Geopolitics is increasingly shaping EU–China scientific collaboration. A new policy proposal suggests the EU is moving toward excluding Chinese entities from most strategic research areas, reflecting the securitization of knowledge production amid growing technological rivalry and concerns over dual-use technologies.
Key takeaways:
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The draft Horizon Europe Work Program for 2026–2027, if adopted, would fundamentally reshape the framework of EU–China scientific cooperation by barring Chinese institutions from most research and innovation projects.
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Europe’s evolving policy on research collaboration with China is not attributable to a single cause; it arises from the interplay of bilateral tensions and broader structural shifts in how technology shapes geopolitical competition.
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As in economic relations, full decoupling in research cooperation is neither feasible nor desirable, and the EU needs to strike the right balance.
The EU’s embrace of “de-risking” vis-à-vis China marks a profound recalibration of its external engagement strategy. This shift is often discussed in terms of trade, industrial policy, and supply chains. Less clamorous, but no less consequential, is its impact on scientific collaboration. Once celebrated as a pillar of science diplomacy and a bridge for mutual understanding, EU–China research cooperation is now increasingly geopoliticized. This evolution represents more than a policy adjustment; it exposes a deeper tension between openness and control, between cooperation and geopolitical caution. Moreover, it reflects a trend that goes far beyond the EU and its member states, as shown by a growing number of countries, including the United States, Canada, and Japan, adopting measures to protect sensitive research from foreign interference.
Another brick in the wall
According to data from the European Commission’s CORDIS, China is currently involved as a participant or partner in approximately 107 projects that address crucial issues for EU economic competitiveness and global challenges. These projects range from sustainable agriculture and improved energy storage systems to combating climate change.
However, this situation may soon change as rising tensions increasingly translate into tangible policy shifts. A new draft of the EU’s €93.5 billion Horizon Europe program for 2026–27 proposes formally barring Chinese institutions from most research and innovation projects. Specifically, Article 22(6) states that Chinese entities are ineligible for all Innovation Actions unless explicitly permitted to participate. This ban applies to Clusters 1 (health), 3 (civil security and society), and 4 (digital, industry, and space). In addition, it would also apply to EU-based entities “directly or indirectly controlled by Chinese organisations” in sensitive fields such as AI, semiconductors, and quantum technologies.
Another clause singles out universities affiliated with China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, notably the so-called Seven Sons of National Defense, specifying that they are not eligible to participate in any action under any part of the Work Program. Cooperation with China would remain possible in Clusters 2 (culture, creativity, and inclusive society), 5 (climate, energy, and mobility), and 6 (natural resources and agriculture).
The message is unambiguous: for Europe, knowledge has become a strategic asset amid growing geopolitical and geoeconomic competition. If adopted, these measures would represent a dramatic shift in the framework for most EU–China scientific cooperation.
The draft does not emerge in a vacuum; it is the culmination of a steady process. In recent years, collaboration with China under Horizon Europe and its predecessor, Horizon 2020, has faced scrutiny for partnering with some of China’s top military-linked universities on projects ranging from driverless cars to network security. Chinese participation in certain sensitive areas was already restricted in the Horizon Europe Work Program 2023–2024.
More broadly, research security frameworks are proliferating and becoming a crucial part of the EU’s economic security strategy. Since 2021, Regulation 2021/821 has established controls on the export of dual-use items for security reasons. This regulation, together with Recommendation 2021/1700, also applies to academic research, effectively linking research security with broader trade and security policy. Other measures range from specific national guidelines to dedicated compliance staff and internal vetting procedures within universities.
Most recently, the Commission has announced its intention to anchor research security in law through the upcoming European Research Area Act. Together, these measures are gradually completing a wall that has been slowly but steadily rising, showing that the architecture of European science is being rewired for an era of geopolitical risk.
Multiple drivers
There is no single driver behind Europe’s changing approach to research cooperation with China. On one level, the shift can be read as the EU’s response to China’s rise as a scientific superpower. According to the World Bank, by 2023, China’s R&D expenditure as a share of GDP had surpassed that of Europe and was approaching American levels. WIPO figures show that the United States spent about $783 billion on R&D, China $723 billion, and Europe roughly $410 billion.
Moreover, a report by the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation notes that between 2019 and 2023, Chinese R&D investment grew at an annual rate of 8.9%, compared with 4.7% in the United States, and argues that because R&D is cheaper in China, Beijing is likely conducting more research in absolute terms than Washington. The sheer scale suggests that China is not only catching up but increasingly setting the pace.
Yet numbers alone do not tell the full story. The mood in Europe has been shaped by a series of controversial cases involving the academic and research community. One example concerns RWTH Aachen University in Germany, where investigations revealed ongoing collaborations with Chinese institutions closely tied to the country’s defense sector, including several of the Seven Sons of National Defense. These collaborations encompassed projects involving technologies with dual-use potential.
Similar cases have emerged at other European universities, such as Delft University of Technology in the Netherlands, which also faced scrutiny for collaborating on dual-use research, including emerging and disruptive technologies, with Chinese institutions linked to the military.
In this broader context, specific espionage incidents have further reinforced suspicions that certain Chinese research engagements may serve strategic rather than purely academic purposes. A particularly striking example occurred in April 2024, when three German citizens were arrested on charges of spying for China by transferring sensitive technologies with military applications. The main suspect, identified as Thomas R., is alleged to have acted on behalf of China’s Ministry of State Security since at least 2022, passing information on powerful ship engines and facilitating the illegal export of high-power lasers—both technologies with clear dual-use implications.
Nonetheless, to fully grasp the nature of the shifting EU attitude towards research cooperation with China, it is crucial to look at the broader picture, which reflects a structural shift across all advanced economies. The boundaries between civilian and military technology have largely dissolved. Today, artificial intelligence powers both consumer devices and autonomous weapons; quantum computing promises breakthroughs in drug discovery but also codebreaking. Innovation is now inherently dual-use. When dealing with China, where Military-Civil Fusion has been elevated to a national priority under President Xi Jinping, this ambiguity is further amplified. In such an environment, even seemingly benign collaboration can produce unintended strategic spillovers.
Finding the right balance
Despite this challenging picture, it is widely recognized that, as with economic ties, shutting the door entirely is not an option. China may be a systemic rival, but it is also an indispensable scientific power and partner. Global challenges, such as pandemics, climate change, and food security, cannot be tackled without it. Research thrives on openness; insulating Europe from China would slow innovation precisely when Europe is striving to close the technological gap with its competitors.
Moreover, heavy-handed restrictions risk stifling the very academic vitality the EU seeks to preserve. Europe’s own policy documents, including the expert report A New European Framework for Science Diplomacy, stress the need to combine strategic safeguards with scientific engagement. The goal is not decoupling but calibrated de-risking: transparency, due diligence, and selective restriction. Isolation is neither possible nor desirable.
This balancing act will shape Europe’s scientific posture for the next decade. The latest Horizon draft appears to push the pendulum firmly towards control. The challenge will be to ensure it does not swing so far that cooperation becomes a casualty of geopolitics.
