Slovakia’s China pivot: Economic pragmatism or political subservience? A briefing on Robert Fico’s visit to China in November 2024

Key takeaways:

The visit fits into the larger context of the foreign policy of the Fico government which promotes “allazimuth diplomacy” that supposedly transcends geopolitical divisions and under which Fico has also advocated for resuming ties with Russia. The government has repeatedly claimed it is pursuing a “sovereign Slovak foreign policy”, explicitly pronouncing that it will not be influenced by the EU’s or other allies’ concerns.

Moreover, the new government has stressed it will focus more on economic diplomacy, by searching for new opportunities for Slovak businesses and attracting new investments, especially outside of the “traditional” markets. As a part of this focus, Slovakia has recently reorganized its diplomatic representation around the world, opening new missions in Asia and Africa, and closing some in Europe. Moreover, Slovakia has significantly increased the number of economic diplomats. While Fico presented the China visit as the “most significant visit of 2024”, it was also put in the larger context of his economic diplomacy-focused travel, including the preceding visit to South Korea and upcoming visits to South America or Vietnam.

Itinerary

The visit comprised of three stops–in Beijing, Hefei, and Shanghai. In Beijing, the itinerary included meetings with the highest PRC representatives, including President Xi Jinping, Premier Li Qiang, and Chairman of the Standing Committee of National People’s Congress Zhao Leji. The two sides issued a statement on establishing a Strategic Partnership and signed 13 further documents on cooperation in various areas.3 In Beijing, PM Fico also opened a Slovak-China Business Forum. The second stop of the itinerary, Hefei in China’s Anhui province, included meetings with the local provincial leadership and a visit to the headquarters of the Gotion company. Fico also gave a lecture at the Anhui University. Finally, the delegation participated in the opening of the China International Import Expo in Shanghai.

Political outcomes

In terms of political outcomes, the elevation of the relationship to a strategic partnership was the most significant. From China’s perspective, the official designation of ties reflects the status of the relationship. Up until now, Slovakia remained one of the few EU countries (now only 6) without such a designation, and the last among the V4 countries. However, most of the strategic relationships in the EU were signed in the 2000s and 2010s, in a different geopolitical context, and some of them, such as the one between Czechia and China, are now largely symbolic without meaningful cooperation ongoing.

The provisions of the strategic relationship establish the framework for more intensive political and economic ties. The partnership establishes a mechanism for intergovernmental cooperation on the level of the foreign minister. While most of the content is standard, embedding the bilateral ties into the wider context of EU-China relations, there are some noteworthy deviations.

First of all, the document states that “The participants firmly oppose the politicization and instrumentalization of human rights issues, and firmly oppose any country interfering in the internal affairs of other countries in the name of democracy and human rights.” Such language directly echoes China’s rhetoric that denies the universality of human rights but also reflects the principles of Slovak foreign policy under Fico, which explicitly neglects value considerations.

Second, the document includes strong wording on the One China Policy, stating that “Slovakia opposes any attempts to interfere in China´s internal affairs, sovereignty and territorial integrity, including Taiwan.” Slovakia’s official designation of the One China Policy has also previously been very closely aligned with China’s stance, as defined by the 2003 joint communique. However, the explicit reiteration by the current government comes after the previous government developed intensive contacts with Taiwan, despite the 2003 formulation of the One China Policy.

Therefore, the inclusion of the clause in the strategic partnership document can be seen as a reassurance by the Slovak government that it will refrain from taking further steps towards developing governmental relations with Taiwan, which China would oppose. However, the previously achieved developments in the relationship with Taiwan will most likely not be undone. A major litmus test for this will be the continuation (and accompanying level of medialization) of the Joint Economic Affairs Commission, which has been held semi-annually since 2021, and accompanying meetings typically held at the deputy ministerial level.

On international issues, the invasion of Ukraine by Russia was also on the agenda during the high-level meetings. Slovakia praised China’s stance on the issue as “fair, objective and constructive” and expressed its support for the China-Brazil joint peace plan on Ukraine and their Friends of Peace initiative at the UN. Slovakia thus joined Hungary as the second EU country to support the initiative which Ukraine has previously criticized as contradictory to its vision of just peace. Fico supported China’s position already since the time in opposition, then in the form of China’s 12-point “peace plan”. The issue is likely to continue to feature in the Slovak approach towards China due to its importance in Fico’s domestic messaging as he can claim Slovak position on peace in Ukraine is echoed by key international players.

Economic outcomes

Official communication from the Prime Minister’s Office highlighted particularly two outcomes as key deliverables of the visit: the extension of China’s visa-free regime to Slovakia (see below) and investment by China’s privately owned battery maker Gotion into battery production in Slovakia. Beyond these two outcomes, other initiatives were touched upon during the visit, such as cooperation on transport and energy infrastructure development in Slovakia, but very few specifics are available for now. Some of the proposed projects, like the power plant on the Ipeľ river and the direct flight connection between Bratislava and Beijing, are mainstays of the Slovak proposals to China, with Beijing showing only little interest in picking them up through the past decade.

As far as Gotion battery plan is concerned, Fico’s government already signed an MoU with Gotion about its investment plans back in November 2023, less than a month after the government was formed. Thus, focusing on this project highlights that Fico’s trip did not have very specific aims and that its outcomes are rather underwhelming.

Gotion’s plans to establish a battery factory in Slovakia as currently a point of controversy. Local inhabitants have mobilized to voice concerns over a mix of issues, ranging from legitimate environmental concerns to downright xenophobia. In an attempt to alleviate the concerns, several inhabitants of the Šurany township were invited to visit Gotion’s headquarters in Hefei just a few days prior to the Prime Minister’s visit. Despite initially positive reactions from the participants, the issue is far from settled, as the project is increasingly instrumentalized by local and national-level actors on the far right side of the political spectrum.

The Gotion project, together with another big Chinese investment, the Volvo (Geely) EV plant in Košice, was in fact negotiated already during previous administrations, which maintained a much more critical approach to China. This actually underscores that a wary approach to China, conscious of security considerations and political values, is not necessarily detrimental to economic cooperation, especially on projects that follow economic logic, rather than political wishes.

Interestingly, official communication barely mentioned the topic of EU tariffs on China-made EVs, which Fico has been vocally opposing at home. In Fico’s view, the tariffs are part of a ‘nonsensical trade war pursued by the European Commission’ with ‘devastating effects for the European economy.’ Despite previous warnings by Fico of the major impact of China’s retaliatory automotive tariffs (targeting luxury vehicles–a dominant item in Slovak exports to China) on Slovakia, it seems that the topic was not a significant point in discussion with Chinese counterparts. Neither did Fico comment on Beijing’s push for locating Chinese EV investments in Europe only into those countries that opposed tariffs as a success of his policy.

As the other documents signed during the visit were memoranda of understanding (MOU), they have an inherent vagueness to them. The language and topics covered are indicative of broader views of China in the current Slovak administration and its potential interests vis-à-vis China. Overall, the signed documents show a clear dismissal of economic security concerns in relations with China:

Cooperation on the digital economy spells a departure from Slovakia’s wary views of Chinese tech firms. Areas of cooperation mentioned in the respective MoU include 5G, cloud computing, satellite navigation, data centers, AI, the Internet of Things, and others. This is in stark contrast to the past approach. In 2020 Slovakia signed a Clean Networks Memorandum with the US and accordingly updated its cybersecurity legal regime. In 2021, the Slovak Intelligence Service warned about Chinese attempts to penetrate critical technological infrastructure.

Green tech will be a major platform for more economic cooperation with China. Besides EVs and batteries, other sectors of focus include energy (solar, wind, nuclear, hydrogen, etc.) or green finance. Interestingly, the Slovak Ministry of Economy sees this also as a way to fulfill the EU-funded Slovak Reconstruction and Resilience. This could result in allocating EU funds in a way that is not consistent with the EU Economic Security Strategy and broader de-risking goals.

Among the 56 businesses accompanying PM Fico on the trip, several are active in sectors considered sensitive or strategically important. The delegation included, among others, several companies active in nuclear energy, defense, semiconductors, telecommunications, cybersecurity, or artificial intelligence. These are also some of the fields in which Slovakia and China pledged to deepen research cooperation, which would lead to increased exposure of the Slovak academia to China, while the appetite to implement a robust research security framework has all but stalled.

When it comes to infrastructure projects that the Fico government has been promoting as one of the key priorities in cooperation with China, the construction of the Karpaty highway tunnel seems the be the most probable to happen. This can be inferred from the list of cabinet-approved list of follow-up tasks, under which the Ministry of Transport is obliged to negotiate a memorandum of understanding on the construction of the tunnel with the PRC National Development and Reform Commission by the end of March 2025. Little details are available about the project for now though, beyond a cursory mention on the Ministry’s social media that infrastructure cooperation with China could take the form of “intergovernmental projects.” This suggests that inter-governmental agreements might be used in order to skirt public procurement processes and various transparency requirements, creating an environment susceptible to corruption, conflict of interests or other forms of poor governance.

Other issues

The key deliverable from the visit presented by the government was the extension of visa-free travel to for up to 15 days China for Slovak citizens. However, the importance of the move was exaggerated by Fico, as Slovakia was included in a batch of other countries, and 17 European countries had already received the same beneficial treatment over the past year as part of China’s effort to boost domestic tourism and improve ties with Europe. After new announcements, as of early December, only three EU countries (Sweden, Lithuania and Czechia) have not yet received the visa-free treatment, which was in the meantime extended from 15 to 30 days.

Chinese media also reported that an MoU on cooperation was signed between the Slovak Press Agency TASR and China’s state-owned China Media Group, establishing a mechanism for cooperation in areas including content sharing. Such agreements, signed by China and many media outlets around the world, create a potential conduit for the transmission of China’s propaganda into foreign information spaces. This is especially important as TASR content is often reused by other Slovak media.

In his public pronouncements before and during the visit, including an interview for China’s CCTV, Fico continued in an established highly laudatory rhetoric on China, commending its economic and technological development, praising its positive role in ensuring global peace and stability, and discounting any criticism of China as illegitimate. Fico’s public presentation of the visit also featured attacks on the opposition politicians that criticized the trip, with Fico calling them “barking dogs”.

Outlook

Overall, Fico’s approach to China is largely a departure from the pre-existing approach, espoused by the governments formed by the rival parties between 2020-2023 which tended to follow the EU’s policy of seeing China simultaneously as a partner, competitor, and systemic rival. This was enshrined also in the 2021 National Security Strategy, a document that viewed China largely through the prism of economic security: “China is significantly increasing its power potential and political influence underpinned by rapidly growing military capabilities, which, combined with economic power and strategic investments, it is assertively using to advance its interests.”

Through two large investments (Volvo and Gotion), China has significantly increased its economic involvement in Slovakia. As further Chinese companies involved in EV supply chains are looking for new investment sites in the EU, Slovakia might receive more Chinese capital, especially if Beijing pushes its companies to only invest in countries that oppose the tariffs. The recent announcement that Chinese Leapmotors will scrap its plans to produce cars with its JV partner Stellantis in Poland and is considering moving the production to the existing Stellantis plant in Trnava in Western Slovakia is the first indication. Attracting new Chinese investments that create job opportunities might further support the government’s friendly approach to China and lead to closer economic but also political cooperation, that might follow the example of neighboring Hungary.

One issue to look out for is how the Slovak government will act in various international forums where China-related topics might come up for discussion. For instance, in the previous parliamentary term, Slovakia tended to support the adoption of resolutions critical of China over its human rights abuses. Given Slovakia’s new pledge to refrain from using human rights as a tool for “interfering in China’s domestic affairs,” it seems very unlikely that such activities would continue during Fico’s tenure as the Prime Minister.

While Prime Minister Robert Fico’s policies reflect a significant pivot towards China, labeling him a “vassal” of Beijing oversimplifies the dynamics at play. For now, we have not observed any behavior that would undermine the adoption of China-focused positions at the EU Council level–which has been a modus operandi repeatedly shown by Hungary in the past. While Slovakia did vote against the EV tariffs, it should not be taken as evidence of such an approach as it did so along Germany and three other member states and 12 more abstained. Nevertheless, this needs to be monitored for indications of changes in approach. At this stage, however, Fico’s actions toward China are better described as a “convergence of interests”, motivated by Fico’s domestic agenda and general anti-West posturing.

This briefing paper was prepared in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung representative office in Bratislava. The views, conclusions and recommendations expressed in this report are solely those of its authors and do not reflect the view of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, or its employees.