This CEIAS report offers the first comprehensive, bottom-up analysis of Europe-Taiwan relations across 30 European countries. By systematically examining bilateral ties rather than treating Europe as a single actor, it provides a new empirical foundation for assessing the scope, depth, and current limits of Europe’s engagement with Taiwan.
Since 2020, Europe’s approach to Taiwan has shifted from relative marginality toward greater strategic relevance. Growing parliamentary engagement, expanding economic and technological cooperation, and more frequent political exchanges reflect a broader reassessment of Europe’s external partnerships. Rather than a single policy turn, this shift results from incremental adjustments across EU institutions and individual states, driven by changing assessments of risks and benefits associated with engagement with Taiwan.
This reassessment has been shaped by overlapping disruptions, including Europe’s deteriorating relations with China, supply-chain shocks during the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia’s war against Ukraine, and rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan’s central role in critical supply chains—particularly in advanced technologies such as semiconductors—has further elevated its importance in European strategic thinking, while uncertainty surrounding U.S. foreign policy has reinforced incentives for more autonomous and diversified cooperation.
Despite these trends, Europe-Taiwan relations remain uneven. Divergent national interests and risk appetites, differing interpretations of One-China policies, and sustained pressure from Beijing continue to constrain a coherent European approach. This report addresses these challenges through a systematic, data-driven assessment of bilateral relations between Taiwan and the EU, its 27 member states, and three closely linked non-EU partners—the United Kingdom, Norway, and Switzerland. By disaggregating “Europe” into its constituent actors and examining relations with Taiwan primarily on a bilateral basis, the study identifies patterns of convergence and divergence while treating China as an intervening rather than defining factor.
Executive summary:
- Since the beginning of the 2020s, Europe-Taiwan ties have seen a sharp uptick, both at the level of EU institutions and the individual states. Data collected by the EU-Taiwan Tracker database shows a fivefold increase in interactions between the EU and Taiwan from 2019 to 2024.
- While most European states are increasingly open to engaging with Taiwan, they do so at differing speeds and with divergent risk appetites. Based on the level of development of individual countries’ economic and political relations with Taiwan, four groups of countries clearly emerge: Old Partners, New Friends, Pragmatists, and Laggards.
- Old Partners are Western European countries with fairly broad and long-term relations with Taiwan, often dating back to the period of their diplomatic recognition of the Republic of China. These countries maintain robust economic and political ties with Taiwan. While they might exhibit periods of more or less active engagement, the very act of maintaining quasi-formal relations with Taiwan over a considerable period of time is domestically rarely contested. This group includes Germany, France, and the United Kingdom.
- New Friends are countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) that, after a period of dormancy, (re-)discovered engagement with Taiwan at the beginning of the 2020s. They are often among the most politically active European states vis-à-vis Taiwan. While eager to establish new economic links with Taiwan across a variety of sectors, their economic relationship with Taiwan still lacks the longitudinal maturity of the previous category. This group includes Czechia, Lithuania, and Poland.
- Pragmatists are the largest group of countries that are quite wary of openly pursuing political relations with Taiwan, yet enjoy beneficial economic ties, sometimes even surpassing some of the more politically active states. This group includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.
- Laggards are countries with comparatively underdeveloped relations with Taiwan in both political and economic domains, and which would require wide-ranging changes in their approach to Taiwan to engender more robust ties. None of these countries currently maintains a representative office in Taiwan. This group includes Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Norway, Portugal, Romania, and Slovenia.
- The majority of European countries host some form of Taiwanese representation on their soil, even if they themselves might not maintain a direct presence in Taipei. Only seven European states have no quasi-diplomatic contact with Taiwan. Ongoing negotiations with Estonia to open a new representative office of Taiwan in Europe have stumbled over the issue of how to name the delegation (Taipei or Taiwan representative office), highlighting the symbolism-versus-substance dilemma that Taiwanese diplomacy faces in pursuing relations with Europe.
- Between 2019 and 2024, the volume of mutual visits increased more than sixfold. The normalization of mutual visits also included their moving from secrecy into the public spotlight and from unofficial interactions to more formal meetings. Still, ministerial-level meetings remain sporadic, and when they do occur, they are usually limited to less sensitive portfolios such as education or science.
- Despite recognition constraints, Taiwan and Europe have developed a growing set of binding agreements across three areas: facilitating economic relations (avoiding double taxation; customs cooperation), legal cooperation and law enforcement (criminal and civil judicial cooperation; extraditions; patents prosecution highway), and mobility and people-to-people contacts (working holidays; recognition of driver’s licenses). Only Poland and Slovakia have extradition treaties with Taiwan, and Slovakia is still the only country with an agreement on civil and commercial judicial cooperation. While a full EU-Taiwan trade and investment deal remains unlikely, the UK’s Enhanced Trade Partnership offers a realistic template for a politically workable compromise.
- Three new dynamics underpin security cooperation. Soft-security cooperation has expanded rapidly, covering foreign information manipulations and interference (FIMI), critical infrastructure, energy security, economic security, and supply-chain resilience. The Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF) provides a politically low-risk platform for Taiwan and its European partners to collaborate on soft security issues. Commercial links in security-adjacent sectors (drones, semiconductors, energy) increasingly blur the lines between economy and security, contributing to the erosion of European taboos around security cooperation. Europe’s growing recognition of the interdependence between European and Indo-Pacific security has also increased naval activity: France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK have conducted transits through the Taiwan Strait despite Beijing’s objections, signaling a slow strategic shift.
- Despite its status as a “like-minded partner,” the EU has persistent concerns about two major human rights issues in Taiwan: the continued use of capital punishment and the status of migrant workers. The latter case risks colliding with the EU’s forthcoming forced-labor import ban, with potential economic and reputational costs for Taiwan. At the same time, Taiwan can strengthen its role as a like-minded partner by supporting European civil society facing democratic backsliding and aligning its values-based diplomacy with its strategic interests.
- Economic exchanges between Taiwan and the EU are institutionally supported, with annual consultations upgraded in 2022 to the EU-Taiwan Trade and Investment Dialogue. Despite deepening ties, non-tariff barriers continue to impede market access, most visibly in offshore wind, where EU complaints over Taiwan’s local-content rules led to World Trade Organization (WTO) consultations in 2024 and only a partial resolution. As of late 2025, European firms still report obstacles to wind energy, pharmaceuticals, and agricultural exports, underscoring that removing regulatory bottlenecks remains essential to fully leverage the momentum in EU-Taiwan economic relations.
- Trade in goods peaked at €84.2 billion in 2022 and remains significant, with the EU ranking as Taiwan’s fourth-largest trading partner and Taiwan as the EU’s 13th. Europe consistently runs a sizeable goods deficit but a services surplus. While Taiwan is a major partner for several large EU economies, bilateral statistics are often distorted by transshipment, masking the true scope of trade relations.
- The EU is Taiwan’s largest source of investment, with cumulative flows of $58.1 billion since 1952 and substantial European stakes in semiconductors and green energy, led by the Netherlands and Denmark. Taiwanese investment in Europe has surged since 2019, reaching $13.5 billion cumulatively and accelerating through major semiconductor ventures such as Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company’s (TSMC) €10 billion-plus ESMC project in Germany. This flagship investment and the expected arrival of Taiwanese suppliers have spillover potential for Central European economies seeking to build their own semiconductor ecosystems.
- The semiconductor sector currently drives most economic cooperation. Opportunities for more economic engagement also lie in other high-tech sectors, such as aerospace and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs); clean energy; pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, and medical devices; advanced machinery, robotics, and industrial automation; photonics and lasers; or artificial intelligence and data centers.
- Paradiplomacy (subnational governmental exchanges) remains an underused tool, despite it being an efficient way to bypass Taiwan’s diplomatic constraints. Currently, 28 European cities and regions have ties to Taiwanese partners. Tainan, Taoyuan, Taipei, and Kaohsiung are the most active Taiwanese cities pursuing ties with European self-governing regions and municipalities. Besides direct city-to-city contacts, multilateral inter-city fora—such as the Pact of Free Cities, of which Taipei and Taoyuan are members—also offer Taiwanese cities a way to foster international partnerships.
- Political-party dialogue remains an underdeveloped but potentially powerful stabilizer of Europe-Taiwan relations. Structured party-to-party engagement—especially among lower-rank cadres—could mitigate risks from domestic political swings, bypass some One-China-related constraints, socialize future European leaders on Taiwan’s strategic relevance, and provide a channel for resolving grievances. Existing links through international party alliances also offer platforms for this dialogue.
- NGO outreach, think-tank diplomacy, and academic cooperation have become critical workarounds for Taiwan to deepen engagement with Europe despite formal diplomatic limits. High-profile think-tank events enable unofficial visits by Taiwanese leaders, while evolving mutual interest has pushed European institutes to treat Taiwan as an autonomous actor rather than a China-related footnote. On the academic front, Taiwan offers Europe alternatives to China-linked language and China-studies funding, and supports semiconductor-focused training and research that aligns with Europe’s industrial upgrading goals.
- While Taiwan’s profile has risen significantly, the goal of long-term sustainability of the relationship needs to be a constantly evolving process that balances symbolism with substance.
Editors: Matej Šimalčík, Kristina Kironska, Alfred Gerstl
Editorial assistance: Vladimíra Ličková
Country chapter authors: Konstantinas Andrijauskas, Agust Börjesson, Andreea Brinza, Julie Yu-wen Chen, Quentin Couvreur, Luís Cunha, Dana Dūda, Zsuzsa Anna Ferenczy, Freda Fiala, Rumena Filipova, Alfred Gerstl, Simona Grano, Sense Hofstede, Saša Istenič Kotar, Marcin Jerzewski, Kristina Kironska, Vladimíra Ličková, Julia Marinaccio, Kara Němečková, Jonas Parello-Plesner, Lana Pedišić, Stefano Pellagi, Josie-Marie Perkhun, Jasper Roctus, Amelie Salomon Jankjær, Filip Šebok, Shiany Pérez-Cheng, Matej Šimalčík, Bernadett Szél, Mart Tšernjuk, Konstantinos Tsimonis, Arthur Wong, Andrew Yeh
