Ukraine as a battlefield in an inter-Korean proxy war

With an exhibition glorifying North Korean troops fighting in Ukraine opening in Moscow and South Korea signing new arms deals with Poland to bolster its defenses against potential Russian aggression, Ukraine is increasingly emerging as a proxy battlefield between the two Koreas.

Key takeaways:

The Russian propagandist Aleksandr Dugin has called for his country to adopt of the North Korean state ideology, Juche. Rooted in the principles of sovereignty and self-sufficiency, Juche has been Pyongyang’s official ideology since the 1970s. This has, Dugin argues, allowed the North Korean regime to embark “on the path of total struggle against Western domination and the defense of their sovereignty.”

As the chief ideologue of neo-Eurasianism, a theory promoting a pan-Slavic, “tellurocratic” state based on territorial expansion, Dugin is widely regarded as having a deep ideological influence on Russian President Vladimir Putin. The North Korean Juche and Dugin’s neo-Eurasianism are intrinsically linked through their defiance of the West and belief in the superiority of their respective political systems. This alignment has grown increasingly tangible through mutual support, most visibly in North Korea’s involvement in Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.

North Korea’s direct support to Russia

In August 2024, as Ukraine launched its counteroffensive in Kursk and Russia faced a shortage of manpower, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un decided to back Moscow’s imperial war by deploying troops to Russia. The deployments reportedly began in October 2024 with around 12,000 soldiers, reinforced by an additional 3,000 in February 2025. According to South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS), the troops were primarily stationed in the Kursk region, where they suffered heavy casualties. Pyongyang viewed the deployment as an opportunity to gain valuable battlefield experience. However, the arrangement also exposed the implicit racial hierarchy within the Russian command structure, where ethnic minority soldiers (and now North Koreans) experienced disproportionately high losses. The North Korean troops have since been pulled back from the frontlines.

Beyond direct deployments, North Korea has supported Russia through its defense industry, supplying an estimated 12 million rounds of artillery ammunition and 200 long-range artillery systems, including the M-1978 Koksan howitzer. By mid-2025, it was estimated that North Korea had provided roughly half of Russia’s artillery munitions, underscoring Moscow’s growing dependence on external sources despite increases in its own military budget and production. North Korean assistance has thus become critical to sustaining Russia’s war effort.

This direct involvement illustrates the deep anti-Western animus embedded in Juche and its convergence with Dugin’s neo-Eurasian vision, where Russian and North Korean regimes align to extend control over territories they claim as rightfully theirs but currently governed by “primary foes.” In doing so, the inter-Korean rivalry has been effectively exported to Europe, turning Ukraine into a proxy battlefield.

In return for its support, North Korea has reportedly received technological assistance from Russia, including nuclear-submarine propulsion modules for its weapons program. Pyongyang has thus gained battlefield experience, bolstered its nuclear capabilities, and enhanced its defense-industrial efficiency under wartime conditions. Collectively, these outcomes strengthen North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un’s regime in the event of renewed conflict on the Korean Peninsula, and potentially enable coordinated operations with China in a broader regional confrontation involving Taiwan and South Korea.

South Korea’s support to Ukraine: A policy of restraint

Most of these developments have been closely documented by South Korea’s National Intelligence Service and Ministry of Defense, reflecting Seoul’s intense scrutiny of growing Russia–North Korea military exchanges. As South Korea remains de jure at war with its northern neighbor, its engagement in the Ukraine conflict is watched closely both domestically and internationally.

Since the start of Russia’s invasion, South Korea has emerged as an active yet cautious supporter of Ukraine. Seoul pledged $394 million in financial aid for 2024 and doubled its contribution to NATO’s Ukraine Trust Fund to $24 million for 2025. In addition, it announced a $2.3 billion assistance package in 2025 to address Ukraine’s urgent needs in energy, infrastructure, healthcare, and education.

However, Seoul has maintained a strict policy of supplying only non-lethal and medical equipment. This restraint reflects not only South Korea’s traditional reluctance to involve itself in foreign conflicts but also legal and strategic constraints. The Foreign Trade Act restricts exports to peaceful purposes, while Seoul seeks to preserve ammunition reserves amid a shortage of critical defense systems. This calibrated approach allows South Korea to maintain solidarity with Western allies without provoking diplomatic friction with Moscow or Beijing. President Yoon Suk Yeol later signaled a potential policy shift, stating that while he had “a principle of not supplying lethal weapons,” the government could “more flexibly examine this option depending on North Korean soldiers’ moves.” Despite the change in tone, no substantive policy shift followed.

Meanwhile, South Korea has become an indirect but significant military supplier to Ukraine’s European allies. Defense exports have surged, particularly through large-scale contracts with Poland. Successive Polish governments, regardless of political alignment, have strengthened defense-industrial cooperation with Seoul. This culminated in the Strategic Partnership Action Plan signed in March 2025. Poland has since purchased 180 K2 tanks for approximately $6.2 billion, and is considering acquiring new submarines. Earlier 2022 agreements included a $12.4 billion package for tanks, howitzers, and FA-50 aircraft. In late September 2025, Poland also signed a $2.6 billion deal to deliver 1,266 Legwan 4×4 military vehicles by 2035.

As Poland assumes a leading role in Europe’s rearmament and coordination of military aid to Ukraine, South Korea has emerged as an essential supplier of advanced defense equipment with short delivery timelines. These partnerships yield substantial financial gains for Seoul while enhancing its technological capabilities and industrial expertise. In this way, South Korea counterbalances North Korea’s direct support for Russia, transforming Ukraine into a distant stage of the inter-Korean rivalry.

Future of the Korean role in Ukraine

Despite its evolving stance, Seoul has yet to decide on providing lethal equipment to Ukraine. President Lee Jae-myung’s rise to power in June 2025, given his more cautious approach, may further limit direct involvement. His earlier controversial remarks suggesting that the Ukrainian leadership bore partial responsibility for the conflict drew strong criticism and could constrain his maneuvering room.

Nevertheless, adopting a more assertive posture toward Russia could enhance Seoul’s global standing. South Korea now faces a strategic choice between maintaining its current restraint and pursuing a more proactive role in shaping global security dynamics. Expanding military cooperation with Ukraine through selective exports or joint technological ventures, particularly in drones and aerospace innovation, could elevate South Korea into the ranks of major global defense actors and significantly raise the international valuation of its defense industry.

For the European Union and the United States, stronger integration of South Korea into diplomatic efforts toward peace and security guarantees for Ukraine would reinforce transatlantic–Indo-Pacific linkages. Enhanced security cooperation could help reshape the Asia–Europe security architecture and strengthen collective deterrence against authoritarian powers. Ultimately, whether by choice or by circumstance, South Korea now stands as a major economic and political power whose geopolitical realities increasingly compel it to act as such.

By contrast, North Korea is likely to remain a decisive, though destabilizing, factor in the continuation of the war in Ukraine. Its partnership with Russia is expected to evolve into a more structured and enduring relationship, driven by shared isolation and mutual dependency. Yet, despite the ideological and symbolic alignment of both regimes, their partnership remains inherently asymmetric and fragile. While their capacity to reshape the Eurasian security order is limited, the prospect of a trilateral alignment with China could have far-reaching consequences, though such an alliance would likely come at the expense of Russian and North Korean state’s sovereignty.