Situation report: Contested narratives about China on V4 social media

Introduction

This situation report maps social media discourse about China within the V4 states. It is the second situational of the “Investigating China-related narratives in the Central European information space” project that CEIAS is implementing in cooperation with Matej Bel University, supported by the European Media and Information Fund (EMIF), and managed by the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation.

Using Gerulata Juno, a unique online dashboard that maps social media platforms, this report dissects the discourse between December 1, 2024 and January 15, 2025. It primarily focuses on a sample of 100 most-interacted-with posts, excluding irrelevant data such as incidental references to China. It is divided by country and, within each, by discussions among three groups: China-affiliated media and official accounts publishing in the local language of the respective V4 country; local political discourse; and a broader online debate, with a special focus on “alternative media” and anti-system voices.

Czechia: Calls for pragmatic engagement with China

This report analyzed social media discourse based on a sample of 5,719 Czech-language posts, predominantly on Facebook and Telegram, as well as on X (formerly Twitter) and other social media platforms. The debate largely reflects the global discussion, including TikTok’s ban in the United States, the alleged electoral interference in Romania by actors on TikTok, and China’s sabotage of an undersea cable. There were also discussions about the competitiveness of the European Union (EU) vis-à-vis China and the US-China rivalry. Chinese electric vehicles (EVs) were another hot topic in the Czech domestic political debate.

Chinese embassy promotes a conference co-organized with a Czech communist party-affiliated media.

Beyond its usual content promoting a positive image of China—covering culture, travel tips, and technological advancements— the official X account of the Chinese Embassy in Prague recently shared a post about a conference it co-organized with Naše pravda, a Czech media outlet affiliated with the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM). The event focused on Czech-China relations and the reforms that have driven China’s development and modernization. Attendees included the chairman and vice-chairman of the Czech communist party, former Czech Prime Minister Jiří Paroubek, and former Czech President Miloš Zeman. Also present were Pavel Hrubec, a member of the international academic committee of the China-CEE Institute, and Jan Campbell, a commentator known for his frequent contributions to Parlamentní Listy, a Czech fringe media platform. Campbell’s blog explores topics such as China’s Confucianist constitutional system and the legitimacy of political power.

The Czech-language Facebook page of China Radio International (CRI) published over 300 posts during the analyzed period. As expected, its most popular content featured images of China’s landscapes, Chinese cultural events and posts reshared from CGTN’s Czech-language page. The page also amplified videos produced by the Czech-speaking Chinese influencers Pepa Zhang and Lada Wang, including their New Year’s greetings. Marking the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and Czechia, CRI shared a video from an exhibition that showcased Czech-China ties between 1945 and 1959 and included insights from senior Czech sinologists.

A significant number of CRI’s high-impact posts—some reaching up to 225.3K views—centered on Ukraine’s decision to halt Russian gas transit to Slovakia. One post covered Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico’s visit to Moscow in December 2022, framing it as a “response to Ukrainian President Zelensky’s opposition to plans for transporting Russian natural gas through Ukraine.” The post also highlighted that Putin was willing to continue gas supplies to Western Europe. Another post also quoted Fico and argued that “blocking the transport of natural gas through Ukraine harms Slovakia’s national interests and could negatively impact the entire European Union.”

Other posts included statements from China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense as well as content from Russia‘s state-owned news agency, TASS. The page also frequently shared posts that deliberately conflated the “One China principle” with the “One China policy”—a recurring tactic in China’s external communications. Additionally, it featured an interview that Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić gave to CGTN regarding the Belt and Road Initiative and China’s three global initiatives—the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, and the Global Civilization Initiative. However, the interview was conducted in Serbian without subtitles, suggesting limited localization of Chinese media outreach. The account also reshared a CGTN article that argued the EU was misusing the notion of “Chinese overcapacity” as a pretext for protectionist measures and trade disputes.

China at the center of Czech political infighting

During the examined period, China was referenced in various domestic political discussions. In one heated media exchange, former President Miloš Zeman—known for his long-standing pro-China stance—accused Prime Minister Petr Fiala of ruining the country and called President Petr Pavel a puppet. Fiala fired back, condemning Zeman for “bowing to China and blind faith in Chinese investments that no one has ever seen.” His remarks gained significant traction on social media. Ondřej Kolář, a Member of the European Parliament (MEP) from TOP 09, a party in the governing coalition, also weighed in, referring to Zeman as a “Chinese emissary.” 

The debate over EVs and China—which we analyzed in our previous report—remained dominated by Filip Turek, an MEP and a staunch advocate of combustion-engine cars. Turek argued that the EU’s Green Deal disproportionately benefits China by reinforcing its dominance in the EV and solar panel industries. He also contends that Czech and German energy policies serve the interests of China and Russia. Similarly, Jindřich Rajchl—who rose to prominence leading protests against COVID-19 measures—also criticized the EU’s green policies, stating, “We are reducing emissions while China is laughing in our faces.” Rajchl also highlighted China’s highway projects and an EV factory in Hungary, contrasting them with the Czech government’s approach, which he claimed had alienated major global powers, leading to a lack of similar investments in Czechia.

Tomio Okamura, leader of the far-right Freedom and Democracy Party (SPD), pointed to the expansion of BRICS as a sign that the bloc is increasingly positioned to challenge the West. He reiterated the SPD’s advocacy for diversified diplomacy and trade, including deeper engagement with BRICS nations, to reduce dependence on what he described as weakening EU and Western alliances.

Notably, some Czech politicians downplayed potential security threats related to China and ignored human rights abuses. Jan Zahradil—a former MEP from the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), a governing party, and a well-known pro-China voice— dismissed concerns over China’s repressive policies in Xinjiang, portraying them as legitimate responses to separatism and the risk of an Islamist state. His comments ignored well-documented evidence of widespread human rights violations.

Meanwhile, members of the Euroskeptic and national-conservative Trikolóra movement circulated a Facebook commentary by military and security expert Jaroslav Štefek. In it, Štefek accused NATO Military Committee Chair Rob Bauer of scaremongering with “Russian and Chinese threats.” He was likely responding to Bauer’s recent speech, where he stated that deterrence and support for Ukraine would require sacrifices and risk-taking. Štefek countered that NATO and EU leadership were pushing Europe toward war and that the Czech government was neglecting its people’s well-being.

Other relevant content

Among the 100 most popular posts mentioning China was a video from a debate featuring prominent figures in Czechia’s alternative media space. They criticized Czech foreign policy, arguing that the country has alienated major powers—including Russia, the United States, and China—through what they described as a naïve approach. In contrast, they praised the diplomatic strategies of Fico and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, claiming their more open and pragmatic engagement with global powers has secured them greater influence. 

The Facebook page dnesnaukrajine.cz frequently covered China-related news, with a particular focus on Sino-Russian cooperation and China’s competition with the US. The page highlighted reports of Chinese and Russian ships damaging critical infrastructure in international waters and Chinese antennas being used in drones that attacked Kyiv. Alongside these updates, it also asserted that Russia and China aim to reshape the global order—prioritizing economic interests over human rights and international agreements in pursuit of modern empire-building.

Hungary: Polarized media space with a focus on Chinese investments

This analysis is based on a qualitative investigation and tagging of the 100 most interacted-with posts related to China in the Hungarian-language social media space between December 15, 2024, and January 31, 2025. The dataset includes a nearly equal distribution of Hungary-specific posts (47) and non-Hungary-specific ones (53). The most common topic identified was “Chinese investments in Hungary” (27 posts), followed by “HMPV [epidemic in China]” (11 posts), “China-Hungary bilateral relations” (10 posts), “China-US rivalry” (8 posts), and “China’s foreign policy” (7 posts). Sentiment analysis by Gerulata revealed that negative sentiment prevailed, accounting for 37 of the 100 analyzed posts, surpassing positive sentiment (22 posts) but still trailing neutral content (41 posts). The qualitative analysis further indicates a polarized discourse, shaped mainly by pro- and anti-government sympathies.

Chinese political actors and state media remain at the margins

As noted in the previous situational report, Chinese government actors and state media accounts do not play a prominent role in the analyzed discourse. Among the top 100 most interacted-with posts, only two from the Chinese Cultural Center in Budapest—a state-owned institution—appear in the lower segment, promoting tourist attractions in China, garnering 463 and 242 interactions, respectively. Neither the Chinese embassy in Budapest nor CGTN Magyarul (CGTN Hungarian) had any posts in the analyzed sample. The most interacted-with post from these sources was a Facebook post by CGTN Magyarul, which accumulated 152 interactions as of February 11, 2025. Overall, the number of interactions among the top 100 posts ranged from approximately 12,750 to 229. 

Notably, the post with the second-highest number of interactions (approximately 10,510) originated from the Facebook channel of the US Embassy in Budapest. The post featured a video criticizing Chinese investments in Hungary, particularly warning about potential indebtedness to China, using the Budapest-Belgrade railway project as an example. The post attracted many negative comments from pro-government users—an unsurprising reaction given its publication during the tenure of former US Ambassador David Pressman, who the Biden administration appointed.

Domestic political actors

Among domestic political actors, the most prominent content creator in the analyzed discourse is Ákos Hadházy, an independent opposition member of parliament (MP) known for his investigative reports on corruption in Hungary. Hadházy authored six of the top 100 posts, five of which rank among the ten most interacted with. These five posts all focus on the recently announced deal to (re-)establish Hungary Airlines with Chinese involvement—an agreement criticized for its opaque negotiations and alleged ties to István Tiborcz, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s son-in-law and one of the country’s wealthiest individuals. 

Other political figures contributing to the discourse include Foreign Minister Péter Szíjjártó, members of the opposition Tisza Párty, currently the most influential opposition party, and representatives from the far-right Mi Hazánk (Our Homeland) party. Each of these actors generated one or two posts in the analyzed sample.

While government figures presented China-Hungary relations in a positive light, opposition voices primarily focused on issues of corruption, indebtedness, and environmental concerns. Meanwhile, far-right figures expressed additional criticisms, particularly regarding the government’s policy of bringing in large numbers of Asian guest workers to staff factories built by Chinese investors. They also strongly opposed Hungary’s recent shift to mandatory digitized public administration, framing it as a move toward a “Chinese-style surveillance state.” 

Media outlets and fringe actors

A significant portion of the analyzed content was created by popular news outlets, including both pro-government channels (Ultrahang, Hit Rádió, Patrióta) and government-critical platforms (Telex, 444.hu, 24.hu). One of the most prominent posts, garnering 3,117 interactions, came from the YouTube channel of the pro-government news outlet Patrióta. It featured energy expert Dr. Máté Tóth praising China’s development model, echoing many of the same narratives promoted by official Chinese government sources—particularly in legitimizing Chinese President Xi Jinping’s rule as rooted in supposed Chinese national characteristics.

Government-critical outlets, on the other hand, focused on a range of topics that cast a critical light on Hungary-China relations. A notable post by 444.hu, with 1,109 interactions, reported on the recent publication of a Chinese-language edition of a book by Balázs Orbán, political director to Prime Minister Orbán (no relation). In September 2024, Balázs Orbán sparked controversy in Hungary by questioning the legitimacy of Hungary’s resistance to the Soviet Union during the 1956 uprising. Most of the comments on the book’s publication ridiculed him for his perceived pro-Russian and pro-Chinese stance.

Fringe actors and alternative media also played a role in the discourse, including far-left, far-right, and pro-Kremlin sources. The pro-Kremlin Telegram channel Orosz Hírek (Russian News) appeared three times among the top 100 most interacted-with posts. Orosz Hírek has been identified in a recent report by Hungary’s controversial Sovereignty Protection Office as a promoter of “Russian legitimacy narratives” regarding the Ukraine War. The primary objective of the recently established Sovereignty Protection Office is to target independent, government-critical journalists with accusations of being part of foreign, primarily Western, influence operations. Two of Orosz Hírek’s three posts reported on positive developments in China-Russia relations.

Other fringe political figures in the discourse include Gyula Thürmer, leader of the Workers’ Party of Hungary, a Marxist-Leninist party with no parliamentary representation. Thürmer, whose views have increasingly aligned with the ruling Fidesz party, shared a video from his trip to China, during which he was interviewed by CGTN. In the interview, he expressed admiration for China’s development model. In an earlier CGTN roundtable discussion recorded in October 2024, Thürmer similarly praised China, adding that Orbán shared his admiration—though he notably referred to Orbán as “bourgeois,” leading to an awkward silence among the panelists.

Poland: Examining China’s role in the region as Warsaw gears up for elections

This report analyzes the most popular discussions about China based on a sample of 100 Polish-language posts. The conversation primarily took place on YouTube and X, the dominant social media platforms for political discourse in Poland. The most frequently discussed topic was “Chinese domestic events” (22 posts), followed by “China-Russia-Ukraine relations” (21 posts), “economic issues” (18 posts), and “smear campaigns” (18 posts).

Chinese political actors and state media

Chinese government actors and state media accounts played a minor role in the analyzed discourse. No posts from the Chinese embassy in Warsaw appeared among the 100 most interacted-with posts, and only three posts from CRI made the list—all focused on praising China’s domestic development. These posts highlighted:

1.   A solar power project reaching full grid generation capacity;
2. The completion of a green belt in Xinjiang’s Taklamakan Desert to stop desertification, alongside ongoing solar power projects;
3. An engineering achievement in Yunnan Province, where a massive bridge was successfully rotated into place.

Reactions to these posts were mixed. Under the Taklamakan Desert post, many commenters used the opportunity to criticize Europe. Some of the most-liked comments included: “Soon the Chinese will be coming to Europe like it’s some kind of open-air museum 🤦‍♂️. Biggest loser of 2024? Europe” (which garnered 806 likes) and “Meanwhile, Europe has a Type-C charger, a paper straw, and a bottle cap that stays attached” (544 likes). 

However, critical comments about China also appeared, though they received fewer likes. These included: “Too bad these impressive achievements come with the oppression of ethnic minorities in the region – Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and others. A police state that even Orwell couldn’t have imagined” (35 likes) and “If you think China is so great, you’re free to move there. You hype China up while bashing everything about Poland and the EU. Do you seriously want their system???” (24 likes).

This division reflects broader Polish attitudes toward China. One group, often Euroskeptic, praises China’s economic and industrial progress, while the other remains critical, pointing to the Chinese government’s human rights record and political system.

Domestic political actors

As Poland prepares for its presidential elections in May, discussions about China have been drawn into broader campaign debates. The most popular post in the dataset came from Sławomir Mentzen, an MP from the far-right Confederation (Konfederacja) party and a presidential candidate. His TikTok video amassed 38.28k interactions and 492.9k views, in which he accused Warsaw Mayor and Koalicja Obywatelska (KO) candidate Rafał Trzaskowski of economic unpatriotism. Mentzen cited the City of Warsaw’s purchase of 18 Chinese Yutong electric buses as evidence, often pairing it with allegations that the city’s transport company relied on Russian gas. Right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) politicians, including MEP Waldemar Buda and MPs Patryk Jaki and Stanisław Kaleta, amplified these claims on their social media platforms.

While this topic dominated China-related discussions among politicians, a few exceptions emerged. Konfederacja MP Krzysztof Bosak addressed China during a radio interview, discussing China-US competition, Chinese investments, and Poland’s bilateral relations with Beijing. He advocated for a “multi-vector foreign policy” and maintaining good business relations with all countries, including China—a stance rhetorically similar to Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico’s “all-azimuth foreign policy,” which has fostered closer ties between Bratislava and Beijing.

Elsewhere, Mateusz Morawiecki, a former prime minister, used X to criticize the EU Green Deal, arguing that it would deepen Europe’s dependence on China. Meanwhile, Konfederacja member Paweł Usiądek referenced a report condemning the WHO for its weak response to China during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Media outlets

Among mainstream media outlets, content from RadioZet—Poland’s second-most-listened-to radio station—and Wirtualna Polska, a major online news platform, featured prominently among the most interacted-with China-related posts. 

RadioZet‘s coverage included an interview with Konfederacja MP Sławomir Mentzen (10,510 interactions), in which he asserted that the United States would not abandon NATO’s Eastern Flank, as doing so would push its traditional allies toward China. The station also extensively covered the controversy surrounding Chinese-made X-ray machines used at Warsaw Chopin Airport, Poland’s main international gateway. A YouTube video on the topic, which was released on December 6 and attracted 4,965 interactions, framed the presence of Chinese technology in sensitive sectors like airport security as a challenge to “transparency.”

Meanwhile, Wirtualna Polska’s most notable China-related content was an interview with retired Lt. Gen. Waldemar Skrzypczak. Highlights from the conversation featured among the top 100 posts, including discussions on China-Russia relations (3,378 interactions) and China’s potential role in resolving the war in Ukraine (3,322 interactions).

Beyond mainstream media, some of the most engaging posts came from Kremlinka Show, a YouTube channel specializing in current affairs analysis, with a focus on Russia and occasional coverage of China-Russia relations. Produced by journalists and independent scholars, the channel gained traction with a January 11 video titled “Is Xi Jinping already fed up with Putin?” (4,588 interactions), which explored the sustainability of China’s economic and political support for Russia amid the ongoing war in Ukraine. Another notable video, with 2,425 interactions, from December 22 featured a Warsaw-based expert on Chinese economic affairs discussing the geoeconomic implications of the China-Russia partnership.

The analysis of China-related posts with the highest interaction rates—both in mainstream media and independent journalistic initiatives such as the Kremlinka Show—demonstrates that Polish audiences are particularly engaged with China-related content when it is framed within a familiar national or regional context.

Fringe Actors

Content produced by fringe actors did not explicitly discuss developments in China. Instead, China was often used as a rhetorical device to highlight perceived inefficiencies in Poland and the EU, particularly under liberal leadership. This trend is evident in the top-performing posts from the Euroskeptic Koneser Unii Europejskiej X channel, which has been flagged by watchdogs, including the Przeciwdziałamy Dezinformacji Foundation, for disseminating disinformation. One notable post (2,952 interactions) mocked the EU’s new common charger regulations, juxtaposing them with “real wonders of technology” such as China’s Three Gorges Dam. This type of narrative aligns with the sentiments expressed by commenters analyzed in the Chinese Actors section of the report.

Euroskeptic discourse frequently portrays the European Union as an “over-regulator,” stifling progress, while contrasting it with the perceived efficiency of China’s system—credited with producing technological and infrastructural “miracles.”

Slovakia: Virus, influencers and Fico‘s sovereign foreign policy

An analysis of Slovakia’s social media environment reveals that China remains a relatively marginal topic in Slovak online discourse. Among the 100 most interacted-with posts—ranging from 1,050 to 10,497 interactions—between December 15, 2024, and January 31, 2025, the dominant theme was Slovakia’s foreign policy orientation under the government of Prime Minister Robert Fico (33 posts). Other notable topics included the HMPV virus (8 posts) and Slovak influencers sharing content about their trips to China (8 posts). In contrast, global issues such as the Sino-American rivalry (5 posts), the debate over TikTok (6 posts), and Chinese investments in Slovakia (4 posts) received relatively little attention, highlighting the limited focus on China-related topics within Slovak social media discussions.

HMPV Virus and memories of COVID-19

The three most interacted-with posts in the dataset focused on the HMPV virus outbreak in China. Mentions of the disease were concentrated in early January, coinciding with the confirmation of cases in neighboring Hungary. The most engaged-with post came from the news portal Refresher, accumulating 14,900 interactions, followed by posts from StartitUP with 13,980 and 10,500 interactions, respectively.

The topic was also covered by Ereport, a portal described as a disinformation outlet with links to the ruling Smer-SSD party. Its most popular post on the virus garnered just over 6,300 interactions. While the overall sentiment of posts about HMPV was negative, most were primarily informational. However, Ereport drew a controversial parallel between HMPV and a virus that “the whole world faced in the recent past,” contradicting expert assessments. Notably, while Ereport’s social media posts were highly emotional, the report on its website maintained a more neutral, informational tone. Only StartitUP referred to HMPV as the “Chinese virus,” a term widely used for COVID-19.

Domestic political actors

A notable category of posts under review focused on Slovakia’s “all-azimuth foreign policy” under its current government. Foreign Minister Juraj Blanár framed this strategy as a response to the shifting global landscape, emphasizing what he sees as the EU’s declining influence and competitiveness. According to Blanár, this presents an opportunity for Slovakia to attract investments in its economy, science, and research. The government’s approach includes strengthening ties with the Indo-Pacific and Global South while re-engaging with regions allegedly neglected by previous administrations.

However, opposition politicians—particularly former foreign ministers and diplomats—have sharply criticized this foreign policy direction. They argue that it is primarily based on unfounded criticism of the EU, NATO, and Slovakia’s allies and neighbors, while instead prioritizing closer relations with authoritarian or totalitarian states such as Russia, China, and Vietnam.

China was most frequently mentioned in the context of Fico’s visit to the PRC in late October 2024. The discussion around this trip was primarily framed within broader debates about the government’s foreign policy moves and their impact on domestic politics. The most interacted-with post (8,600 interactions) came from Eduard Chmelár, a former advisor to Fico. In a Facebook post, Chmelár responded to criticism from Ivan Korčok, a politician from Progressive Slovakia, who argued that Slovakia had become irrelevant on the international stage due to the current government’s foreign policy. Chmelár countered by asserting that meetings with the Russian and Chinese presidents, a visit to Brazil, and a phone call with then-president-elect Donald Trump were clear signs that Slovakia remained diplomatically active.

Another highly engaged post (7,512 interactions) came from the official SMER-SSD Facebook page, where MEP Katarína Roth-Neveďalová emphasized the importance of Fico’s engagement with major global leaders. Other related posts, particularly those from Foreign Minister Blanár, highlighted Slovakia’s decision to join the Sino-Brazilian peace plan for Ukraine. Marek Šoun, a well-known figure in the Slovak disinformation scene, also voiced support for Slovakia’s deepening engagement with BRICS countries. He echoed the government’s narrative, claiming that Slovakia’s foreign policy had improved its international standing and opened new, albeit unspecified, business opportunities.

A fleeting but notable reference to China appeared in posts by Andrej Danko, leader of the Slovak National Party coalition, during his visit to Moscow. He remarked on the presence of Chinese cars and European retail chains in Russia, using this as evidence to argue that Western sanctions had been ineffective and that refusing to trade with Russia was economically disadvantageous.

Video bloggers traveling and living in China

Among the most popular social media posts during the review period were videos by Slovak YouTuber PPPíter, whose travel series about China attracted significant engagement. His posts garnered 8,750, 8,046, and 5,076 interactions, respectively. In some of his videos from China, PPPíter collaborated with Pavel Dvořák, a Slovak author, blogger, and long-time resident of China. Dvořák, known for his books and insights into Chinese culture, released five videos that received between 1,443 and 3,047 interactions. His content included a recap of 2024, explorations of life in the Chinese countryside, and comparisons between rural China and Slovakia.

Fringe topics

Globally significant topics, such as the Sino-American rivalry and the debate over banning TikTok in the US, remained relatively marginal in Slovakia, with coverage mainly provided by news portals. Similarly, posts related to domestic events—such as trivia about the earthquake in China (1,051 interactions), the Three Gorges Dam (1,628), and the “ladder to heaven” (4,825)—were among the hundred most successful posts on social networks.

Among posts with fewer than 1,500 interactions, two stand out due to their significance in terms of key actors involved: an interview with the Chinese ambassador to Slovakia, Cai Ge and a post by Minister of Agriculture Richard Takáč about negotiations with the Slovak-Chinese Chamber of Commerce. While Minister Takáč’s post was formal and general, the interview with the ambassador—aired on the controversial Západoslovenská Television—took on a more substantive yet uncritical tone. The discussion touched on Prime Minister Robert Fico’s visit to China, Slovak-Chinese cooperation in various areas, the bilateral strategic partnership, student exchanges, and electromobility. The interview lacked critical questioning, with the moderator posing suggestive questions that allowed the ambassador to freely present China’s official narratives. This included emphasizing non-interference in other states’ internal affairs, defending China against accusations of environmental pollution, and arguing against EU tariffs on Chinese-made electric cars.       

Notes:

The presented research aims to provide a representative sample of wider social media discourse across the studied platforms. However, some caveats need to be noted. Certain accounts could not be monitored due to platform and privacy limitations, such as the Facebook accounts of politicians created as private accounts. The post history of some accounts was not always available.

This publication is the inaugural report of the project “Investigating China-related narratives in the Central European information space” that CEIAS is implementing in cooperation with Matej Bel University, supported by the European Media and Information Fund (EMIF) managed by the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation.

The sole responsibility for any content supported by the European Media and Information Fund lies with the authors, and it may not necessarily reflect the positions of the EMIF and the Fund Partners, the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, and the European University Institute.