Debating Chinese EVs on social media in Central Europe

Key takeaways:

Introduction

On October 4, 2024, the European Council adopted the European Commission’s proposal to impose additional countervailing duties of up to 35.3% on imports of battery electric vehicles (BEVs) from China. The issue of electric vehicle (EV) imports has become one of the primary points of contention between the EU and China in recent years, and the European Commission, with the support of a group of member states, chief among them France, has seen duties to be a way of counteracting the seemingly unfair government subsidies that enable China-based carmakers to flood the European market with under-priced vehicles. Beijing had tried to prevent this outcome through persuasion, pressure, and cooptation, lobbying the Commission and the member states and arguing that tariffs would be unsubstantiated and damage bilateral economic ties to the detriment of the EU. 

Opinions about duties and potential Chinese retaliation differed significantly among EU member states. Some have been extremely wary of supporting the tariffs lest they damage their close political ties with Beijing. Of the Visegrad Four (V4) states, Hungary and Slovakia were two of the five member states that voted against the tariffs at the European Council, while Poland supported them and Czechia, despite its otherwise critical stance on Beijing, abstained. With the exception of Czechia, the other three V4 states have seen increased Chinese investment into their local automotive supply chains in recent years.

This situation report maps social media discourse about Chinese involvement in electromobility, in general, and the EU tariffs, in particular, within the V4 states. It is the inaugural report of the project “Investigating China-related narratives in the Central European information space” that CEIAS is implementing in cooperation with Matej Bel University, supported by the European Media and Information Fund (EMIF), and managed by the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation.

Using Gerulata Juno, a unique online dashboard that maps social media platforms, this report dissects the related discourse between July 1, 2024 and November 30, 2024. It is divided by country and, within each, by the discourse of three broadly defined groups: China-affiliated media and official accounts publishing in the local language of the respective country; local political discourse; and a wider online discourse with a special focus on “alternative media” and antisystemic voices. 

The analysis was created by using a preexisting corpus of accounts monitored by Gerulata, complemented by a project-specific mapping of accounts relevant to discussions on China: China-affiliated groups; major political parties and politicians; key mainstream media; social media influencers; and those previously tied to alternative and anti-system sources. The final corpus altogether included more than 3400 sources in Czechia, 1300 in Hungary, 8500 in Poland and 3200 sources in Slovakia. Unique search strings were developed in each language using Boolean operations, focusing on keywords like “China”, “EVs,” and “battery” (and their variants). Posts were then manually filtered to exclude irrelevant content.

Czech information space: Fringe politicians echo Chinese discourse

This report analyzed the social media discourse regarding China and electromobility based on a sample of 325 Czech-language posts, predominantly on Facebook and Telegram, as well as on X (formerly Twitter) and other social media platforms. A general narrative is clear: Chinese automakers dominate the market and are able to provide high-quality and financially accessible EV models. Chinese companies, therefore, are ahead of European carmakers, which now face intense competition from China. However, there is also much online debate about environmental and health concerns related to Chinese EV production and security concerns about using Chinese-made EVs.

Chinese accounts: high reach, little impact

In July 2024, the X account of the Chinese Embassy in Prague shared an op-ed authored by Ambassador Feng Biao arguing that Chinese EVs are beneficial for European citizens. The embassy also shared a video produced by Xinhua, a Chinese state-run media outlet, featuring Hungarian minister for national economy, Márton Nagy, in which he stated that “Chinese electric vehicle (EV) technology is neither a threat nor a danger, but a development opportunity.” He also emphasized the benefits of healthy competition with Beijing, arguing that it would be a “win-win” situation if Chinese EVs had access to the EU market.

The Facebook account of the Czech-language version of China Radio International (CRI) was very active in covering this topic, devoting more than 60 posts to EVs. (The account has more than 1 million followers, which appears to be unusually high. Most likely a large percentage of these followers are automated accounts. That said, given the proximity between the Czech and Slovak languages, the content shared by CRI’s Czech-language social media accounts most likely caters also to a Slovak audience.) CRI mostly promoted content that it had published on its website, providing updates on EU-China negotiations and anti-subsidy investigations, cooperation between China and Hungary, and Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico’s visit to China in November. It also promoted China’s EVs, such as by showing images from Chinese technology trade fairs. To support the Chinese position on the tariff debate, CRI cited statements from prominent German automakers, such as Volkswagen, Mercedes-Benz, and BMW, and European politicians who opposed the tariffs, including Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre as well as German Vice-Chancellor Robert Habeck, who argued that Brussels and Beijing should work on an alternative solution.

The most popular post published by Chinese sources on the topic was a vlog showcasing a Chinese technology import fair. This sponsored post has over 2 million views and 749 interactions. It was created by the Chinese influencer “Lada Wang,” who creates content about China, its culture, technologies, economy, and travel tips in the Czech language. Although her official account on TikTok does not mention any connection to Chinese state media, she is affiliated with CRI. Her content is also sometimes supported by paid advertising, as revealed by the Facebook Ad Library. That includes her particular popular post. The data suggest that it was displayed in many countries across the EU and likely also targeted users in Africa and Asia, but the figures for specific countries are not available. In terms of views, the post appears to have been more successful compared to content produced by CRI, whose posts typically generated only around five interactions, on average. CRI’s strategy of employing influencers to create content for Chinese state media, combined with paid sponsorships, seems effective at first glance. However, the high number of views does not correlate with substantial engagement with local audiences. Most of the likes on the Czech-language post by Lada Wang came from non-Czech accounts, suggesting that either users are liking content they do not fully understand or that bots are artificially boosting its visibility.

Besides the CRI account, Pepa Zhang, the Chinese influencer affiliated with the CRI, published a video on his personal TikTok account, showing his experience with electric vehicles, specifically focusing on battery change. This video belongs among the most popular content during the analyzed period and reached almost 100 thousand views. 

Under the shadow of the Green Deal

Most Czech opposition parties—especially the Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD), Motoristé, the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM), and ANO—have consistently opposed the transition towards electromobility, arguing that it will harm Europe’s competitiveness and economy. As such, their narratives about China and electromobility largely reflected their wider anti-Green Deal stance. Opposition to the Green Deal and electromobility was at the core of a campaign by Filip Turek, a racing driver turned politician, which ultimately led to his election to the European Parliament. Among his most popular content were his comments made during a panel discussion on Czech TV in which he argued that promoting the Green Deal and electromobility means that the EU is effectively providing support to China. This post was published by a Facebook page Manifest, which promotes conservative values and opposes the Green Deal.

One narrative centered on the impacts of electromobility on European companies, especially Volkswagen, the parent company of Skoda, a major employer in Czechia. This narrative suggested that European companies are laying off their employees due to low demand caused by competition with China. Interestingly, Tomio Okamura, leader of the right-wing populist SPD, argued that the significant increase in the market share of Chinese EVs in the EU was a “threat”. This is unusual since the SPD has typically advocated for pragmatic trade relations with China and has criticized the Czech government’s critical policy towards Beijing. However, it appears that such pragmatism has its limits and the potential impact on Czech companies is a priority.

Kateřina Konečná, a Czech MEP and the leader of the KSČM who has long-standing ties to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), criticized Czech Minister of Foreign Affairs Jan Lipavský for his travels to Taiwan when Slovakia is building battery plants and Hungary is receiving Chinese investment in EV production, calling it a “disintegration of the state”. This video circulated among several anti-government groups. In another video, Konečná argued that subsidies in the automotive sector are common and also occur in Europe, and warned of the negative impacts of a trade war with China. She also called the EU tariffs against China “short-sighted” due to the supply chain dependencies on battery imports from China. 

Ivan David, an MEP representing the SPD, translated an article from Global Times, a Chinese state media outlet, focusing on Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico’s visit to China in November. This highlighted how official content by Chinese official channels can be repurposed by local politicians. The article in question mentioned the opinions of some Chinese analysts who thought Fico’s visit could “establish a model for China-EU cooperation and help improve China-EU relations, especially amid ongoing disputes over tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles (EVs).” In a similar vein, Zuzana Majerová, of SPD’s partner movement Trikolóra, expressed opposition to tariffs, claiming that they would only lead to raising costs of EVs within the EU.

Former Czech Prime Minister Jiří Paroubek, now a relatively fringe figure with close ties to China, published a number of op-eds on iportaL24.cz, a media outlet linked with the KSČM, including two pieces pertaining to EVs. In these articles, he highlighted how China tailors its response to tariffs, retaliating only against the countries that voted in favor of them, while also outlining the negative consequences if China were to impose counter-tariffs on German car imports. He also recounted his recent trip to China, during which he visited an EV car park, and argued that it isn’t China’s subsidies that make Chinese car manufacturers more competitive than their European counterparts. His op-eds were circulated across various social media platforms and were shared by accounts of the Czech alternative infoscene. 

Between economic worries and security concerns

More broadly in the Czech online space, EVs were frequently discussed in relation to the financial troubles and planned layoffs at German automakers, stemming from fierce competition in China, sales slowdown in other key markets, and the expensive shift to EV production. The introduction of tariffs was frequently viewed as damaging to the German automotive industry, with potential ripple effects on Czechia’s economy and workers. Telegram posts suggested that rising production costs in China will also impact German automakers like Volkswagen and BMW, and implied that Chinese countermeasures could hurt the European automotive sector. As part of this narrative, it was argued that the tariffs on Chinese EVs will accelerate the downfall of automotive production in Europe.

A Telegram account Co neMÁTE vědět repeated the comments of Robin Zeng, director of CATL, a Chinese battery giant, regarding the inability of the EU to compete with China due to the lack of researchers in the technological fields, including in electrochemistry, which is crucial for battery designs. This argument was part of an article criticizing Europe and its lack of graduates with technological backgrounds.

On Telegram, the expansion of battery production facilities in Hungary were also discussed in relation to environmental and health risks. One post highlighted concerns about the approval of numerous chimneys at these factories, which could release harmful pollutants. It also linked this potential pollution to the rising rate of cancer deaths in Hungary. While the claims focused on the dangers of these factories, they are testament to a widespread debate about their impact on local communities.

A post from the Akta X Facebook page, which claims to provide uncensored global news, was shared across several anti-vax and pro-Russian Facebook groups. It raised concerns about Chinese EVs potentially compromising UK national security. It cited a (legitimate) report from the China Strategic Risk Institute that warned that suppliers with links to China’s military-industrial complex represent a significant threat. The report called on the UK government to prevent Chinese EV manufacturers from securing public contracts, citing fears that wireless components embedded in these vehicles could be “weaponized” to disrupt British infrastructure, including by blocking streets.

Hungarian information space: “Rising East, declining West”

Analysis of the social media discourse in Hungary about Chinese EVs was based on 537 posts from Hungarian-language social media collected between July 1, 2024, and November 30, 2024. The results of the search query indicate that Facebook and YouTube are the main social media platforms on which the discourse took place. In terms of the amount of content, Facebook was by far the most popular channel, while Telegram also had a relatively large number of items. In terms of the number of interactions, YouTube was ahead of Facebook. 

The discourse was dominated by geopolitically focused pro-government news channels and independent business-focused sources. Chinese state institutions appear to have had little role, perhaps due to Hungary’s state and pro-government news outlets occupying the same rhetorical space. The content that came closest to balanced analyses of the economic implications of the topic was created by economic news channels. Pro-government news platforms were more interested in framing this topic around broader geopolitical issues, such as the Ukraine War. Instead of a nuanced approach to the economic implications of China’s trade practices and EU responses to it in the EV sector, pro-government media was intent on tying this issue to the “decline of the West, rise of the East” meta-narrative. These sources were, thus, focused on emphasizing the alleged economic and military victory of Russia and China over Europe. Social media outlets that echo the Kremlin’s narratives of Ukraine cannot be considered “fringe media” in the Hungarian context since they mostly promote the same narratives as Hungarian pro-government media or the Chinese state-backed sources.

Lack of Chinese actors’ engagement

The Chinese embassy in Budapest seems to have taken a back seat in the discourse over EV tariffs, having posted just four items on its Facebook page related to the topic in the analyzed time period. To put that in context, the embassy’s Facebook and X channels published around 220 posts on other topics during this period. China’s state-owned television CGTN has a Hungarian-language Facebook (CGTN Magyarul) channel that published only four further relevant posts in the time period. These are mainly focused on promoting Chinese EV brands and emphasizing their global competitiveness. The highest number of likes (55) was received by post repeating Orbán’s critical stance on the EV tariffs, warning against “bloc formations” in global trade.

Neither were Hungarian government officials overly active, according to the results. Péter Szíjjártó, the foreign minister, does not feature among the top 10 content producers in terms of number of posts, having posted only four relevant items. One of Szíjjártó’s posts was a report about a visit by Robin Zeng, the CEO of CATL, a major Chinese EV battery maker, to Budapest. The other three were videos of a speech Szíjjártó made to the Hungarian parliament, a meeting he had with his Slovak counterpart, and an economic roundtable discussion. One popular Facebook post was published by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, which was a transcript of his weekly interview with Hungary’s public radio, Kossuth Rádió. The main aim of these posts by Hungarian government officials was to promote Hungary’s strategy of transitioning to electromobility, in which attracting Chinese investments is an important element. In this context, state-owned and pro-government media do a large part of the job promoting China-friendly narratives of Chinese investments in the EV sector.

The recently established and currently most influential opposition party Tisza Párt (Party of Respect and Liberty), led by Péter Magyar, published a critical post on Facebook in October about the Hungarian government’s investment policy. One of the party’s MEPs, Eszter Lakos, criticized the government for giving up Hungary’s sovereignty, ignoring environmental damage, and not creating high-value-added jobs for Hungarians via the major Chinese investments in the EV battery sector. The post produced 1,484 interactions, as of November 18, 2024. By comparison, the top 10 performing posts mostly produced interactions in the range of 3,000-4,000, although most of them were not focusing solely on the China/EV topic.

Among other prominent members of the opposition, one post by Ákos Hadházy, an independent member of the Hungarian parliament, was relevant to this study. Hadházy runs a popular YouTube video channel in which he investigates corruption. In a Facebook post in August 2024, Hadházy reshared a news article from Szeged365.hu reporting on the fears of residents of Szeged, a town, over a planned BYD factory. Per the article, the town’s leadership is working on the re-classification of larger areas in the outskirts of Szeged as “special industrial zones.” This has led to fears of environmental and noise pollution among local residents, and their sense of a lack of agency in deciding on what types of investments will be approved, as Hadházy noted in his comments on the article. 

László Toroczkai, the leader of the far-right Mi Hazánk (Our Homeland) party, appeared in the discourse with a YouTube video related to a protest by Hungarian farmers. He briefly mentioned environmental concerns and the large number of guest workers as risks related to EV battery plants. Toroczkai’s Youtube video produced 3,228 interactions, featuring among the top 10 performers returned for the search query.

Geopolitical narratives 

In terms of the number of relevant items to the query, the list is led by Hungary’s state television M1 (60 items), the economic magazine Portfolio (53 items), and pro-government media platform Ultrahang (19 items). The remainder of the top 10 producers included geopolitical analyst Csaba Káncz, various pro-government and government-critical media platforms, economic news platforms, and a news platform called Oroszok az Igazság Oldalán (Russians on the Side of Justice) that has been criticized by some observers for its overt pro-Kremlin stance. In terms of interaction numbers, the pro-government media platforms Ultrahang and Ultrahang Plusz and the analyst Csaba Káncz occupy the top three places (with 48,180, 24,990, and 14,500 interactions, respectively), while the remainder of the top 10 includes Orbán, the ruling Fidesz party, the far-right pro-government platform Patrióta, as well as M1, a state television channel, and the business-oriented government-critical media platform HVG. It is noteworthy that both Orbán and M1 are listed with one item only, although these had high interaction numbers. 

Looking more closely at top creators—M1, Ultrahang, and the more balanced content produced by Káncz—it is evident that the China/EV topic was spoken of only as part of broader geopolitical events, the main focus of which is the Ukraine War. For instance, content promoted by M1 and Ultrahang included critical, almost mocking coverage of the recent news that Chinese EV-maker Leapmotor decided to scrap its factory investment plans in Poland. This was reportedly due to the Polish government’s decision to vote in favor of EU tariffs on Chinese EVs. In a YouTube post on October 31, 2024, Ultrahang Plusz reported that “China took the decision: Hungary’s earlier vote is worth gold”, with a thumbnail showing European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen looking angry. The short description implies that the EU made a “miscalculation” in its moves against China. 

State-owned and pro-government media seemed intent on integrating the Chinese EV topic into the larger geopolitical narrative of Russia/China vs. the West. In most cases, they did not feature items solely dedicated to the China/EVs topic. Meanwhile, platforms focused on economic affairs, such as Portfolio, Pénzcentrum, and Macronom.hu, did publish news items focused solely on the China/EV topic. Such articles were more focused on analyzing the economic aspects of China’s EV investments in Europe and the implications of the EU’s tariffs on Chinese EV imports. 

Some Russia-focused news outlets with apparent pro-Kremlin sympathies discussed the topic of China and EVs, mostly following the Hungarian government’s “decline of the West, rise of the East” narrative. One of the most prominent of these outlets in Hungary is Oroszok az Igazság Oldalán (Russians on the Side of Justice), which posted 11 relevant items on its Telegram channel. A qualitative analysis of its posts revealed that the platform’s narratives were in line with Chinese and Hungarian government-friendly narratives, which emphasize that Europe is losing out in its competition with China’s EV industry, part of the broader theme of Western decline. 

With regard to the China/EV topics, Magyar Jelen (Hungarian Present), a platform with ties to the far-right opposition party Mi Hazánk (Our Homeland) appears in the list with one Facebook post, which reshared an article criticizing the Hungarian government’s failed “battery plant great power dreams”, a reference to the environmental degradation and low productivity of EV battery plants, although without elaborating on these points.

Polish information space: Fueling anti-German sentiments

This report analyzed the social media discourse regarding China and electromobility based on a sample of 919 Polish-language posts. In the sample, the topic was predominantly discussed on X, the primary social media for political discussions in Poland. 

There are two apices in terms of the number of posts. The primary apex occurred between Week 40 and Week 41 of 2024 – the period surrounding the Council of the European Union vote on October 4 giving the European Commission a green light to impose countervailing duties on electric vehicles. The second conspicuous increase occurred in Weeks 46-47, between November 11 and 22. Week 46 witnessed the peak number of interactions, whereas Week 47 saw a secondary apex in the number of posts. This surge can be attributed to a wave of responses to a story published in the German Die Welt about “China punishing Poland” for the affirming vote on the tariffs and blocking Poland-based production of the Leapmotor B10 at a Stellantis facility in Tychy, Silesia. 

The analysis reveals a strong anti-German sentiment. This intensified particularly after the October 4 vote on tariffs. Right-wing politicians and alternative media framed it as a “German conspiracy” that subjugated the Polish national interest to that of its Western neighbor. These posts alleged that by voting in favor of the tariffs, the Polish government advanced the interests of Germany rather than Poland, juxtaposing the “self-sabotaging” Polish stance on the trade measures with the goals-oriented approach of Berlin. Anti-German sentiment has long been instrumentalized in Polish political discourse, particularly by right-wing actors, so the issue of EV tariffs effectively became a subset of larger antagonistic discourse vis-à-vis Berlin.

Chinese actors: business as usual

Chinese actors have a limited presence on Polish social media, with their most visible profiles being the Chinese Embassy in Warsaw on X and the Polish-language version of China Radio International (CRI), which is solely on Facebook. Both profiles use formulaic communication, which limits engagement with Polish audiences.

The embassy primarily employs a traditional diplomatic tone, only occasionally attempting to connect with Polish users. On October 9, for instance, it announced the launch of a new BYD hybrid model in Poland, praising its energy efficiency and environmental benefits. The post emphasized a local connection with images of the car against the backdrop of the Royal Castle in Warsaw and its potential for “Warsaw cruises.” However, more assertive posts also appeared, such as one declaring that American tariffs would not slow down Chinese technological development. Another cited Chinese Trade Minister Wang Wentao’s comment that “open cooperation is the best option,” noting the high interdependence between Chinese and EU car industries.

CRI adopted a more forceful communication strategy, particularly on contentious EU-China trade issues. After Brussels’s decision to impose tariffs on Chinese EVs, CRI ramped up its posts in October, sharing nearly daily updates, including four posts on October 4, the day of the vote. Its messaging questioned the legitimacy of the EU’s concerns, using a variety of arguments to support its case. These focused mainly on criticisms of EU protectionism. For example, CRI shared Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s criticism of EU trade policies as “self-defeating” and stressing Hungary’s openness to strengthening ties with China. Another post highlighted the remarks by UK Trade Secretary Jonathan Reynolds, who stated that London had no plans to impose tariffs, emphasizing that the country “needs to engage more with China.” 

Eurosceptic narratives among politicians

Of the 50 most active accounts across social media platforms, eleven (22%) belonged to Polish politicians and political groups, chiefly representatives of the right-wing populist Law and Justice (PiS) party and the far-right Confederation (Konfederacja), both of which frequently criticize the EU’s green policies. Notably, centrist and left-wing voices, including the Green party, were largely absent. One of the few exceptions was Łukasz Kohut, a member of the ruling Civic Coalition and former member of Confederation, who suggested that the tariffs could increase European competition and safeguard the local market. His post on X, however, sparked limited engagement.

The immediate political response to the tariff decision was muted, though Michał Wawer, a lawmaker for Confederation, quickly criticized the move in an interview with the state news agency. He argued that, without a domestic EV industry, Poland should prioritize affordability, even if it means importing Chinese cars. The tariffs, he added, would make both Chinese and German EVs similarly expensive, harming consumers. His stance aligns with Confederation’s broader pragmatic approach to foreign policy. The interview, shared on YouTube, gained little traction, with just 9,500 views.

Particularly engaging narratives framed the tariffs as Berlin’s ploy to harm Poland while benefiting its own economy. Although politicians like Konrad Niżnik, of Confederation, highlighted it earlier in the year, the anti-German narrative gained traction after the decision by multinational car giant Stellantis on November 15 to relocate EV production from Poland to Germany and Slovakia, two countries that opposed the tariffs. PiS politicians Michał Woś, a former environment minister, and Jacek Sasin, a former deputy prime minister, accused Civic Coalition leader Donald Tusk, Poland’s current prime minister, of advancing EU policies that undermine Poland’s economy to protect Berlin’s interests. Woś’s post on X gained nearly 200,000 views and 8,500 reactions, while Sasin’s received 100,000 views and 3,800 engagements.

While some posts raised concerns about Chinese manufacturers dominating the EV market with subsidized, cheaper products, such points were overshadowed by broader Eurosceptic narratives. Beata Szydło, PiS MEP and former prime minister, and Waldemar Buda, also a PiS MEP, shared excerpts from their European Parliament speeches on X just a few days after the decision to impose tariffs. They argued that the EU’s environmental targets threaten Poland’s economy and automotive sector and fail to address people’s everyday needs. This focus on criticizing European policies was likely aimed at a domestic audience, where the automotive industry plays a significant role, accounting for 8% of GDP and employing around 490,000 people. Since China is not a major concern for the Polish public, the discussions largely avoided addressing the tariffs’ implications, instead opting to stoke nationalist sentiments.

Mainstream and “alternative” media

Among mainstream media outlets, the Facebook page of money.pl clearly stands out in terms of the amount of published content on Chinese EVs. As of 2023, money.pl enjoyed the highest reach among all of Poland’s business-legal internet platforms. With 28 posts, it ranks as the top content creator of content on Chinese EVs on Facebook and the third most prolific across all platforms. Regarding the EU’s tariffs, money.pl featured nuanced perspectives on the issue, carrying articles written by proponents and opponents of the measures. For example, its Facebook page promoted responses and counter-responses by two economic policy experts, Andrzej Robaszewski and Piotr Arak. Simultaneously, it featured pieces based on EU sources as well as interviews with Chinese stakeholders, including an entrepreneur from the automotive sector.  

Posts on X by think tank experts, including China watchers and energy and green transition specialists, were prominently featured in the Polish discourse on Chinese EVs. A prominent area studies scholar boasted an interaction rate of 1.21 per cent, although it was notably lower than the weighted average of 3.79 per cent (where the interaction rate is weighted by the number of posts.) 

A considerable number of accounts connected to foreign interference and manipulation of information (FIMI) operations featured among the top ten accounts in the dataset. Notably, this included the Telegram channels Olej w Głowie (All One’s Marbles) and Niezależny Dziennik Polityczny (Independent Political Journal). Olej w Głowie is a news aggregator that amplifies the narratives from Russian or Kremlin-friendly channels. Niezależny Dziennik Polityczny was explicitly referenced in a Kościuszko Institute report on Kremlin-sponsored disinformation in the Lublin Triangle and the investigation on Russian disinformation by Stanisław Żaryn, the Polish Government Plenipotentiary for the Security of Information Space. Interestingly, the qualitative analysis of their posts related to the issue of tariffs on Chinese EVs exposes significant differences. Olej w Głowie presented a neutral outlook on the design of the new trade measures, whereas Niezależny Dziennik Polityczny framed the tariffs as a mark of Europe’s decline and potentially “disastrous” for Polish businesses, implicitly fueling Eurosceptic sentiments. 

One account that merits a closer look is the X account P0liniak. Little information is available about the actors behind it, but in terms of classification, P0liniak has also been identified as an amplifier of pro-Russian narratives. Its inflammatory posts regarding Chinese EVs generated high engagement rates. (Pictures 1 and 3 present the posts with the second-highest and the seventh-highest number of interactions in the dataset, respectively.) The posts use pathos-like appeal capitalizing on the anti-German sentiments in Poland.

Slovak information space: Between government support and local concerns

Slovakia’s information space has long been susceptible to disinformation, often by  accounts co opted by Russian and Chinese interests. This was again evident in the discourse over Chinese EV and battery producers, as well as the EU’s tariffs on China-made EVs. The discourse analysis in Slovakia was based on an analysis of 552 social media posts published in the July-November 2024 period, the majority of which were published on Telegram and Facebook . While the largest number of posts were on the Telegram platform, their cumulative impact (aggregate number of interactions) was much lower than those on Instagram, Youtube, and Facebook. Conversely, despite having a lower number of posts, YouTube played almost as big a role in the shaping of the discourse as Facebook when considering interactions. 

Overall, two main topics emerged in the discourse. First, opposition to the EU’s EV tariffs by the Slovak government, which was further amplified by the state visit of Prime Minister Robert Fico and eight cabinet members to China in early November. Second, construction of a battery factory by Gotion in Slovakia and environmental concerns of the local population, which was instrumentalized by a portion of the far-right political actors.

Chinese actors are MIA

One notable aspect of the social media discourse on Chinese EVs was the apparent lack of Chinese voices. Both the Chinese Embassy in Bratislava and Chinese media (CGTN) are present on social media with the aim of targeting the Slovak audience. When it came to the EV topic, however, the embassy’s accounts remained silent despite the issue being important for overall Chinese foreign policy and China’s relations with the EU. The Slovak-language version of CGTN published a couple of posts on the topic on its Facebook page but they received little attention (interactions in single digits), despite the page having around 16,000 followers. 

However, given the alignment of Beijing and the Slovak government on the EU’s EV tariffs, it seems that China does not need to engage in direct communication on the issue. This is not a unique observation in relation to the EV topic, but rather a typical characteristic of China’s public communication in Slovakia. In general, official social media channels of the Chinese embassy in Bratislava and other government-linked entities rarely communicate publicly about what China considers contentious issues, as China’s interests appear to be taken care of by local proxies.  Though Slovak-language accounts linked to the Chinese state have negligible impact, thanks to similarities between the Slovak and Czech languages, content produced by the Czech-language version of China Radio International (CRI) is most likely consumed also by Slovak audiences.

Government and far-right voices dominate among Slovak actors

When it comes to domestic actors, discourse around EVs focused on two main topics: the EU tariffs on China-made EVs which the Slovak government opposed, and the construction of the battery-manufacturing facility in the Surany township by Gotion which has been causing local controversy. This was also shaped by the composition of the actors involved in the narrative, which was dominated by those affiliated with the current government coalitions in Slovakia, led by Prime Minister Robert Fico of the SMER-SD party.

The magnitude of Fico’s online presence is evident: his posts on his Facebook, Instagram, and Telegram accounts gathered almost 30,000 interactions, around 23% of aggregate interactions of the examined content. His impact was further reinforced by content posted from accounts owned by his SMER-SD party, as well as the Government Office of Slovakia, his official workspace.

Other influential actors included Miriam “Mimi” Šramová, a vlogger known from the local “alternative” scene, and youth and technology-focused online media outlets, namely Startitup and FonTech. In the case of FonTech, its high aggregate reach is a function of the large number of produced posts; with 33 posts, FonTech was the most active actor. Among the far-right politicians, a significant impact was made by Andrea Hudecová and Miro Heredoš, both of whom are linked to the non-parliamentary People’s Party Our Slovakia (ĽSNS). The list of the top ten most popular actors also includes several “alternative” outlets, such as the YouTube channels Informácie pravdy (Information Truths) and Politická scéna (Political scene), and Zem&Vek (Earth&Age). 

Voices representing the parliamentary opposition were barely represented in the social media discourse on China and the tariffs. Among the few active opposition members were Miriam Lexmann, an MEP of KDH (Christian Democrats), Ľubica Karvašová, an MEP of Progressive Slovakia, and Peter Bátor, Slovakia’s former ambassador to NATO and currently the foreign and security policy advisor to Progressive Slovakia. Nevertheless, their cumulative impact was significantly lower compared to Fico’s social media communication.

A similar observation can be made about the mainstream media. Besides the two online media outlets that made it into the top ten (which tend to focus the discussion on technical aspects of Chinese EVs), other mainstream media platforms had only little impact on the social media discourse.

Robert Fico takes China’s side on EV tariffs

In October, Slovakia was one of the five EU members that opposed the adoption of countervailing tariffs on imports of China-made EVs. Ever since their adoption, Prime Minister Fico has emerged as the most vocal opponent of the decision among Slovak politicians. 

Immediately after the adoption of the tariffs, Fico took to social media to decry them as part of a “nonsensical trade war pursued by the European Commission” with “devastating effects for the European economy.” According to Fico, potential retaliation by China against luxury combustion engine vehicles would damage the Slovak economy, as this is a dominant part of Slovak exports to China, especially Volkswagen’s production based in the country.

Since then, Fico has periodically returned to this topic, using it to promote relations with China as part of his cabinet’s “all-azimuth foreign policy,” as well as to push back against the EU Commission. Furthermore, on several occasions, Fico’s Facebook posts, both from his personal page as well as from the Government Office page, were sponsored, ensuring their wider reach: the three sponsored posts were viewed more than 210,000 times.

Fico’s posts on social media regarding Chinese EVs and EU tariffs peaked during his trip to China in the beginning of November. During his visit, which drew criticism from opposition parties, Fico posted several videos to social media in which he lauded the inward investment from the Chinese firm Gotion (discussed below) and the apparent overall beneficiary nature of pursuing economic relations with China. 

He also pushed back against criticism of his approach to China. According to Fico, such criticism, including over the EV sector, is a demonstration of “sinophobia.” However, he would not be deterred: “Greetings to barking doggies in Slovakia. I am telling them that the governmental caravan in China continues to go on.” As the Czechia case study revealed, Fico’s trip to China also provided an opportunity for spreading pro-China content within the Czech-language social media ecosystem.

Šurany battery plant controversies

The planned battery plant project near Šurany by Gotion, a Chinese firm, and its Slovak partner InoBat sparked intense debate in 2024. Negotiations began under the previous Heger government but gained crucial support after the 2023 general elections. In November 2023, after being elected prime minister for the fourth time, Fico signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Gotion, signaling strong governmental backing for the scheme. With an estimated cost of €1.2 billion and the promise of creating at least 1,300 jobs, the project is set to become the largest foreign investment of Fico’s fourth government. Before the monitored period,  the earliest issue-related posts on social media came from Denisa Saková, the economy minister, and Ladislav Kamenický, the finance minister. The reach, however, was relatively weak, especially Saková´s posts. 

Among the opposition parties, the KDH and its MEP, Miriam Lexmann, countered the positive posts of the ruling coalition with arguments about the threat of China’s growing influence and the dangers Chinese EV firms pose to European car manufacturers. To a lesser extent, their arguments were about the inadequacy of financial support for the investment and the possible negative impacts on the environment.

In early August, the Slovak people began to express concerns about the environmental damage of the Gotion investment. Primarily through posts on Telegram, they criticized Saková, the economy minister, for the announced amount of the subsidy. Posts were also pointing out the high level of employment in the region where the investment is directed. Some posts alleged that the investors intend to use cheap labor from abroad, especially from African countries or from Ukraine, and argued that the factory in Šurany weakened Slovakia’s food self-sufficiency by constructing on fertile land. Later, this negative narrative included allegations that land might be expropriated for the planned factory.

In response to public concerns, the investors arranged to meet with the people of the affected municipalities. This resulted in further social media discourse, with the YouTube channel Informacie Pravdy calling the meeting a “rebellion against the battery factory” as “Slovaks attacked and expelled Chinese investors.”

Miroslav Suja, a member of the extra-parliamentary far-right Republika party, was particularly outspoken. He spoke at the aforementioned meeting between the investors and locals, a video recording of which was distributed by the Suja himself as well as by disinformation media. In his speech, Suja reproduced narratives already present on social networks—the questionable location of the investment and the environmental threat to water and land: “I understand,” he said, “the investment, that it will bring money, but why here, where unemployment is at most 3%, where we will pollute the water, where we will pollute the best quality land and where people do not want it?!” 

The videos of the meeting shared on Facebook by Suja himself had between 1,700 and 3,600 interactions. Post about the meeting on the Telegram channel InfoVojna reached more than 15,000 views and almost 800 interactions. Suja and other Republika-affiliated actors were notably critical not just of Fico and his SMER-SD party but also of the far-right members of the ruling coalition, such as Minister of Environment Tomáš Taraba and Chair of Environmental Committee Rudolf Huliak. This indicates a split within the Slovak far-right scene. It is also a significant development since, for years, China has tried to co-opt leading far-right voices, including Milan Uhrík, Republika’s chairman and an MEP. 

Another vocal opponent of the Gotion factory and state aid provided to it by the government was Andrea Hudecová, of the far-right ĽSNS. Her chief objection was why the money wasn’t instead being spent on Slovak citizens: “They don’t have money for Slovaks, but they have enough for a Chinese company!!!,” she wrote on social media. Though ĽSNS is performing worse than Republika in the polls, Hudecova was among the most impactful voices on the social media talking about China and EVs during the examined period. 

In response to criticisms raised by the far-right, several members of the ruling coalition, including the chairman of the Slovak National Party (SNS), Andrej Dank, took a critical stance on the investment. Subsequently, the topic was fueled by other actors from the far-right spectrum and the opposition KDH, led by Miriam Lexmann and Jozef Hajko. The most successful of these posts had between 15,000 and 20,000 views and hundreds of interactions.

The topic reached its peak during Fico’s visit to China. His most popular video (and most popular post overall in the analyzed corpus) from the business trip reached more than 310,000 views and over 19,000 interactions on Facebook. The topic of the battery factory was only one of the topics in this successful video, but several posts were dedicated to Fico’s visit to Gotion and support for the construction of the factory.

By the end of the research period, the most prominent topic was the delegation of residents and representatives of the affected municipalities that visited China, where they visited the Gotion headquarters and its battery factory. The junket trip organized by Gotion sought to convince local representatives of the factory’s environmental safety. After the visit, the negative sentiment about the investment eased up on social media. The delegation included a council member from Šurany who was originally opposed to the construction of the plant but reportedly changed his stance after returning from China. (However, it should be noted that the source of the interview is Hlavné správy, which is considered a disinformation outlet by the watchdog Konspiratori.sk. The interview itself should be treated as a primary source only and not as verified information). In addition to Fico, an interesting role was also played by Šramová, a figure in the Slovak alternative media scene and an assistant to a coalition lawmaker, who conducted non-critical interviews with politicians such as Minister of Environment Tomáš Taraba that touched upon the topic. She also provided a platform to the director of the Gotion InoBat JV, Pavol Krokoš, in order to defend the planned investment. Related videos on her YouTube and Telegram channels have reached over 260,000 views and over 13,000 interactions.

Caveats: The presented research aims to provide a representative sample of wider social media discourse across the studied platforms. However, some caveats need to be noted. At the time of analysis, the Juno platform temporarily lost access to Facebook groups, which thus could not be analyzed. Certain accounts could not be monitored due to platform and privacy limitations, such as the Facebook accounts of politicians created as private accounts. The post history of some accounts was not always available.

This publication is the inaugural report of the project “Investigating China-related narratives in the Central European information space” that CEIAS is implementing in cooperation with Matej Bel University, supported by the European Media and Information Fund (EMIF) managed by the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation.

The sole responsibility for any content supported by the European Media and Information Fund lies with the authors and it may not necessarily reflect the positions of the EMIF and the Fund Partners, the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, and the European University Institute.