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CEEasia Briefing #55: Orban’s trip to Beijing, China-Belarus military drills, South Korea wins the Dukovany nuclear tender

CEEasia Briefing #55: Orban’s trip to Beijing, China-Belarus military drills, South Korea wins the Dukovany nuclear tender

Welcome to the 55th issue of the CEEasia Briefing.

In this issue, we dissect the following topics:

  1. Orban’s visit to Beijing
  2. China-Belarus military drills
  3. South Korea wins the Dukovany nuclear tender
  4. Modi in Moscow

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1. Orban’s trip to Beijing

What’s going on? Shortly after his trips to Kyiv and Moscow, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban visited Beijing at the beginning of July for what he termed “Peace mission 3.0.” With the Russian war in Ukraine being the main talking point, Hungary is wasting no time in trying to make security (and its role in negotiating the end to the war) the main concern of its Presidency of the Council of the European Union.

Going deeper… All three visits came without coordination with the rest of the EU and were quickly rebuked by other European leaders, who stressed that Orban did not receive a mandate from the Council for his negotiations in Moscow and Beijing. Budapest said that the trips were undertaken as part of its own bilateral diplomacy. But the timing of these trips and the use of the logo of the Hungarian Council Presidency prompted accusations of Hungary’s abuse of power. Several member states as well as the European Commission boycotted the events and meetings organized by the Hungarian Presidency as a response.

On a bilateral level… Hungary and China have been strengthening their cooperation in not just economic but also security domains. In February this year, the two countries signed an agreement on cooperation in judicial and security matters, including in law enforcement. This was followed by an upgrade of their bilateral ties to an ‘All-Weather Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for the New Era’, which confirmed Hungary’s support for China’s Global Development, Global Security and Global Civilization Initiatives; all aimed at increasing Beijing’s discourse power and role in conflict resolution on a global stage. Several commercial agreements were also signed between Chinese and Hungarian companies, prompting further security concerns. For example, the Chinese company Rizhao Wohe Aviation Service has ordered 50 fusion-powered planes from the Hungarian company Magnus Aircraft. The latter since announced its plans to start a construction of its first manufacturing base in China. This is noteworthy as nuclear fusion is emerging as the next frontier in the great power rivalry between the US and China.

This means… Hungary’s support for China’s peace plan is indicative of the two countries’ mutual support for their respective mediating roles in conflict resolution. Indeed, Hungary has been portraying itself as one of the few countries that can talk to both sides (i.e., both Russia and Ukraine in case of the EU). And, although Orban has since tried to de-escalate the EU-wide diplomatic spats prompted by his visits , several member states have questioned the EU’s decision to boycott the Hungarian Presidency. The existing lack of unity within the EU may thus allow Orban to push for both Hungary’s and China’s security agendas, further dividing the bloc’s position on China.


2. China-Belarus military drills

What’s going on? In July, China and Belarus conducted an 11-day joint military exercise at a base near Brest (Belarus), close to the Belarus-Polish border. The military drills, described by officials as an ‘anti-terrorist training’ coincided with the NATO summit in Washington and took place after Belarus’ accession to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as its 10th member in July.

Going deeper… The exercise, named The Eagle Assault 2024, involved over 100 Chinese troops. According to the Chinese Ministry of Defense, it aimed to foster practical cooperation between the two countries and allow Chinese troops to learn how to utilize Belarusian technology and weapon systems. Belarusian officials framed the drills as a response to ‘the West’s aggressive policies’ and ‘Ukrainian provocations’. However, the training was not the first of its kind; already in 2018, the special operations forces of the two countries engaged in joint training in Jinan City, China, to enhance professional skills and counter-terrorism tactics.

Furthermore… The joint military exercises are not the only signs of deepening military and political collaboration between China and Belarus. During President Lukashenko’s two visits to China in 2023, the two countries outlined a new plan for developing their ‘all-weather comprehensive strategic partnership’. President Lukashenko also met with his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, on the sidelines of the SCO in July. And shortly after the SCO summit, Belarus’ new Foreign Minister, Maksim Ryzhenkov, met with Wang Yi, expressing gratitude for China’s support in Belarus’ accession to the SCO and reaffirming the commitment to its partnership with China.

This means… Belarus’ accession to the SCO as the only European member, the joint military drills, and their shared stances on Russia’s war in Ukraine undoubtedly indicate a strengthening alliance between China and Belarus. These developments also underscore China’s aim to expand its influence in Eastern Europe.


3. South Korea wins the Dukovany nuclear tender

What’s going on? South Korean semi-state company KHNP (Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power Company) won the biggest-ever public procurement in the history of the Czech Republic. It will construct two new blocks of the Dukovany nuclear power plant in southern Czechia with an option to build two more blocks in Temelín later.

Going deeper… Since 2016, when the bidding officially started, four companies have delivered their offers: American Westinghouse, French EDF, Korean KHNP, and Russian Rosatom. However, after the revelations of possible Russian involvement in the explosion of the ammunition storage in Vrbětice in 2021, Rosatom was excluded from the public offering. Later, in January 2024, Westinghouse’s bid was rejected, as it did not meet the stated requirements.

KHNP thus defeated the French state-owned energy company EDF (Electricity of France). The contract is expected to be signed in March 2025 with the trial operation beginning in 2036.

South Korea’s offer… KHNP submitted its first bid in November 2022, offering a modified version of its APR1000 reactor, specifically designed for the European Utility Requirements (EUR). The Czech government finally picked KHNP’s offer mainly thanks to a lower price and a price cut of about 20% in case the 2 blocks were constructed at once. Although the final price is yet to be agreed, one block should cost around CZK 200 billion.

However, KHNP is currently involved in litigation proceedings with the US company Westinghouse, which was involved in the development of the reactor offered by KHNP. If the Korean side loses the litigation, it risks a high financial penalty or construction delays.

This means… Regardless of the risks, analysts say a project of this size could represent a new impulse for the Czech energy industry as well as for the economy as a whole. KHNP reportedly promised that up to 60% of the project suppliers could be Czech companies. Moreover, the second block of Dukovany could potentially be financed by a loan from the Korean Export-Import Bank, which could give the Czech government more favorable loan terms and deepen Czech-Korean mutual ties even further.

Potential in Slovakia… This May, Slovakia’s government also approved a plan to build one more nuclear reactor in Jaslovské Bohunice power plant in western Slovakia. Shortly after the decision, Slovakia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Juraj Blanár visited Cho Tae-yul, his counterpart in Seoul, to discuss the elevation of mutual relations between the two countries to a strategic partnership. The partnership could lead to strengthened cooperation in the energy sector as well.


4. Modi in Moscow

What’s going on? Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi paid a two-day visit to Moscow to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin at the beginning of July. The visit came amid the NATO summit in Washington, during which the Russian war in Ukraine was a key topic.

Going deeper… The Kremlin visit was only one part of Modi’s foreign trip. The second part consisted of the visit to Austria, which was the first visit of any Indian Prime Minister to Austria in more than 40 years. Modi’s visit to Russia has, nevertheless, marked his first such trip to the Kremlin since 2019 and the second foreign visit since assuming PM’s office for the third consecutive term. Even though India also keeps the line of communication open and active with Ukraine, the visit is emblematic of continuum in India’s multi-alignment foreign policy, which has been accompanied by the lack of criticism toward Russia and its war in Ukraine.

This means… An eye should be kept on India-Russia relations. However, at the same time Modi’s visit should be placed in a wider context. There are several reasons for the visit to Kremlin, which concerned not only cooperation and trade in strategic areas, but also issues that are sensitive for the Indian side – such as the imbalance in mutual trade, repatriation of Indian citizens who were recruited into the Russian army, and balancing Chinese influence in Russia. And despite Modi’s Kremlin visit, cooperation with Western countries across many issues remains crucial for Delhi.


Quick takes on CEEasia developments

CHINA | China and Poland inked an action plan at the end of June to deepen their comprehensive strategic partnership, namely in people-to-people and cultural exchanges. The next day, China extended its visa-free policy to Poland until December 31st 2025, allowing Polish citizens to enter and stay in China visa-free for up to 15 days.

CHINA | Yu Jiang, China’s special envoy for cooperation between China and CEE countries (i.e. format 14+1), led a delegation on a visit to Slovakia in early July. Yu was received by Rastislav Chovanec, state secretary of Slovak Foreign Ministry, and the two sides reiterated shared interest in deepening bilateral trade relations and confirmed the visit by Slovak Prime Minister Fico to China in the autumn this year.

JAPAN | During the visit of Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida to Berlin in mid-July, Japan and Germany agreed to boost security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. PM Kishida and his German counterpart, Olaf Scholz, also confirmed establishing an economic security framework amid China’s overproduction of EVs and other heavily subsidized products.

JAPAN | Japan approved a $3.3 billion loan as part of the G7’s $50 billion support package for Ukraine and announced plans to enhance Ukraine’s domestic laws and regulations. This includes plans to provide assistance aimed at supporting Ukraine’s reconstruction efforts, advancing its negotiations for EU membership, and creating a favorable environment for Japanese companies to invest in the country.

VIETNAM | The Slovak government agreed to include the Vietnamese community living in Slovakia into the funding scheme of the Fund to support the culture of national minorities. This move is a reaction to last year’s government resolution to recognise the Vietnamese community as a national minority. The Vietnamese community, however, will not be able to use the funds at least until next year.

VIETNAM | During a meeting with the ambassador of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in Czech Republic, Duong Hoai Nam, Czech company Mega a.s. expressed its interest in cooperation with Vietnamese companies on water treatment issues in Vietnam. According to the company’s leadership, joint projects could help Vietnam get access to advanced technology related to environmental protection.

Authors

Vladimíra Ličková
Vladimíra Ličková

Research Fellow

Barbara Kelemen
Barbara Kelemen

Research Fellow

Barbara Pavlovičová
Barbara Pavlovičová

Research Assistant

Aneta Roth
Aneta Roth

Research Fellow

Nikola Majsniarova
Nikola Majsniarova

Research Assistant

Dominika Remžová
Dominika Remžová

Research Fellow

See all authors

Key Topics

CEECEEAsia BriefingViktor OrbánChinaJapanVietnamSouth KoreaHungaryRussiaBelarusCzech RepublicIndia

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