. Her conclusion is clear: instead of diversification, Hungary has moved toward asymmetric economic dependence, and the proposed correction is not disengagement from China, but a shift toward a more balanced, reciprocal, and strategically aligned relationship.
It is important to note that the electoral program does not approach East Asian relations through a human rights or democracy framework. Instead, it adopts an interest-driven approach, emphasizing economic benefits while seeking to avoid frictions within the Western alliance system. This implies repositioning along three axes: reintegration into the European Union and NATO frameworks, reduction of ad hoc bilateralism, and depoliticization of economic cooperation.
China policy: openness with conditions
Magyar’s first international press conference provides a clear indication of future China policy. In response to a question from a journalist, he follows a dual logic. On the one hand, it signals respect and openness, maintaining diplomatic engagement and avoiding confrontation. On the other hand, it clearly defines conditions under which Chinese investments are acceptable. These include compliance with European Union and Hungarian regulations, as well as adherence to environmental, labor, and health standards. This reflects not only a political but also a regulatory shift, including plans for stronger oversight of investments in the battery industry, more effective sanctions, and the re-establishment of environmental governance institutions.
The Tisza program does not frame East Asian relations in terms of human rights or democracy but rather defines future cooperation primarily through an interest-based approach, suggesting a pragmatically oriented foreign policy trajectory for Taiwan relations, conducted within the EU’s regulatory and political frameworks. A strategy of calibrated balancing is likely to emerge, within which the scope for engagement with Taiwan may expand, while remaining conditioned by broader geopolitical and economic considerations. Based on the party’s previous voting behavior in the European Parliament, an alignment with its European parliamentary group, the European People’s Party, can be expected on Taiwan-related issues.
All in all, the inherited model is unlikely to be abandoned abruptly but may gradually evolve, possibly alongside stronger cooperation in strategic sectors. Hungary-Taiwan relations may become more dynamic and balanced, continuing to follow a logic best described as functional pragmatism.
Limited recalibration within constraints
The incoming government is undertaking a comprehensive review of Hungary’s foreign policy, within which its approach to the Indo-Pacific is also taking shape. At its core lies the intention to reintegrate into the Western alliance system, signaling a clear geopolitical orientation toward the West, while maintaining economic engagement with the East under stricter conditions and placing greater emphasis on diversification and rules-based governance.
Within this framework, China will remain a key partner, but no longer as a privileged actor; its role will most probably be defined by clearer political and regulatory boundaries. At the same time, the scope for strategic repositioning is constrained. Chinese presence in Hungary extends well beyond individual investments, as it is deeply embedded in industrial value chains, logistics infrastructure, and institutional cooperation. This latter dimension encompasses formalized state-level partnerships, such as the All-Weather Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, including cooperation in areas such as nuclear energy, media, and the EV ecosystem, as well as multiple bilateral agreements, bilateral financial arrangements (state-backed infrastructure financing), and emerging forms of security cooperation (law enforcement agreements and joint policing mechanisms). Together, these institutionalize and stabilize long-term economic engagement. As a result, any change is unlikely to be radical and can instead be expected to unfold gradually.
All in all, the Tisza Party’s emphasis on reconnecting to Western economic networks and value chains points toward diversification within the Indo-Pacific context. This implies reducing one-sided dependence on China, preferably increasing the role of other Asian economies, and strengthening technological cooperation in strategic sectors such as information and communication technologies and innovation. However, the feasibility of this will depend on several factors, such as the availability of alternative partners, EU regulatory constraints, and existing supply chain dependencies. Assessing these remains a task for future analysis.
