Estonia, the smallest Baltic state with only 1.3 million inhabitants, hosts 18 higher education institutions, including public universities, universities of applied sciences, a private university, and scientific research institutes. Given the limited exchanges between Estonia and China at the state level, fewer than half of these institutions have engaged in cooperation with Chinese counterparts.
Although Estonia’s Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) does not explicitly cover academic transparency, more than half of the institutions responded to FOIA requests. The Estonian Business School was the only institution to outright refuse, citing legal reasons. The Estonian University of Life Sciences (Eesti Maaülikool) postponed its response by invoking FOIA subclauses but ultimately failed to provide information on its cooperation with Chinese entities.
Problematic areas in current and past Sino-Estonian university cooperation
The main problem in Sino-Estonian academic cooperation lies in Estonian universities’ lack of awareness of the risks associated with Chinese partnerships. In past cooperation, collaborations in the STEM sector stood out, with some links to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The absence of state-level guidelines has led to divergent approaches among universities in managing these risks.
A broader issue is the lack of transparency. While many universities list Chinese partners on their websites, there is no centralized register of contracts and cooperation agreements on the Estonian Research Council’s website. As a result, the public cannot access a comprehensive overview of inter-university cooperation.
Academic cooperation and transparency
The Public Information Act (Avaliku teabe seadus) does little to clarify the scope of Sino-Estonian cooperation. Several universities responding to FOIA inquiries cited different legal provisions to withhold details, particularly regarding non-EU-funded projects with Chinese partners. By contrast, EU-funded projects are all listed on the Estonian Research Council’s website, with partners and sectors clearly identified.
The lack of publicly available information on universities’ own websites has resulted in limited media coverage and, consequently, minimal public scrutiny of Estonia–China academic cooperation.
Research security
The absence of state guidelines on cooperation with academic institutions in authoritarian regimes has also prevented meaningful debate on research security. While Estonian universities terminated ties with Russian and Belarusian entities in 2022 on the basis of “moral duties, academic and democratic values,” according to the Council of Estonian Rectors in 2022, this was a voluntary decision, not the result of a formal policy.
More recent security assessments highlight the risks of Chinese engagement. A year on from the release of the EU’s 2024 economic security strategy, the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service (Välisluureamet), in its 2025 annual report, warned that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) uses researchers and doctoral candidates abroad to transfer valuable technologies back to China. Similarly, the Estonian Internal Security Service (Kaitsepolitseiamet), in its April 2024 review, flagged instances of “government-forced technology transfer” involving Chinese firms and researchers.
Confucius Institute: monopoly on teaching Chinese languages
Estonia hosts only one Confucius Institute (CI), located at Tallinn University. According to the university’s website, it focuses on teaching Mandarin, organizing cultural events, and facilitating book clubs. Since its establishment in 2010, the CI has dominated Chinese language teaching in Estonia, due to the shortage of Mandarin-speaking Estonian teachers or Chinese teachers capable of teaching in Estonian (although some secondary schools in Saaremaa have been teaching Mandarin since the early 2000s). The only alternative on the tertiary level is the University of Tartu’s Asia Center, which offers beginner-level courses (A0–A2.1) taught by an Estonian instructor unaffiliated with Chinese institutions.
The CI’s influence on academic freedom at Tallinn University appears limited. Structurally, it is categorized as a “support unit” (Tugiüksus), not an academic department. While there is no direct evidence of interference in teaching or research on China-related subjects, there is the impression that staff associated with the CI are generally reluctant to comment publicly on Chinese politics. Beyond Tallinn University, Tallinn Mustamäe Gymnasium (Tallinna Mustamäe Gümanaasium) is listed as also employing a CI-linked Mandarin teacher, Yuxin Chen, who also teaches Mandarin Chinese at Tallinn University’s Confucius Institute.
PLA-linked institutions, cooperation with Huawei and the STEM sector
Of all identified Sino-Estonian collaborations, 11 involved PLA-linked Chinese institutions, with risk levels ranging from low to very high, according to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s (ASPI) Defence University Tracker. Most partnerships were in agriculture, biodiversity, and medicine. However, Estonian universities also interacted with one “high risk” and two “very high risk” Chinese institutions, including the Beijing Institute of Technology, a member of China’s “Seven Sons of National Defence,” which collaborated with Tallinn University of Technology (TalTech) in 2018.
Past collaborations also included agreements with Huawei. Both the University of Tartu and TalTech partnered with Huawei on student scholarships and internships. During this period, a critical article about Huawei was censored in the University of Tartu’s student magazine in 2020, sparking a national debate on academic freedom.
Although areas such as artificial intelligence and electric vehicles have not featured prominently in cooperation, Estonia’s strength in these fields makes its universities vulnerable to risks from insufficient due diligence. In spite of the small number of Chinese partners categorized as a high risk by the ASPI Tracker, cooperation in the STEM sector seems to be the priority of Sino-Estonian university partnerships, whereas Chinese universities labelled less risky tend to be associated with cooperation in agriculture, biodiversity and medicine.
Recommendations
As seen, Sino-Estonian academic cooperation suffers from insufficient transparency and weak risk management. Estonian universities follow inconsistent approaches, with only Tallinn University consulting the Foreign and Interior Ministries, while others rely on internal rules or no screening mechanisms at all when it comes to working with Chinese higher education institutions or entities from other non-democratic regimes.
To address these shortcomings, the Estonian Ministry of Education should coordinate with other ministries to issue non-binding guidelines on cooperation with institutions from authoritarian regimes. A dedicated section on China should identify concrete risks, particularly in STEM collaboration, where research security is most vulnerable.
Finally, Estonia needs a legally binding framework on transparency in academic cooperation. By ensuring systematic disclosure of agreements, the government can strengthen public oversight of university partnerships with Chinese institutions and with entities from other non-democratic regimes.
Explore more data on Estonia-China academic engagements here.
