The Russia card: How Jakarta and Hanoi leverage Moscow amid great power rivalry

Key takeaways:

Following its annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia came under severe Western sanctions and launched a so-called “Turn to the East” (povorot na vostok). The goal was to diversify Russian diplomacy and economic ties away from Europe and toward Asia. Yet by 2025, more than a decade after the project began, the results of Russia’s pivot remain limited, with the notable exception of its deep partnership with China. In practice, the pivot has been more symbolic than material, serving mainly as a means of escaping the isolation imposed by Western sanctions.

Russia is not a key trading partner for any Southeast Asian country. In terms of exports, Russia ranked as the 29th destination for Indonesian goods in 2024 (over $1.3 billion), the 28th for Vietnam in 2023 (over $1.7 billion), and the 37th for Thailand in 2024 (around $880 million). In all three cases, the United States and China remain the dominant export destinations.

Nevertheless, Russia still plays an important role in Southeast Asia. Although in Europe and North America, Russia is frequently perceived as a security threat due to its war against Ukraine, this equation does not necessarily hold in Southeast Asia. On the contrary, Russia is often regarded as a credible and valuable partner, with cooperation deepening amid intensifying Sino–American rivalry. This rivalry places states such as Indonesia and Vietnam in a delicate position, requiring them to balance the influence of both powers.

In this regard, Russian foreign policy has achieved a measure of success in Southeast Asia. In 2024, Vietnam and Indonesia became official BRICS partners, and in 2025, Indonesia formally acceded to the organization. Given that one of BRICS’s central purposes is advancing a multipolar world order, Indonesia’s membership represents a notable achievement for Russia, whose long-term goal is to break American unipolarity

This policy cannot be seen as hedging against China, an important BRICS member, but it can be argued that if Russia were not also a key member—and if BRICS were only a Chinese bloc—then Indonesia and Vietnam would probably have been reluctant to join.

Indonesia’s play for international status

According to Indonesian Foreign Minister Sugiono, the country’s accession to BRICS forms an integral part of the country’s “free and active” (bebas dan aktif) foreign policy. In the context of Sino–American rivalry, Jakarta aims to avoid binding itself too closely to either power bloc, which also helps explain Indonesia’s simultaneous application to the OECD.

In June 2025, President Prabowo Subianto visited St. Petersburg to attend the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, prioritizing this engagement over the G7 summit in Canada, to which he had also been invited. In St. Petersburg, Prabowo met with Vladimir Putin in what was an ostentatiously friendly encounter. He noted that both countries “align in their views” on “many issues on the global agenda.” During the visit, the two leaders signed a Declaration of Strategic Partnership to guide future bilateral relations, followed by agreements to enhance cooperation in areas such as the digital sphere.

During and after the Cold War, with a temporary pause in the 1990s, Indonesia’s main security partner has been the United States. For instance, since 2007, Indonesia has regularly conducted joint military exercises with the United States under the Garuda framework. In recent years, however, this orientation has begun to shift, as Jakarta pursues hedging and strives to maintain neutrality in its defense relations. In November 2024, as part of a broader strategy of foreign-policy diversification, Indonesia organized its first-ever bilateral military drills with Russia, named “Orruda.”

Indonesia has also used Russia to diversify away from security dependence on the United States in its fighter fleet. Alongside American F-16s, Indonesia operates Russian Su-27s and Su-30s. Indonesia ordered its first Su-27s in 2003, at a time when relations with Washington were tense and the United States maintained an arms embargo over East Timor. Subsequent orders followed, including a major Su-30 purchase in 2011. Today, Russian and American aircraft remain the main pillars of the Indonesian Air Force.

Meanwhile, Beijing remains Jakarta’s most important economic partner, serving as its largest export destination—with values more than twice those to the United States—and as a key source of foreign direct investment, exemplified by the highly successful Morowali Industrial Park for nickel processing. However, due to historical, security, and geopolitical factors, Indonesia’s level of trust toward China remains limited. While hedging against the United States in the security domain is relatively straightforward through cooperation with Russia, using Russia to counterbalance China economically is far more difficult, given Moscow’s limited capacity to offset Chinese investment and demand. Nevertheless, Indonesia seeks to leverage its partnership with Russia to support selected large-scale energy projects.

The best example is nuclear cooperation. In 2015, Rosatom signed a Memorandum of Understanding to help develop Indonesia’s nuclear power industry. Rosatom is widely considered the frontrunner to construct the country’s first nuclear power plant on Sulawesi, enjoying backing from Indonesia’s National Energy Council. Taken together, these developments suggest that Indonesia employs Russia as a symbolic “third way” amid Sino–American rivalry and as a tool to bolster its middle-power status.

Vietnam’s bamboo diplomacy

Like Indonesia, Vietnam has pursued its own multi-alignment policy, often called “bamboo diplomacy.” In practice, it is characterized by neutrality and pragmatic maneuvering among major powers without binding the country to any single bloc. Hanoi’s approach is designed to safeguard national interests, notably Vietnam’s territorial claims in the South China Sea.

Russia plays a crucial role as a third pole balancing both China and the United States. Since 2000, roughly 80% of Vietnam’s weapons systems have been supplied by Russia. In 2025, Vietnamese troops participated in Russia’s Victory Day parade, a gesture of high symbolic significance consistent with Hanoi’s neutral stance on the war in Ukraine.

Hanoi continues to demonstrate a high level of trust toward Russia. In early 2025, Communist Party General Secretary Tô Lâm declared that “Vietnam considers Russia one of [its] top priority partners in foreign policy.” The two states share a long history of close relations. It is no coincidence that Vietnam was one of the few foreign countries Vladimir Putin visited after 2022. In June 2024, Putin traveled to Hanoi, strengthening bilateral ties and signing agreements to deepen cooperation, mostly in energy and nuclear sectors involving Rosatom, Zarubezhneft, and Novatek. Collaboration between universities in both countries was also expanded. One year later, Tô Lâm visited Moscow and described Putin as a “loyal friend and comrade of Vietnam.”

The two countries have long maintained close energy relations. Vietnam has actively supported Russian extraction of oil and natural gas in the South China Sea—an area partly contested between Vietnam and China—by state-owned Zarubezhneft and by Gazprom. Although Gazprom’s revenues were severely affected after 2022,the company and its Vietnamese partners announced plans in 2025 to begin drilling two new fields in the South China Sea. If Russia were to expand energy activity in these contested waters, it would constitute a major success for Vietnam’s bamboo diplomacy vis-à-vis China.

As in Indonesia, Russia has also targeted Vietnam with nuclear diplomacy. In January 2025, the two states signed an agreement to enhance cooperation in the nuclear industry. Rosatom has emerged as the leading candidate to spearhead Vietnam’s efforts to restart and modernize its nuclear energy program.

Conclusion

While Russia is not a major geopolitical actor in Southeast Asia, it remains attractive to some states in the region as a tool for balancing ties with other powers. Indonesia and Vietnam have refrained from condemning Russia’s actions in Ukraine, and Russian officials regularly meet with their representatives—engagement that helps Russia counter perceptions of international isolation.

Indonesia and Vietnam also share an ambition to foster a multilateral world order, aligning them with Russia’s broader strategic objectives. Both have leveraged Russian security and nuclear diplomacy to enhance their international standing, primarily as part of hedging strategies vis-à-vis the United States and China. Through concrete initiatives, especially in defense and nuclear energy, both states have drawn on Russian expertise. This engagement is likely to develop further, regardless of how Russia’s war against Ukraine concludes.