Welcome to the 75th issue of the CEEasia Briefing.
In this issue, we dissect the following topics:
- Poland and Taiwan’s paradiplomatic ties
- Fears of Chinese EV espionage in Poland and Czechia
- Czechia and Japan deepen cooperation on cybersecurity
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1. Polish City of Katowice signs a partnership agreement with Kaohsiung
What’s going on? The Polish city of Katowice and Taiwan’s Kaohsiung have signed a sister-city agreement, marking the seventh paradiplomatic partnership between Polish and Taiwanese municipalities. The deal aims to boost economic cooperation, innovation, and cultural and youth exchanges between the two cities.
Going deeper… The agreement was signed by Katowice Mayor Marcin Krupa and Kaohsiung Mayor Chen Chi-mai, in the presence of senior officials and representatives from both sides. The new connection builds on a growing trend of city-level cooperation between Poland and Taiwan, with Kaohsiung already partnering with Gdynia and Poznań since 2025. Poland has emerged as a leading EU country in developing such subnational ties with Taiwan, with Warsaw, Lodz, Radom, and Elblag also having partners in Taiwan. Currently, 29 European cities and regions maintain partnerships with their Taiwanese counterparts, with cities such as Taipei, Taoyuan, Tainan, and Kaohsiung actively expanding their outreach. Besides, many more engage with Taiwan in expert fora, such as Taiwan’s Smart City Summit & Expo (also held in March 2026), which annually attracts European municipal officials to Taipei.
This means… These sister-city partnerships reflect how city-level diplomacy became an increasingly important tool for Taiwan to expand and strengthen its international presence despite diplomatic constraints. For Poland, these ties offer practical benefits in areas like innovation, business cooperation, and talent exchange, while also aligning with its broader openness to Taiwan. More broadly, such agreements show how European countries can deepen engagement with Taiwan in low-risk ways, suggesting that paradiplomacy could play a growing role in EU–Taiwan relations, especially as geopolitics continue to limit formal government-level cooperation.
However… Despite recent advancements in Poland, paradiplomacy is an underused tool in Taiwan’s approach to Europe. In Japan alone, Taiwanese municipalities have at least 34 partnerships, while they boast over 100 in the US. The reasons for a slower rollout of these partnerships across Europe are both structural and political. Compared to the Japanese and US diasporas in Europe, the Taiwanese diaspora in Europe is much smaller and lacks the political clout to promote the establishment of sister-city and sister-region partnerships. At the same time, officials in many European towns operate under the impression that pursuing cooperation with Taiwanese partners will lead to boycotts by Chinese tourists and other forms of PRC retaliation, which is one reason Edinburgh pre-emptively shelved a friendship agreement with Kaohsiung in 2024.
2. Fears of Chinese EV espionage in Poland and Czechia
What’s going on? The Polish Armed Forces have issued a ban on Chinese autonomous vehicles entering military facilities (except for publicly available spaces), citing concerns about potential sensitive data collection and leakage. A similar decision was made by ORLEN Unipetrol (one of the leading petrochemical producers in the Czech Republic and a subsidiary of the Polish oil conglomerate ORLEN) in March 2026, which decided to bar Chinese cars from entering its sites in Litvínov, Kralupy nad Vltavou, Pardubice, and Neratovice, prompting broader discussions about the access and deployment of made-in-China autonomous vehicles in the vicinity of military sites and critical infrastructure.
Going deeper… These steps mirror debates at the EU level about the potential misuse of Chinese autonomous systems for surveillance, espionage, cyberattacks, and other forms of sabotage through remote access. However, broader supranational and national-level regulatory frameworks, and strict conditions for cross-border transfers of non-personal data (e.g., industrial and operational), are still lacking. This stands in stark contrast to both the situation in China and the US, the former of which has developed a comprehensive regulatory framework for the domestic deployment of foreign-made autonomous vehicles. In practice, this mainly applies to Tesla-produced vehicles. Still, risks associated with the transition to connected and automated mobility were outlined as early as 2015 in the Made in China 2025.
On the other hand… The US has adopted broader restrictions that apply to finished vehicles as well as to individual components related to vehicle connectivity and automated driving systems. These are based on strict conditions regarding technology and IP transfers in exchange for access to the US market. As highlighted by several analysts, the US response is preferable to the EU’s approach, which fails to address rising security concerns, as Chinese EV and autonomous driving systems can avoid tariffs and thereby retain access to European markets as long as they use some European hardware alongside Chinese software (i.e., the sabotage-prone components).
Moreover… There are growing divergences toward autonomous driving among the V4 states. Czechia and Poland are debating the need to mitigate the security risks posed by the rising deployment of Chinese vehicles on European roads. In contrast, policy debates in Hungary and Slovakia focus on updating regulations to enable and accelerate (rather than restrict) the testing and deployment of autonomous vehicles, including those made by Chinese producers.
To conclude… A case in point is the high-profile partnership between the Slovak technology company DiusAI and the Chinese WeRide, under the auspices of the Slovak government’s ELEVATE initiative, which brings together the Ministry of Transport, the City of Bratislava, Slovak Post, academic institutions and private companies. This makes Slovakia WeRide’s fourth European market after France, Belgium, and Switzerland, but the plan for national-level deployment of WeRide’s autonomous vehicles applies only in Slovakia. At the same time, there are connections between DuisAI and the Slovak government. DiusAI not only employs Prime Minister Róbert Fico’s son as the company’s M&A expert but is also part of the J&T Group’s portfolio, which has long-standing business ties to SMER-SD. This raises further concerns about the illiberal nature of the SMER-SD regime, which, as becomes increasingly apparent, has adopted a Hungarian model of self-reproduction through party-linked domestic and foreign capital.
3. Czechia and Japan sign Memorandum of Cooperation on Cybersecurity
What’s going on? The Czech National Cyber and Information Security Agency (NÚKIB) and the National Cybersecurity Office of Japan (NCO) signed a Memorandum of Cooperation on cybersecurity on the sidelines of the Prague Cybersecurity Conference, formalizing an already well-established relationship between the two institutions.
Going deeper… The memorandum focuses on strengthening cooperation in the exchange of information on cyber incidents, sharing best practices, joint training, and collaboration on modern ICT technologies and supply chain security. It was signed during the 7th edition of the Prague Cyber Security Conference, an international policy-oriented forum on cybersecurity and trusted supply chains established in 2019, which brought together government, academic, and industry representatives from dozens of countries, including Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and New Zealand.
Moreover… In the days preceding the conference, NÚKIB also hosted the 4th edition of the Cyber Champions Summit, which convenes senior political, military, and technical officials from NATO member states and key Indo-Pacific partners, notably the so-called IP4 (Australia, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand). First held in Lithuania in 2023, the summit aims to deepen cooperation in cybersecurity and cyber defense between NATO members and their major partners. This year’s discussions focused on current security challenges, the evolving threat landscape in cyberspace, and opportunities for deeper practical cooperation among Allies and partners.
This means… The memorandum, as well as Prague’s role as host of the Cyber Champions Summit, reflects a broader strategic positioning of Czech cyber diplomacy toward the Indo-Pacific. This aligns with the Czech Indo-Pacific Strategy 2022, which prioritizes cooperation in cybersecurity, resilience-building, countering hybrid threats, and combating cybercrime and extremism. The national cybersecurity strategy similarly emphasizes deeper engagement with EU and transatlantic partners, with a particular focus on the IP4 countries, facilitated in part by deploying a Czech cyber attaché to the Indo-Pacific (based in Australia).
This means… Czechia’s cyber diplomacy has gained recognition thanks to NÚKIB’s public analyses and warnings regarding China-related cyber threats. In December 2018, it became the first European country to warn against the use of Huawei and ZTE technologies in critical infrastructure. This was followed by warnings concerning platforms such as WeChat, TikTok, and DeepSeek, as well as warnings against transferring user and system data to the PRC. In December 2025, NÚKIB released a detailed analysis supporting UK sanctions on China-based tech companies i-Soon and Integrity Tech. Czechia has also supported cybersecurity capacity-building in developing partner countries such as Bhutan.
Quick takes on CEEasia developments
SOUTH KOREA | Polish Sherpa Marcin Przydacz and his South Korean counterpart Kim Hee-sang met to align strategies for the G20 summit in Miami planned this December. As Poland participates as a guest country for the first time, both sides discussed bilateral preparations for the forum and also agreed to maintain close communication regarding the 2028 G20 summit, which will be hosted by South Korea.
PHILIPPINES | Poland established its first honorary consulate on the Philippine island of Bohol on 5 March, appointing Zarah Socorro Dejaresco as Honorary Consul in Tagbilaran City. The new office will assist Polish travelers and facilitate bilateral cooperation in tourism, agriculture, and economic development.
CHINA | The European Union sanctioned Chinese firm i-Soon and its co-founders, Chen Cheng and Wu Haibo, for orchestrating cyberattacks against the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The breach resulted in the theft of sensitive diplomatic communications and data related to the Czech EU presidency. Additional sanctions were imposed on Integrity Technology Group for its involvement with the Flax Typhoon hacking group, which compromised over 65,000 devices across Europe.
TAIWAN | Former Polish President Lech Walesa visited Taiwan in mid-March and met with Taiwan’s president, Lai Ching-te. He also participated in the Yushan Forum in Taiwan, where he stated that “Chinese nations need to unite”, sparking controversy.
CHINA | At the beginning of March, Poland joined the Interparliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC), a cross-party group of legislators aimed at coordinating relations with the PRC and addressing challenges posed by Beijing while upholding democratic values, human rights, and the rules-based order. Poland thus became the 45th member country, increasing the network’s membership to 310 parliamentarians.
CHINA | Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó announced at the end of March that China Eximbank will establish a regional headquarters in Hungary to support expanding Chinese corporate investments. Hungary currently attracts one-third of all Chinese investments in Europe, positioning itself as a primary hub for East-West economic cooperation.
