“Sana-mania” leads to a supermajority: What’s next for Japan?

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s personality has brought the ruling LDP an unprecedented supermajority. Yet even with more than two-thirds of the seats in the Lower House, the LDP may face unexpected pressures during its upcoming rule.

Key takeaways:

Just over four months after Japan appointed a new prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, the country faced yet another election. Takaichi attracted global attention as the first female prime minister in a country where women’s political representation remains remarkably low. In her first term, only two women, in addition to her, served in her cabinet. In October 2025, she won the leadership of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) following the resignation of former Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba. Rather than being elected directly by the Japanese public, she assumed office through her party’s internal leadership vote. In January 2026, encouraged by a 70% public approval rating, Takaichi dissolved parliament, calling for a snap election, in hopes of improving her party’s chances of winning.

Takaichi’s rise marked a significant shift within the LDP. In the 2024 LDP leadership race, Ishiba, a more moderate candidate, was selected over Takaichi. This choice reflected the party’s desire to distance itself from the Shinzo Abe faction, which was riddled with fundraising scandals. By contrast, Takaichi’s positions were perceived as polarizing because of her conservative stances on historical issues and a hawkish foreign policy. Nonetheless, a year later, these very positions have become a rallying point. As the LDP was losing conservative votes to the rising far-right Sanseito, the LDP needed someone like Takaichi to push the party further to the right.

 The timing of the snap election itself is unusual. Elections held in winter are rare in Japan because several regions of the country typically experience severe winter weather. Just days before the election, Japan had indeed record-breaking snowfall, causing the death of 30 people and prompting the deployment of the JSDF. Nonetheless, voter turnout was 56%, 2.41 percentage points higher than in the 2024 general election.

Charismatic leadership between ‘stanning’ politics and scandal

 Takaichi is especially popular among younger people thanks to her charisma and her rare ability to look tough while remaining playful. Her meetings and visits with foreign leaders have demonstrated to many Japanese that politics and diplomacy need not be dull. She has casually mentioned her love of Korean cosmetics, seaweed, and Korean dramas at a press conference, played the drums with the South Korean president to the tune of the popular K-pop-themed American animated movie K-Pop Demon Hunters, and even surprised Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni with a birthday cake while singing “Happy Birthday.” Her appointment also breaks a long streak of politics dominated by boring, bland old men. At the same time, her firm support for Taiwan–reinforced by her refusal to retract her comments despite China’s backlash–appears to have helped her boost her image domestically. As a result, her approval rating remained steady around 70% across most opinion polls.

This cultivated a near-cult following. Supporters often refer to Takaichi by her nickname, “Sana,” and her rise has coincided with the emergence of “oshikatsu” (roughly, “fandom” or “stanning”) politics centered on her. Young people engage in “sanakatsu,” buying her bag, her signature pink pen, and even her favorite snacks. Takaichi is also relatively social media savvy, with 2.6 million followers on X/Twitter. An LDP campaign video featuring her energetically reciting political slogans reportedly received 121 million views in just ten days, boosted by a Google Ads push, dwarfing the view counts of other parties’ videos. In January 2026, a poll showed that her administration had 70% approval, but her party only 28.5%. This further supports the hypothesis that her charisma captured the attention of the Japanese public. US President Donald Trump has also publicly endorsed her before the election and congratulated her on the victory.

Takaichi is clearly riding this wave of popularity. As the LDP grapples with fundraising scandals and its ties to the Unification Church, she has used her personal appeal to deflect attention from these controversies. In November 2025, she issued an apology, declaring the matter closed, while repeatedly denying any awareness of the party’s links to the church. That denial has been supported by recent TBS television coverage of a document (“TM Special Report”) in which senior Unification Church officials reported directly to their President on political developments in Japan, dismissed by Takaichi as a “false document of unknown origins.” Still, the controversy has done little to slow her rise: she won the election, and even the LDP’s break with its long-time partner Komeito failed to stop her ascent.

Other parties’ strategies in the shadow of Takaichi

Other parties attempted to carve out space with distinct electoral pledges, though none managed to match the momentum of Takaichi’s LDP. The LDP’s former junior coalition partner, Komeito, joined forces with the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan to form a new opposition bloc, the Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA). Positioning itself as policy-driven, the alliance called for restarting nuclear power plants, supporting national security legislation that partially permits the exercise of collective self-defense, and proposing a “refundable tax credit” to support low- and middle-income earners. It also advocated stricter regulations on corporate donations, a separate surname system for married couples, and reaffirmed Japan’s “three non-nuclear principles.”

On the other hand, the controversial Sanseito, in the spotlight for its nationalist rhetoric and rapid rise in popularity, struggled to secure votes because of the overlap between its conservative base and Takaichi’s supporters. Party leader Kamiya Sōhei sought to portray the LDP as influenced by its “left-leaning” faction as a rationale for voting for Sanseito instead. For the election, they unveiled their slogan “I am Japan” (or “each of us is Japan” in Japanese), underscoring its emphasis on building a Japan for the Japanese. While Sanseito and Takaichi both advocate tighter immigration controls and expansionary fiscal policies, the party sought to distinguish itself by adopting stronger policy stances. Sanseito opposed measures such as boosting rice production, expanding renewable energy, and providing free school lunches, and proposed the establishment of an “agency for comprehensive policies on foreigners.”

A landslide victory for the LDP and a rightward shift

The election’s outcome is clear: under Takaichi, the LDP secured 316 seats, a two-thirds majority in the House of Representatives. This grants the LDP control of the Lower House, allowing it to pass legislation with ease and override veto attempts. This is the first time since World War II that a single party has obtained such a supermajority. The LDP’s coalition partner, the Japan Innovation Party (JIP), secured 36 seats, gaining two compared to the previous election. Sanseito increased its representation from 2 to 15, while the newly established Team Mirai, supporting the adoption of digital technologies in politics, won 11 seats.

On the other hand, the main opposition coalition, despite becoming the second-largest force in the Lower House, struggled to compete with the LDP’s power. The CRA suffered heavy losses in seats, from 148 for the CDPJ and 24 for Komeito in the previous election to a mere 49 seats altogether. This massive defeat led to the resignation of the two leaders, Yoshihiko Noda and Tetsuo Saito. Overall, the election resulted not only in a landslide victory for the LDP but also in a clear rightward shift within Japanese politics, as right-wing parties such as JIP and Sanseito—and the conservative wing of the LDP itself—cemented their influence.

Nonetheless, there are some internal disagreements within the LDP. Former Prime Minister Ishiba implied veiled sarcasm in a video posted on X/Twitter, saying, “This election is nothing but social media and slogans. I’d like everyone to think a bit more seriously about the election. Don’t make fun of voters.” In the past, Ishiba has not shied away from criticizing Takaichi’s more hawkish positions, such as her remarks on Taiwan or the proposal to abandon Japan’s three non-nuclear principles. This highlights internal tensions due to Takaichi’s overt nationalism. The next step for Takaichi is to overhaul fiscal policy, including delivering the promised 8% reduction in the food sales tax.

Takaichi has also signaled a desire to reform the country’s pacifist constitution, a goal that her mentor, the former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, also sought. There seems to be some support for this move even amongst the opposition camp. However, its precise form will be the subject of broader discussion. For some, simple recognition of the country’s Self-Defense Forces in the constitution may suffice, while others may want to go further. With the moderates within the LDP seemingly the last remaining opposition, it will be interesting to see how far Takaichi’s attempts to revise the constitution will go. However, the actual passage of any constitutional change is likely still some time off, as the LDP would need not only a two-thirds majority in the Lower House but also a similar majority in the Upper House, where the opposition still holds almost half the seats. Even then, any changes would require a national referendum before implementation.

Implications for Japan’s foreign policy

Such a significant LDP victory has likely affirmed Takaichi’s approach to China. Beijing’s economic pressure campaign has not changed the outcome; it has instead affirmed her stance as a tough external politician and backfired. Given the scale of support the LDP achieved, it is unlikely that the generally hawkish wing of the LDP will seek any reconciliation with Beijing beyond what was attempted at the outset of the diplomatic spat. China has already highlighted that it perceives Takaichi as the main troublemaker, issuing calls for her to retract comments regarding the security situation over Taiwan. Following the elections, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson again raised the issue in the context of World War Two, called upon Takaichi to retract her previous remarks, and stated that the country’s stance won’t change with a single election. Although China has taken no new measures to escalate the situation or hinted at doing so, tensions are likely to persist.

One reason that, in the past, sparked regional controversy and fueled tensions between Japan and China, as well as between Japan and South Korea, was the visits by high-ranking politicians to the Yasukuni Shrine. The shrine serves as a symbol, and in some ways a monument, to Japan’s past militarism, enshrining several “Class-A” World War Two war criminals, along with commemorating those who died in service in Japan’s wars. Takaichi, herself a frequent visitor before being elected prime minister, has noted that she will seek to first ‘secure understanding from allies and neighboring countries’. In 2013, a visit by then-Prime Minister Abe sparked anger in the United States and neighboring countries, including South Korea and China.

Within a broader region, the South Korean Prime Minister has already congratulated her on the victory, hoping to ‘broaden and deepen relations based on trust and friendship’ between Japan and South Korea. A potential point of contention between the two countries may, however, arise in a few days, when, on February 22, Japan observes “Takeshima day” to assert its sovereignty over the disputed islands, known as “Dokdo” in South Korea, which currently controls them.

Arguably more important than its regional neighbors will be Japan’s relationship with its closest ally, the United States. Takaichi’s victory will certainly be a path towards strengthening Japan-US relations, with Trump endorsing Takaichi before the election. Trump-Takaichi relations may yet echo the previous “bromance” of Trump and Abe, who leveraged the personal relationship to strengthen the Japan-US relations. It is, however, unclear what this will mean amid Trump’s tariff bonanza and efforts to attract foreign investment to the United States. In 2025, Japan agreed to invest $550bn in the United States by 2029 in exchange for a reduction in tariffs from 25% to 15%. According to recent reports, the Trump administration is not satisfied with the pace of these investment pledges. This could prove painful for Tokyo, as recent reports from South Korea indicate that, if Trump believes others are “not living up” to the expectations set by bilateral trade agreements, he has no objection to reversing tariff reductions.

With respect to Europe, the clearest policy line Takaichi may pursue runs through Russia and Ukraine. Before being elected prime minister, Takaichi was banned by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs from entering Russia indefinitely in response to sanctions imposed by the Japanese government in light of Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. In the past, she has shown support for Kyiv by attending the Virtual Leaders Meeting of the Coalition of the Willing on Ukraine and by pledging continued support during a call with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in November 2025.

For the EU itself, its policy is not yet clear; however, before the elections, it reaffirmed its view that the EU and Japan are “important strategic partners in maintaining and strengthening a free and open international order.” With respect to security cooperation, she will likely advance the Japan-EU Security and Defense Partnership and deepen selective defense cooperation with France and Germany. On the economic-security front, Takaichi is set to reinforce the Japan–EU Competitiveness Alliance, expanding cooperation on supply-chain resilience, critical minerals, and digital infrastructure, which have become increasingly important amid China’s economic pressure campaign.

Takaichi has a strong mandate, arguably stronger than the LDP has ever had, but this does not mean there will be no obstacles she will face. Amid the supposed breakdown of the liberal world order, with a China seeking to establish itself in East Asia and the United States rethinking its engagement in global affairs, Takaichi’s government will have to do more than arguably any other democratically elected government in Japan has before. Ishiba noted that the election victory does not immediately give her a “blank check,” and she may yet face not only external but also internal pressure from more moderate forces.